US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence | 56 comments (56 topical, editorial, 0 hidden)

Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (4.00 / 3)

A possible explanation indeed, although in the facts it was probably in effect mixed up with blunders and simple lack of interest from the US: not enough oil in the Balkans. Kicking Russia out didn't appear then as the priority it is now, Russia was crumbling and nobody was envisioning the Putin resurrection to happen so quickly.

However, there is another component of US opportunism that played a part: after the fighting begun on the ground, the EU wanted to do something about it (some sort of Balkan angst, after all it's basically the backyard), and yet remained mired in a mess of century old alliances, hesitations, failure to commit adequate resources for a real intervention. Basically, they couldn't do anything without the US leadership, and for this very reason the US restrained from any decisive action until the self-inflicted damage to the EU was such that a common military policy became totally unthinkable for many years to come. The damage to the balkans in the meantime was a negligible collateral for Washington. Because at that time, a stronger Europe around a reunited Germany was the most obvious challenger they could think of, not Putin.

Pierre

by Pierre on Fri Dec 14th, 2007 at 11:44:23 AM EST

Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 1)

Basically, they couldn't do anything without the US leadership, and for this very reason the US restrained from any decisive action until the self-inflicted damage to the EU was such that a common military policy became totally unthinkable for many years to come.

This is the most common conspiracy theory in Russia as well. With an occasional extra twist that it would have been impossible to contemplate Euro (and EMU before that) as the world's reserve currency while a war was going on in Europe's backyard, and so not doing everything possible was a smart thing to do for the USA. Recognising Kosovo is another match going into the same fire.

by Sargon on Fri Dec 14th, 2007 at 12:50:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

It doesn't explain the US's reluctance to follow Europe's lead on recognition. Consider that this is what set the region on fire in the first place.

by Upstate NY on Fri Dec 14th, 2007 at 12:59:31 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (4.00 / 2)

It is an interesting question, so I figured checking The Dismantling of Yugoslavia: A Study in Inhumanitarian Intervention (and a Western Liberal-Left Intellectual and Moral Collapse) for a possible answer might be enligthening. I will just run through and cut comments focused on the US and EC (as the EU was namned then) acting in Yugoslavia around 1990 and then see what comes out of it.

Monthly Review

The collapse of the Soviet bloc a decade later deprived Yugoslavia of Western support for the unified state. As the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia purportedly instructed Belgrade upon his arrival in April 1989: "Yugoslavia no longer enjoyed the geopolitical importance that the United States had given it during the Cold War.

Monthly Review

Had Western powers supported the federal state, Yugoslavia might have held together--but they did not. Instead they not only encouraged Slovenia, Croatia, and later Bosnia-Herzegovina to secede, they also insisted that the federal state not use force to prevent it. Diana Johnstone recounts a January 1991 meeting in Belgrade between the U.S. ambassador and Borisav Jovic, a Serb then serving on Yugoslavia's collective State Presidency. "[T]he United States would not accept any use of force to disarm the paramilitaries," Jovic was told. "Only `peaceful' means were acceptable to Washington. The Yugoslav army was prohibited by the United States from using force to preserve the Federation, which meant that it could not prevent the Federation from being dismembered by force"12--a remarkable injunction against a sovereign state. Similar warnings were communicated by the EC as well.

Monthly Review

One way this was accomplished was by the EC's September 1991 appointment of an Arbitration Commission--the Badinter Commission--to assess legal aspects of the contests over Yugoslavia. This body's work provided a "pseudo-legal gloss to the [EC's] opportunistic consent to the destruction of Yugoslavia demanded by Germany," Diana Johnstone writes.14 On each of the major issues contested by the Serbian republic, the commission ruled against Serbia. Yugoslavia was "in the process of dissolution," the commission's notorious Opinion No. 1 stated when published on December 7, 1991. Similarly, Opinion No. 2 held that "the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina...[does not] have the right to self-determination," though it "is entitled to all the rights concerned to minorities and ethnic groups under international law...." And Opinion No. 3 declared that "the [former] internal boundaries between Croatia and Serbia and between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia...[have] become frontiers protected by international law."15 Remarkably, the commission recognized the right of republics to secede from the former Yugoslavia, and thus affixed the right of self-determination to Yugoslavia's former administrative units; but the commission detached the right of self-determination from Yugoslavia's peoples, and thus denied comparable rights to the new minorities now stranded within the breakaway republics.

Monthly Review

Germany in particular encouraged Slovenia and Croatia to secede, which they did on June 25, 1991; formal recognition was granted on December 23, one year to the day after 94.5 percent of Slovenes had voted in a referendum in favor of independence. EC recognition followed on January 15, 1992, as did U.S. recognition in early April, when Washington recognized Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina all at once.

The picture I get is that the formal recognition played only a minor part in the breakup and that in the important part of forbidding the federal government to use state violence against the militias, the EC and US cooperated.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Sat Dec 15th, 2007 at 11:20:06 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

But none of this contradicts what I've been saying. For the US to be against recognition and also against the use of force at the same time is not a contradiction. As for the consequences of the end of the Cold War, that too seems to be a rather obvious consequence, but we know that in 1991-1992 Germany and the US were already in disagreement over recognition.

by Upstate NY on Sat Dec 15th, 2007 at 12:20:29 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 1)

Upstate NY:

For the US to be against recognition and also against the use of force at the same time is not a contradiction.

Telling another country that it may not use force to keep together is essentially telling separatist movements that they may use force without risk of being punished by the government. It is in effect quite a strong endorsement of separatism.

But it then remains a good question why US, Germany, and the rest of the west were split on recognition.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Sat Dec 15th, 2007 at 01:48:01 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

You're assuming there will be a use of force. It's not automatic.

For instance, look at Slovenia. The US didn't want to recognize Slovenia either, and there wasn't much use of force from Slovenia's side.

We'll have to disagree on this. I simply don't see the contradiction between stressing to the Serbs that they should put down their weapons while at the same refusing to recognize the countries that wanted to separate.

by Upstate NY on Sat Dec 15th, 2007 at 08:54:28 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 1)

Based on newly released documents of the CIA, NSC, DIA and the US State Department Intelligence & Research Division, which were declassified between March 1992 and September 1998, it's clear that as early as 1971, CIA experts on Yugoslavia were considering the violent breakup of the country with the secession of Vojvodina, Kosovo, Macedonia and of course Croatia and Slovenia.

Most of those scenarios revolved around US/NATO providing political, military and financial support to Slovenian and Croatian "Western leaning" separatists. Saying that the US was against the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia while at the same time supporting the delivery of arms to Croatia's nationalists and the training of KLA guerillas in Germany just does not make the mark.

As usual, there are clearly differences between public posturing (US declarations that they're against independence, for peace and what not) and the financial, military realities on the ground (who gets the arms & the money).

It's not what we say but what we do that defines who we are.

by vladimir on Sun Dec 16th, 2007 at 04:41:57 AM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

Intelligence & Research Divisions, eh? You mean brainstorming sessions. And this surprises you. Over and over again, I've asked you the question, and you completely avoid it. What did the US gain by refusing to recognize Coratia and Slovenia? Answer that.

"Saying that the US was against the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia while at the same time supporting the delivery of arms to Croatia's nationalists and the training of KLA guerillas in Germany just does not make the mark."

This comment seems like a blatant contradiction. I'm arguing that the US opposed German policy. You write that the US was against recognition even while Germany was training KLA guerillas. As though this is a contradiction. It's not. The US has one policy. The Germans had another. This is central to my original point. How can you miss this?

Not to mention the fact that Germany had helped train the KLA long after the period we are talking about (1991). The KLA hardly existed as such back then. They came into existence after the fall of the Albanian ponzi scheme years later.

"It's not what we say but what we do that defines who we are."

Well, you have to get the story straight first.

by Upstate NY on Sun Dec 16th, 2007 at 11:17:25 AM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

Intelligence & Research Divisions, eh? You mean brainstorming sessions. And this surprises you.

Doesn't surprise me at all. It confirms my thesis that Washington is a major protagonist in the violent breakup of Yugoslavia - and not the "peace maker" it portrays itself as being.

You write that the US was against recognition even while Germany was training KLA guerillas.

No I don't. I say that the public posturing of the US was against recognition in 89-90-91 and I give a number of reasons for this (see my previous posts).

The US has one policy. The Germans had another.

Don't buy that. George H. W. Bush (Senior), president of the US from 1988-1992 proclaimed on numerous occasions during his tenure that Germany was America's strategic partner. You don't make that kind of statement if you've got a serious foreign policy disagreement with your "strategic partner". Conclusion: US and Germany were partners in which the roles were well defined and distributed (it's a classic in business negotiations).

If the world's sole surviving superpower in 1990 wanted peace, why didn't it offer a balanced peace plan to the parties - for example: the right to autodetermination for eacht ethnic group: Albanians in Kosovo, Serbs in Croatia, Serbs in Bosnia, Croats in Bosnia, ... etc?

And I don't buy "bludner" as the answer, given the armies of men & women that work on "brainstorming" scenarios, as you pointed out.

by vladimir on Sun Dec 16th, 2007 at 03:07:20 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

You're making wild leaps in logic about CIA research and planning. These people are paid to project scenarios. That's their job.

I WROTE: "You write that the US was against recognition even while Germany was training KLA guerillas."

YOU WROTE: "No I don't. I say that the public posturing of the US was against recognition in 89-90-91 and I give a number of reasons for this (see my previous posts)."

A. In your earlier sentence you stated that US policy was contradictory because the US refused recognition while Germany was training the KLA. You did write this.

B. I see absolutely no reasons explaining why the US refused recognition when in reality it wanted to recognize Slovenia and Croatia.

"Don't buy that. George H. W. Bush (Senior), president of the US from 1988-1992 proclaimed on numerous occasions during his tenure that Germany was America's strategic partner. You don't make that kind of statement if you've got a serious foreign policy disagreement with your "strategic partner"."

Hmmm, America and Germany are strategic partners therefore they never disagree.

Gotcha.

by Upstate NY on Sun Dec 16th, 2007 at 08:28:12 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

Upstate NY:

Over and over again, I've asked you the question, and you completely avoid it. What did the US gain by refusing to recognize Coratia and Slovenia? Answer that.

Actually, vladimir takes a stab at a reason:

vladimir:

As usual, there are clearly differences between public posturing (US declarations that they're against independence, for peace and what not) and the financial, military realities on the ground (who gets the arms & the money).

In effect, that recognition was withheld for some time for public relations reasons. It looked (to some group, for some reason) better if Germany went first. Plausible? Sure. True? Don't know.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Sun Dec 16th, 2007 at 03:20:53 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

I still don't see an answer.

Public relations, you say?

How is that an answer? Rather vague. The US was concerned about how hurting the Serb's feelings would play out in front of a somnabulistic American public?

As for looking better if Germany went first, that would be easily done by standing aside, but instead the US denounced and blocked Germany's moves in the UN. This was well known at the time.

by Upstate NY on Sun Dec 16th, 2007 at 08:23:33 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

Saying that the US was against the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia while at the same time supporting the delivery of arms to Croatia's nationalists and the training of KLA guerillas in Germany just does not make the mark.

There is clearly some confusion and misunderstanding here. Le me restate:

[ Upstate NY ] saying that the US was against recognition of Slovenia and Croatia while it [the US] was supporting at the same time the delivery of arms to Croatia's nationalists and the training of KLA guerillas in Germany just does not make the mark.

I thought that was clear, but sometimes, when you have to put your ideas on paper quickly, it's just not crystal clear. I hope now it is.

As for looking better if Germany went first, that would be easily done by standing aside, but instead the US denounced and blocked Germany's moves in the UN. This was well known at the time.

Blocked a German move in the UN? Germany has about as much power in the UN as Zanzibar (ok, a bit more). Are you suggesting that Germany's letter to the Secretary General of the UN informing him of German's intent to recognize Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991 was a "move at the UN"? France was against recognition at the time as was most of the EU - so there was no need for the US to "block" anything at the UN.

Let me repeat my reasons why the US was publicly against German haste to recognize:

1. Public posturing, for a number of reasons including keeping relations smooth with the rest of the EU which was against recognition.

2. US-Serb negotiations that were underway and that could have provided the US with a much better deal than the one it struck with Bonn - yes we're talking about spoils.

3. US-German disagreement about spoils.

Let's go back to 1991. The CIA plans for the breakup of Yugoslavia since the 70s.The "right" people are promoted to power - or supported by the US and Germany once they made it to the top. The arms are delivered in the 80s. Everything's ready to roll, when all of a sudden, the Soviet Union collapses. This provides an opportunity to the US to extend its influence over all of ex-Yugoslavia... which it tries to do, putting it at odds with Germany, on the other hand, which wants to consolidate its influence over an independent Slovenia and Croatia. There's disagreement about spheres of influence and who gets what. Political maneuvering ensues.

As a Swedish kind of death summarizes: Plausible? Sure. True? Dunno. Unless you are Kohl or Bush or Tudjman or Milosevic or Baker... or one of their close pals, chances are you won't know for sure which (if any) of these 3 hypotheses is the real reason behind what happened.

To conclude, I don't think that it serves your case to focus exclusively on this single issue of a US-German "public rift" in December 1991 as the key element disproving the thesis that the US's long term goal and interest was in the breakup of Yugoslavia and its forceful integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

by vladimir on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 03:32:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

"[ Upstate NY ] saying that the US was against recognition of Slovenia and Croatia while it [the US] was supporting at the same time the delivery of arms to Croatia's nationalists and the training of KLA guerillas in Germany just does not make the mark."

Again, your understanding of the events does not correspond to the timeline. There was no training of KLA guerillas in 1991. I really can't see how you make the claim that the US was against recognition and for training the KLA at the same time. It is, frankly, preposterous.

Lastly, it wasn't just Germany that the US was against. You paint the picture that France was also against it. Here are articles about the US's disagreement with the EC:

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE1D6113CF935A25752C0A964958260
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE3D6123CF935A25752C0A964958260

I've only asked you a thousand times, but tell me what the US gains by disagreeing with the ENTIRE EC at the time. What literally is to be gained?

by Upstate NY on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 09:09:27 AM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

You are misunderstanding me again (it must be my English!). I'm not saying that the US was AGAINST recognition and FOR training the KLA. I'm saying the US was FOR recognition, and FOR training the KLA albeit not publicly at first. I know that the training of the KLA came later - I mentioned it to support my thesis that the US has been supportive of secessionist movements throughout ex-Yugoslavia.

Europe, on the other hand was AGAINST recognition, except for Germany:

http://www.globalbritain.org/BNN/BN06.htm

The CFSP established by Maastricht immediately proved itself inadequate in dealing with the crisis in Yugoslavia. EU diplomacy worked on the assumption that problems could be solved by tinkering with the structure of the Yugoslav federation, rather than seeing the federation itself as the source of the problem. The EU's refusal to recognize the secession from the federation of Croatia (despite the fact that this was the will of 92 per cent of the vote in Croatia's referendum) led Germany to threaten to recognize Croatia unilaterally. Unwilling to break ranks from a determined Germany which was prepared to smash the very CFSP it had advocated so strongly if it did not get its own way, the rest of the EU caved in and followed Bonn's lead.

And the NYT says the same - December 15th 1991:

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE7DA113AF936A25751C1A967958260

Chancellor Helmut Kohl's spokesman, Dieter Vogel, said on Friday that the Bonn Government would wait until after a meeting of European Community foreign ministers in Brussels on Monday before announcing recognition, which has been opposed by the United Nations, the United States and by the European Community. But officials made clear that Bonn's decision would not be affected by the outcome of Monday's meeting.

by vladimir on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 11:05:56 AM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

"You are misunderstanding me again (it must be my English!). I'm not saying that the US was AGAINST recognition and FOR training the KLA. I'm saying the US was FOR recognition, and FOR training the KLA albeit not publicly at first."

It's not a failure of your English. It's a failure of your logic. We are discussing here whether the US was initially predisposed to the breakup of Yugoslavia. The fact that they recognized the secessionists later while the KLA was being trained is not being disputed at all. This is the essence of my very first post on this subject.

You write: "I know that the training of the KLA came later - I mentioned it to support my thesis that the US has been supportive of secessionist movements throughout ex-Yugoslavia.""

How does that support your thesis if it came later AFTER the US recognized the new republics? It doesn't support your thesis at all.

"Europe, on the other hand was AGAINST recognition, except for Germany:"

I just linked to you in the previous post NY Times articles which showed that the US was AGAINST recognition even as the entire EC was for it.

Please explain to me why it benefits the US to refuse recognition even while Ireland and Norway elect to recognize?

by Upstate NY on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 12:19:26 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

In that case, that leaves us with two options:

US-Serb negotiations that were underway and that could have provided the US with a much better deal than the one it struck with Bonn - yes we're talking about spoils.
US-German disagreement about spoils.

What's your theory?

by vladimir on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 12:40:57 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

All this language is so vague. Spoils what where?

What deal with Bonn?

What are you talking about?

by Upstate NY on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 12:59:41 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

If I understand vladimir correctly, the claim is this:
vladimir:

Let's go back to 1991. The CIA plans for the breakup of Yugoslavia since the 70s.The "right" people are promoted to power - or supported by the US and Germany once they made it to the top. The arms are delivered in the 80s. Everything's ready to roll, when all of a sudden, the Soviet Union collapses. This provides an opportunity to the US to extend its influence over all of ex-Yugoslavia... which it tries to do, putting it at odds with Germany, on the other hand, which wants to consolidate its influence over an independent Slovenia and Croatia. There's disagreement about spheres of influence and who gets what. Political maneuvering ensues.

We have met the enemy, and he is us — Pogo

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Dec 22nd, 2007 at 08:05:07 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

You remind me of those who split the world up into two kinds of people.

Me, I also do that on occasion: there are two kinds of people in this world, I say, the kind of people who split the world into two kinds of people, and the kind who don't.

by Upstate NY on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 01:01:18 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 1)

What is vague? That a huge chunk of the industrial and services sectors in all ex Yugoslav republics were "privatized" mostly to Western business concerns at rock bottom prices? No Sir, from Serb mines to the Croat tourism sector - it's well documented. That's what I call the spoils of war. Is it vague that place is teeming with foreign occupation forces? No Sir - it's well documented and I call that spoils of war too.

If you are referring to my lack of "proof" regarding US German collusion, yes it's vague. Tudjman wasn't a buddy of mine. Neither was Slobodan. James & George even less. No, I don't have first hand accounts of the politics at play in January 1992 and this is not the kinda stuff you find on the newspaper stands. But that wasn't even the subject of my thesis.

by vladimir on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 02:14:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

You still haven't answered the basic question: Why, when th entire EC had recognized the former republics, was the US still holding out?

by Upstate NY on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 02:54:00 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

oh, let me see now. well.
can you repeat the question ?

by vladimir on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 03:58:12 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

Why, when the entire EC has recognized the ex-Yugo republics, did the US refuse to recognize them?

by Upstate NY on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 04:58:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

Now why on earth would you want an answer to a question like that?