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Possible? Yes.

Feasible? I'm not sure I agree. The political ramifications alone...

by Metatone (metatone [a|t] gmail (dot) com) on Tue Jan 13th, 2009 at 07:40:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Could the Eurozone institute capital controls on behalf its members with respect to external capital flows?  It's capital; flows to the US that people are worried about.

PS why would the US continue to have first call on global capital flows given the experience of devaluation to date - would it not make much more sense for that privilege to gravitate to the Eurozone now?

(As for Drew's point, we're all in deflationary mode right now...but presumably whoever borrows most, long term, also inflates most, or devalues their currency most with respect to the real output of their economy.  I have always been amazed at the Chinese continued willingness to invest in Dollars)

notes from no w here

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Tue Jan 13th, 2009 at 08:47:23 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The easiest place to institute capital controls is the border of the European Economic Area (single market).

Otherwise, the Hungarian Central Bank might have been inclined to put a stop to Hungarian banks offering people loans denominated in Euros or Swiss francs, but that would have been instituting capital controls within the single market and couldn't be done. All they could do is lean on the banks to restrain themselves voluntarily.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Jan 13th, 2009 at 10:24:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm not sure we'd want to be the global reserve currency. It didn't seem to do much good for the American political economy, after all.

I wonder if it wouldn't be better to have three or four global reserve currencies - maybe that would prevent The Powers That Be from using reserve currency status to strip-mine the real economy.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Tue Jan 13th, 2009 at 10:37:15 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Having first cut at all available global capital at the lowest interest rates would appear to give the US a huge structural advantage...

notes from no w here
by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Tue Jan 13th, 2009 at 10:43:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
It does. But that advantage needs to be weighted against the way it enables asset-stripping, Anglo Disease style.

Which is why I think it might make more sense to be a global reserve currency rather than the global reserve currency.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Tue Jan 13th, 2009 at 10:55:05 AM EST
[ Parent ]
JakeS:
asset-stripping, Anglo Disease style
is a political choice, I'm not clear how it flows inevitably and unavoidably from being the reserve currency...

notes from no w here
by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Tue Jan 13th, 2009 at 10:57:20 AM EST
[ Parent ]
It doesn't unavoidably flow from being a reserve currency, in the same sense that having a military capable of fighting colonial wars doesn't unavoidably cause colonial wars - it remains a policy decision.

But being the only reserve currency makes it easier, because there is enormous inertia in a system with only one reserve currency.

If the country with the only global reserve currency decides to strip-mine its industry, it can do so with greater ease because it has an inflated exchange rate on account of being a reserve currency. And it can continue to do so for a longer time without the damage becoming obvious to Joe Average, because it will continue to have an inflated exchange rate (allowing it to buy stuff from abroad on the cheap) for a long time, due to the inertia in the system.

If you had two or three reserve currencies, it would be a lot more viable for the rest of the world to shift away from the Anglo Diseased currency. Which would remove the upwards pressure on the exchange rate, and make life more difficult both for the people who are strip-mining the country's industry and for the people who are tasked with running the bread and circus shows.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Tue Jan 13th, 2009 at 11:13:57 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Or, if the US dollar drops out of the race (who can tell what the next decade will bring, after all), number three?

China certainly would not want to have the reserve currency until 2020/2030 ... depending on how rough the ride is as they turn the demographic corner, but the Yen as a counterweight to the Euro might be acceptable.

Four? (or, if the US$ drops out, three?) ChrisCook's PetroDinar?


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Jan 13th, 2009 at 10:21:04 PM EST
[ Parent ]
BruceMcF:
ChrisCook's PetroDinar?

Petro.

You wouldn't have the Iranians or Russians supporting an Arabic currency....

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed Jan 14th, 2009 at 05:55:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Ah, I was thinking in terms of capturing and diverting the Gold Dinar, but coming out of SEAsian Dar Islam, it may be ignoring the old fight back in the heartland.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Wed Jan 14th, 2009 at 06:56:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
€, Yen and the North American Peso (a.k.a. US$) is three that will probably have a running chance.

Russia certainly has the population, resources and (potentially) industrial power to support a reserve currency, if they choose to do so (and play their cards right).

You say that China won't want to, and I assume that much the same logic applies to India.

Then there's the possibility of a South American Peso (think € for MerCoSur). That's probably not something we'll see on a ten- or twenty-year horizon, but MerCoSur (or an equivalent organisation) will be a major power within my lifetime.

Then you have Asean, which I personally don't believe will achieve Great Power status, or even enough political and economic coherence to form a monetary union in the first place. It's located right between two major powers (India and China)... which seems to be an unhealthy thing to be, judging by the way the Greater Middle East and Europe during the Cold War turned out...

Sub-Saharan Africa is a complete basket case and will take at least a lifetime to sort out - and that's assuming that the Great Powers would stop actively trying to break things there...

So my guess would be €, Yen, US$ for the first ten to twenty years. After that, possibly the Ruble. And within my lifetime possibly Renmimbi, Rupi or South American Peso.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Jan 14th, 2009 at 01:47:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Just bring back the Bancor.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Jan 14th, 2009 at 04:12:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]
It would be politically and technically difficult to implement a common currency like the Bancor any soon. However, a first step could be to adopt an international monetary system on the model of the pre-Euro European Monetary System.

"Dieu se rit des hommes qui se plaignent des conséquences alors qu'ils en chérissent les causes" Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet
by Melanchthon on Wed Jan 14th, 2009 at 04:37:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But wasn't part of the reason it was the pre-Euro EMS because it failed to hold together against the stresses of divergent FXR and domestic policy monetary policy objectives?

Unless there is an effective mechanism to share the burden of adjustment between surplus and deficit countries, we seem to retain the same tensions. while broadening the system increases the number of divergent domestic and FRX policies in competition.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Wed Jan 14th, 2009 at 06:59:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]
BruceMcF:
Unless there is an effective mechanism to share the burden of adjustment between surplus and deficit countries,

That's where Keynes was onto something with the Bancor/ICU approach.

His design built in a charge on both positive and negative balances. He was apparently a fan of Gesell.

This is in line with the proposal I advocate for credit creation (ie the time to pay/unsecured credit that makes the world go around), as follows:

Point One: Treasuries  -probably decentralised Treasury branches as is still nominally the case in Canada - issue undated interest-free credit (which they do already - it's called cash).

Point Two: Service-providers-formerly-known-as-banks" operate the accounting system and assess/manage the issue of this credit to business and individuals in line with policies set by a Monetary Authority.

Point Three: both sellers and buyers using this credit would pay a charge for the use of the guarantee. ie a charge would be made on both credit and debit balances. This is exactly analogous to Keynes' Gesellian approach.

Point Four: Service-providers-formerly-known-as-banks would be paid reasonable costs plus a share in the outcome.

Point Five: A Default Pool of funds - held by a Custodian-foremerly-known-as-a-Central-Bank would provide necessary liquidity to cover defaults, and any excess would be shared equally as a National Dividend.

Point Six: settlement of credit obligations could be made using positive balances of Treasury credits, or in "money's worth" acceptable to the seller.

Point Seven: defaults would be settled by the Pool and collected from defaulters, if possible. Defaulters could have the option to settle in hours of community service.

Settlement could be, and among businesses often would be, in barter. More generally, through "Unitisation" of existing secured debt, new classes of acceptable units would be developed redeemable in:

(a) energy value - the "Petro's" I have in mind as a generic global reserve currency;

(b) land rental value - an essentially "land-locked" currency.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed Jan 14th, 2009 at 07:39:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]
... their growth in effective productive capacity that are at the most serious risk of long term inflation. Its not the quantity of the borrowing but the effectiveness of the borrowing as an investment. The US has put itself behind the eight ball with $1T+ to maintain the senior workers of the finance sector in the lifestyle to which they have become accustomed ... the question is whether it repeats that in the productive sector with massive investment in an obsolete Energy Economy.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Jan 13th, 2009 at 12:32:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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