Welcome to European Tribune. It's gone a bit quiet around here these days, but it's still going.
Display:
You said a true thing and then moved on to act as if the Chinese propping up the dollar has no impact on the US$:€ exchange rate. But of course, if the Chinese peg directly to the dollar, the dollar exchange rate with all currencies it floats against is higher as a result.

That's the way a mixed floating/pegged system working through exchanges works - the floating currency that is the subject of the pegging operations rises in value relative to other floating currencies.

Except when taking sloppy mainstream economic shortcuts involving assumptions un-anchored in reality that in effect assume money neutrality when discussing demand and supply of one currency for another, there are not two pure cases to consider, but four, and in practice countries can adopt mixes of the pure cases:

  • Pegging to the dollar, targetting the US$ FXR
  • Pegging to the dollar, targetting some other FXR
  • Pegging to something else, targetting the US$ FXR
  • Pegging to something else, targetting some other FXR

It might seem that the second case is just for logical completeness, since we are moving from a period of the West Pacific Rim pegging to the US$ - though it was of course relevant, for example, to the transition from the £sterling to the US$ in the former British Empire in the late 40's and 50's.

China is presently doing a mix of the first and the second, since they adopted a Singapore Peg early in this decade. However, they have the option at any time to switch to mixing all four - for example, shifting the currency basket they peg against to a trade-weighted basket and targetting a stable synthetic FXR against that basket would be a mix of pegging with the US$ and other currencies and targetting US$ and other floating currency exchange rates.

If they switched to that, the floating currencies would be far closer to the situation you imagine, where the pegging operation against one currency does not affect its FXR with the currencies it floats against.

And the Chinese could also switch their target to one that does not include the US$ - they could drop the US$ from their pegging currency basket entirely, or in a less extreme scenario simply shift the focus of their exchange rate management from the RMB¥:US$ to some other FXR, like RMB¥:€

Given that a pegged exchange in a mixed pegged/currency world must be held at a discount in order to be effective - a peg at a premium is subject to speculative attack, draining foreign exchange reserves, while a peg at a discount is of course immune to speculative attack, since capacity to generate domestic currency cannot be drained - pegging countries are net demanders of floating currencies.

Assuming that the currency that they are pegging can be ignored and all that has to be considered is the exchange rate that they are managing via the peg ignores the fact that the same target rate achieved with different currency pegs implies different relative demand for the floating currencies and hence a different exchange rate between the floating currencies.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sat Nov 7th, 2009 at 10:20:41 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I certainly agree that China's propping up the dollar, and how they go about doing that, has an affect on the dollar-euro and dollar-other exchange rates. (I think the affect is unlikely to be very large, however, but I haven't really looked at enough to say for sure, so I admit I could be wrong on that.) I did not mean to imply otherwise. However, that's a US Treasury  problem, not China's problem.  For China what matters is how its own currency and international buying power are changed by its exchange rate policies -- the gross and distributional welfare/development effects of favoring exports over imports or vice-versa.

The fact that China has the option to switch how it manages it's exchange rate policies -- and always has -- leads to the question of why they are choosing to track the US dollar so tightly right now. I think the most reasonable place to start is the political-economy equilibrium view: the current policy of pegging to the dollar best balances the current internal and external demands on government policy for the welfare of various interest groups.  This means that moving away from that peg -- as US exporters and domestic industry wants -- needs to be understood as a set of conditions requiring a shift in the demands of Chinese interests (only one of which is its relationship with the US and others) on China's government.  

China is pegging the dollar because it is in its best interests to do so, and it will change as soon as it is in its best interests to do otherwise.

by santiago on Sat Nov 7th, 2009 at 12:19:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The fact that China has the option to switch how it manages it's exchange rate policies -- and always has -- leads to the question of why they are choosing to track the US dollar so tightly right now.

The evidence you have presented suggests that they are not targeting the US exchange rate with US currency transactions as heavily as previously and are targeting it more heavily with other currency transaction than previously suggests that they are are not taking for granted that they will continue to be targeting the US$ as heavily as they are now doing.

The peg is of course the actual piece of wood being placed in the actual hole that is actually being used to hold onto - anyone who has climbed a peg board in gym know that there's no implication of a peg holding its position for a long period of time if there is a different objective in mind.

I think the most reasonable place to start is the political-economy equilibrium view: the current policy of pegging to the dollar best balances the current internal and external demands on government policy for the welfare of various interest groups.

How about starting with the Iron Law of Oligarchy - an Oligarchy's first priority is staying in power. The number one threat to the oligarchy's hold on power is if there is no job creation to put large numbers of the new entrants into the labor force into employment. The oligarchy has for over a decade now used aggressive neo-mercantalist exchange rate policy as an essential element of its strategy to use export markets as a safety valve generator of employment.

"Political-economy equilibrium" sounds very much like an effort to export a theory that is radically incomplete in explaining economic behavior so that it can be radically incomplete in explaining a broader range of sociopolitical behavior. I suppose there is a sillier application of equilibrium theory than Chinese growth over the past 20 years, but none spring immediately to mind.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sat Nov 7th, 2009 at 06:25:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm not sure why you think employment policy explains so much about a non-democratic regime's methods of keeping power, and I'm not sure that "keeping power" is even a very good explanation of Chinese governance objectives in general. As far as silliness is concerned, I think I'd better just let you rethink your last outburst of "iron laws" and the like. It seems you're lapsing into some simplistic paradigms of Chinese politics here, and political science in general, don't you think, especially coming from someone so well versed in the institionalist critique social science?
by santiago on Sun Nov 8th, 2009 at 01:02:07 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Display:

Occasional Series