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What appears to have happened here is that the process has been reversed: Indictments were issued based on more or less well-founded suspicions, in the hope that enough evidence could be found before the trial.
This is where the tea-leaf reading begins.
There could be several reasons, but my guess - and a guess is all it can be - is that there was enormous political pressure to come up with a list of suspects. NATO burned a lot of powder over Yugoslavia during the '90s, and that powder has to be justified - otherwise NATO would look pretty damn stupid. So it must have been awfully tempting to try to come up with a list of people that were very probably guilty, even if there wasn't actually enough evidence against most of them. After all, if things followed the usual pattern for political criminals, it would take several years from indictment to apprehension, during which evidence could be compiled.
But when you still haven't actually got enough evidence to convict the moment you go to trial, you end up looking stupid: You can't admit that the story above is what happened, because that would be an admission that you had chased people across an entire subcontinent on suspicions that weren't legally valid. But you can't move ahead with the trials either, because then the people whom you think very probably are guilty would be cleanly acquitted for lack of evidence. So you keep them locked up in a Gitmo-like legal limbo for years, while you trawl the Balkans for more evidence.
If this tea-leaf reading is correct, proper investigations and criminal proceedings would have meant a longer time lag between the commission of the crimes and the indictment of suspects. It would also have meant shorter trials and fewer people held in legal limbo for years without a ruling, one way or the other. And maybe even a shorter list of indictees in the final evaluation, because some would be dropped off the list of suspects when the investigators gave up searching for more evidence.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
There could be several reasons, but my guess - and a guess is all it can be - is that there was enormous political pressure to come up with a list of suspects.
So, it is possible that this is standard operating procedure. Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
Coefficients: (Intercept) log(casualties) -4.0792 0.7741 Response: log(indicted)
(indicted)^4 ~ (casualties)^3 / (9 million)
The other
Coefficients: (Intercept) -6.095
(indicted) ~ (casualties) / 400
Taking the number of casualties to be 1 million you get
180 indictees by the first model
2500 indictees by the second model.
I'd go for the first model. Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
NATO's war was against Serbia - not the others. So the pressure is there to specifically find Serbian 'criminals'.
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
It was originally proposed by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and established by Resolution 827 of the United Nations Security Council, which was passed on May 25, 1993.
March 1993 Fighting begins between Bosniaks and Croats. July 1993 Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan offered. Refused by Izetbegovic in August.
March 1993
July 1993
So the pressure is there to specifically find Serbian 'criminals'.
There is a case to be made that the most extreme outliers by one measure are the ones for the Kosovo war, in the direction you imply. Still, I don't think the difference is statistically signnificant. And the figure of 8,000 Serb civilians happens to be the largest estimate you could possibly find, and it is taken from a different source to the others. Wikipedia lists 5,000 as the estimate of the total number of Albanian casualties including KLA combatants. Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
It also looks as if the Croats are getting off the hook for their "activities" in Croatia.
The total estimated dead in Kosovo is around 12 000
KLA: 5,000+ killed [3] NATO: 2 non-combat deaths[4] 1200 killed [5][6] Around 100 Albanian civilians killed by NATO forces [7] NATO bombings: Human Rights Watch was only able to verify 500 civilian deaths throughout Yugoslavia, [8][9] with other sources stating from 1,200 to 5,700 [8]
Look, the fact that there are no NATO people on trial for war crimes is neither here nor there regarding the bias of the ICTY regarding the different Yugoslav ethnic groups. Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
You're grasping at straws - no amount of evidence will convince you that the court is not biased against Serbs. Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
With only 6 points it is really difficult to argue anything. For instance, what is the chance that all three "Serb indictee" points are above the line? 1 in 8. This is not sufficient to show bias at 90% confidence (you would need the probability to be less than 1 in 10) let alone 95% confidence (1 in 20).
If there was a consistent bias against the Serbs to the extent that you claim, then I would argue that it should be visible even at low levels, with few data points to play with. Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.
Especially beware of highlighting - I'm sure highlighting single data points has legitimate uses, but off the top of my head, I cannot think of a single one. A very good indication that Someone Is Up To No Good.
If that's not possible, you sit down and cry.
And when you're done crying, you stop trying to prove abuses that are impossible to prove, and concentrate on the abuses that are possible to prove - such as the excessive durations of the trials (for all the accused).
BUT if your data set is too small to work on statistical significance testing... and if you're not allowed to highlight single data points (if you don't want to be accused of being up to no good) then what can you do with small sets figures?
Just a simple question. How many coin tosses do you need to reject the hypothesis that a coin is unbiased with 99% confidence? 95%? 90%? And if your coin is used fewer times than that and then is lost, how are you going to use statistics to argue it was biased? Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
99% confidence means you are accepting a 1% error on the ideal.
95% means that you are accepting a 5% error on the ideal.
It would be hard to get within 1% or 5% of the ideal with very few tosses. If you do a few tosses you may actually conclude that the coin is biased even if it's not. I suspect that within 10 or 20 tosses you should seriously approach your ideal 50-50.
With 4 coin tosses, HHHH has a probability of 6.25% which allows you to reject at 90% but not 95%.
With 5 coin tosses, HHHHH has a probability of 3.125% which allows you to reject at 95% but not at 99%.
The point is that, with less than 4 coin tosses you cannot show bias, no matter what. Sometimes you simply don't have enough data to argue statistically.
And statistics can only suggest where to look for actual evidence, it can't prove (or disprove) bias all by itself.
For instance, the contingency table analysis I did yesterday suggests looking for actual (not statistical) evidence of bias in the duration or the trials, not in the result. JakeS posted a theory that indictments were issued in the hopes of gathering sufficient evidence by the time the cases came to trial, which in some cases hasn't happened, resulting in prolongued imprisonments without trial rather than dismissals for lack of evidence. But a theory consistent with statistical suggestions is not evidence. Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
The ideal result should be heads 50% of the time and tails 50% of the time.
Because the ratio of Croat convicted to Serb civilian casualties in Croatia DOES show up as being particularly lenient to Croats - the ratio is 0 to some 2 300 dead.
I frankly don't think that NATO cared all that much about which ethnic group the suspects came from (with Kosovo Albanians as a possible exception, but that's much later in the chronology) - as long as they got a few high-profile ones (Milosevic, Tudjman, Karadic and the rest of the names that were "seen on TV"). Because my point is fundamentally about domestic policy within NATO countries, not about foreign policy. And all these Balkan names sound the same to English speakers anyway, so nobody cares which ones are indicted.
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