All the kiddy porn rumours that I have heard that came from any other source than someone who could probably best be left under some form of medication would be one story that I heard about a British Euro figure.

Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.

We can always hope for a messy divorce and Cherie spilling the beans.

Bush is a symptom, not the disease.

The military subsidies are another issue, but I'm not sure that produces more than a temporary setback, since the next president would have likely brought the subsidies back around.  It wouldn't make sense to weaken one's closest ally over the long haul, unless Bush was planning to cut ties with Britain.  That's, I suppose, not out of the realm of possibility (given his arrogance and generally vindictive personality), but -- and I say this even while taking the treatment by the American press of countries like France and Germany into account -- it would've raised more than a few eyebrows among average Americans, especially knowing how much Blair was talked up by the Bush administration after 9/11.

So, in my opinion, RogueTrooper's argument, in part, makes no sense; and, in another part, gives what can only be described as an incomplete story, at best.

If I were a betting man, -- and people who've seen my incredibly bad poker game can tell you I'm not -- I'd bet that Blair was somewhere on the fence in deciding whether or not to join.

Be nice to America. Or we'll bring democracy to your country.

i would love to see what was in those cheney energy task force documents.

New Labour is notably hostile to every British tradition except that the gentleman in Whitehall knows best.

Blair is tone death to ancient institutional history. For example instead of trying to abolish the office of Lord Chancellor (with its historic executive, judicial and legislative responsibilities) by press release and spawning no end of complex constitutional legislation, there was a simpler answer. Blair could have put the Great Seal into commission and split the responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor between three commissioners.

this country is a blessed nation.

The British are special - the world knows it, in our innermost thoughts we know it. This is the greatest nation on earth.

Thatcher just talked about putting the Great back into Britain (OK, maybe a bit more...) But this... Gah.

5. Dyson, Stephen. "The U.S. / U.K. Alliance in Vietnam and Iraq: Why did Britain Stay out of Vietnam and go into Iraq?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, USA, 2006-03-22 Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2007-05-10
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: What accounts for the different outcomes in British decisions in Vietnam (not commit forces), and Iraq (commit forces), despite the similarities in the situations? In both Vietnam and Iraq a U.S. President pressed a Labour Party Prime Minister to commit forces to a war that was unpopular in the U.K. Yet, while Harold Wilson resisted repeated attempts by Lyndon Johnson to secure a commitment of troops, Tony Blair went out of his way to support George W. Bush, despite the domestic political cost. In seeking to account for these differing outcomes, I consider four explanatory variables: structural realism, alliance dynamics, domestic politics, individual characteristics of the Prime Minister.Method: Structured, focused case comparison methodology is used to compare the two episodes in a systematic fashion. These cases are in many ways an ideal pairing given the similarities between the situations yet the divergent outcomes. In order to measure the individual characteristics of the Prime Minister, I employ automated content analysis techniques that process an individual?s verbal output to reveal personality traits.Results: Structural realism fails to account for the difference in outcome between the two cases, as both responses (commit troops, don?t commit troops) can be deduced from a structural perspective. Alliance dynamics explanations are also unsatisfactory. Harold Wilson?s behaviour is contrary to what we would expect from a junior partner, and, while Blair?s choice is more consistent with this approach, the evidence shows that Blair reached the decision on grounds other than a pure calculation of alliance maintenance necessity. Domestic politics, on the other hand, is part of the explanation for the difference in outcome. Wilson was in a much more precarious position than Blair, and hence had to give more attention to the left-wing, anti-war part of the Labour Party than did Blair. However, this is not the whole story, and I find that a convincing account of the different outcomes in these cases requires a consideration of the differences between the Prime Ministers. Blair was a much more ?black and white? thinker than Harold Wilson, making Blair more amenable to the ?good and evil? framing of the situation by the U.S. than the less Manichean Wilson. In addition, Blair had fashioned a closed advisory system which insulated him from the opposition of most of the foreign policy bureaucracy to the war, whereas the Wilson administration operated through more open procedures. Consequently, my conclusion is that a combination of domestic politics and leadership style best accounts for the difference in outcomes in British decision making on Vietnam and Iraq. The paper will be of interest to those working in foreign policy analysis and decision making, the U.S. - U.K. relationship, and alliance dynamics generally.