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I do recall Krugman's columns trumpeting the renewed relevance of Keynes, who was exhumed from the shallow grave in which Friedman and the libertarian think tanks had buried him. But only a tiny minority of economists have even rigorously challenged the "mainstream" of economic orthodoxy, most notably and publicly Steve Keen, Michael Hudson, Jamie Gailbraith and Nouriel Roubini, but also including fund managers such as Paul McCulley, formerly of PIMCO, who had coined the term Minsky Moment in 1998, along with his contemporary advocates.
So far it seems it has been sufficient for the advocates of "mainstream economics" to simply ignore critics and intensify efforts to vilify Keynes based on critiques of Samuelson's synthesis, but not identified as such. Even now Krugman is not so bold as to assert alternative economic approaches or endorse non-mainstream economists. Part of the problem was illustrated by a talk Steve Keen recently gave to a generally sympathetic audience of British economists, (Keen refers to it as the "George Monbiot Seminar" as Monbiot "got it"), still were unable to accept the role that debt has played in bringing on the current debacle, so strong is the spell cast by their academic training. This is particularly discouraging, as the best critiques for a general audience of the problems with the current approach have been in the Financial Times. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
Well, it seems to be quite consistent with the Real Business Cycle drivel. Earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need, but not every man's greed. Gandhi
If only the holders of wealth agreed with mainstream economics that debt doesn't matter we could write down the bad debt and be one step closer to actual recovery. But to them it is the only thing that matters. They just don't want it in their economic theories. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
I even think the US did that in the 80ies, with the savings and loans crash. But I know less about that. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
My fear is more that the process will be subverted politically and that wealthy malefactors will get to keep their money and power more than that it will be impossible to resolve a "TBTF". If you don't want to do something it is always nice if it is impossible.
But, even if a resolution fails and the whole system crashes, I believe that would be better than continuing as we are going. The longer this runs the greater the damage. And no real recovery is possible until the current bad debt is written down, and, probably, until the current financial incumbents are removed from power.
The only reason for temporizing is to spread awareness of the nature of the existing system and the need for fundamental change. The occupy movement is doing that and I suspect that the current effort to wall paper the Euro elephant will fail massively the first time the elephant moves -- which will be soon. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
Bankruptcy means unable to pay one's bills, and writing down loans (assets) in most cases also means writing down liabilities (the loans banks themselves take out from others to leverage their own capital while making loans to others). So profitability would be reduced and in many cases losses would also be experienced by shareholders of banks, but bankruptcy would only occur in some cases. Even in those cases, however, as the US TARP program showed, it is both easy and relatively costless to prevent those banks from failing if they are deemed too large to be allowed to do so. Central banks, as lenders of last resort, can just print money, for free, and lend it to banks for the purpose of just keeping capital high enough on balance sheets to stay in business while the bank raises its own capital through retained earnings and other investments. As long as the money isn't lent, it cannot produce inflation, so it is essentially just a waiver from the government which allows banks to continue operating outside of normal regulatory or best practice standards.
Why do things seem to work differently for banks than for other businesses? Because banks aren't in the business of making any real things, just arranging social commitments between people. They are in the same business that government is -- organizing people to do things in common projects. Just like in government, it really doesn't matter if banks run profits or deficits if their stakeholders are willing to let it pass -- willing to let some of their own commitments be relaxed and worked out later.
Bankruptcy means unable to pay one's bills, and writing down loans (assets) in most cases also means writing down liabilities
That is a bold assertion. Are you really sure most of the loans due to be written off contain an automatic put option in their refinancing?
In any event, writing off a loan means that someone, somewhere will not have the money he thought he had. That buck can stop in four places: With the government, with the private bondholders, with the private shareholders, or with the depositors of depository institutions.
The FDIC means that the first and last options are essentially equivalent. So the question is whether the government wants to make good on the claims of shareholders and bondholders to insolvent institutions, or not.
I vote for "not," and if that causes bank runs, well then there's nothing wrong with a bank run that won't be solved by confiscating the bank, decapitating its management (metaphorically or literally, depending on whether it's done by the government or an angry mob), and repudiating every liability not held by an industrial firm or as an insured deposit.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
our consumption and investment behavior is largely immune to the effects of another bank meltdown.
Ah.
As optimistic about the effects of Capitalism as ever.
And given the present decrepit state of the infrastructure of nominally first-world countries, you would run out of unemployed before you ran out of useful government projects. Possibly quite a long time before, depending on how aggressively you repudiate private sector debts.
If you have a Treasury with a drawer full of shovel-ready, useful infrastructure projects, then the Treasury can shoot the private banking sector in the back of the head, dump the corpse in a shallow grave and nothing excessively bad will happen (except maybe a coup d'etat), irrespective of where you are in the business cycle.
Because with sufficiently activist fiscal policy, you get to abolish the business cycle.
We need a banking system so that the fiscal authority can concentrate their attention on those tasks that a banking system cannot or should not be doing. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Not that you would want to do it unless your banks needed a lead pill delivered intercranially for other reasons.
Obviously we could shoot all the TBTF banks in the back of the head, and so long as we did it by taking them into receivership long enough for people to shift their accounts to small community banks and credit unions, there wouldn't be any massive calamity in the short term, and in the long term we'd be better off.
But shooting the entire private banking sector in the back of the head and having to recreate the entire sector from scratch ~ that seems likely to deepen the current depression. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
The rot is that we have had 40 years of propaganda to the extent that you cannot tax rich people because you would be stealing "their" dollars. Which makes it kind of tough to solve the distributional issue.
Another problem is that we have left money creation in the hands of debt. This therefore makes it necessary to maintain a high level of debt, and therefore a skewed distribution (technically two people could owe each other the same amount, and therefore you'd have debt without any inequality, but of course in practice it just does not happen). We would need to reclaim control of the money supply in order to reduce debt levels. Earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need, but not every man's greed. Gandhi
Debt is a distributional issue. It nets down to zero as for each debtor there must be a creditor.
That's the NCE view.
Looking at it Dynamically, debt has Opportunity Cost(s) for the debtor since they have to make the interest payments. This reduces the amount of money they could spend on other things. Compound interest really socks it to the debtor as the stream-of-payments amounts to as much as 300% of the initial borrowing.
It wouldn't be so bad if this was recycled and circulated in the micro-economy. What happens is the lender takes the payments and loans it out again, creating compounding on compounding, creating a parasite/host predatory economic environmental relationship.
If the predation is not restricted the economy wanders to the right side of this:
graph and Things Fall Apart. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
There need not be any drain from the debt at societal level. Of course, there will be plenty of "repayments" at societal level in the coming decades, mostly because we will have to divert huge resources into making our economies sustainable.
But with regards to the immediate situation (I know climate change has already wrecked many communities, but it is yet to have a major economics impact. Similarly, even at 100$ a barrel, oil remains pretty cheap), it did not have to be that way. It is a matter of choice. A choice that was clearly not made by, or at least in favour of (there is far too much support for crazy policies, after so much propaganda), the 99%. Earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need, but not every man's greed. Gandhi
Money is just the wrapper. You have to peel it off to reveal the naked predation underneath.
Some people enjoy risk. They enjoy being passionate about projects. They enjoy working 16 hour days trying to make something.
I think they're kind of insane, but it's obvious they exist, and they're not necessarily a bad thing.
But all that happens with lending is that someone decides to invest in a project because they think it's viable.
In practice this means believing they won't lose their stake, that they'll get more out than they put in, and that the social, cultural, domestic, and political environment will support the project.
But what profit means is that personal benefit outweighs social calculation. 'Investment' happens because it's personally profitable even though it's socially and culturally ruinous.
So the key idea that has to change is the concept of getting something for nothing. 'Risk' is just a bit of PR that dresses up the concept of investment as public decision-making performed with a view to getting more out than individuals put in.
What's missing is useful accounting of personal and social benefit and loss. Current terminology is biased towards the idea that individual returns are the only outcomes that matter. Reality-based economics would have to include wider social outcomes in its definitions of wealth.
In fact the most productive systems are likely to be ones where there's room for personal enterprise, but also enough control to make sure that political and financial power can never become so personally concentrated that they lock out other stakeholders from policy.
So Debt Deflation can't happen?
George Monbiot Seminar | Steve Keen's Debtwatch
I tried to point out that since the rate of change of debt contributes to aggregate demand (for both newly produced goods & services, and existing assets), then the change in debt matters, but I made no headway at all with the argument.
Of course, it would be far better to couple that with a fairer distribution going forward (which probably requires taxation as you'll find it very hard to prevent the commercial roles from taking a big bite). In effect, you'd be replacing change in the debt level by redistribution in order to get money in the hands of those likely to spend it. Earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need, but not every man's greed. Gandhi
What happened is Greenspan asserted that banks were self regulating and proceeded to let them perform the regulation. This policy was reinforced by appointing anti-regulators to other regulatory bodies. With the repeal of Glass-Steagall higher risk/higher return opportunities were available and the Fed was there when things went wrong, with the Greenspan Put.
Investment banks, such as Goldman's, wanted more and more mortgages to package and sell on and didn't care about the quality. There was a rush to oblige this interest and the price of real estate in large markets soared beyond the conceivable ability of the economy to sustain over time. So we got, say, $10 trillion in mortgages packaged into MBSs that, at current real estate prices, are only worth, say, $5 trillion, and that is only if the banks do not try to sell the non-performing loans. If they did the property underlying the mortgages would be found to be worth substantially less. So, everyone is just holding the bad mortgages on their books and are being allowed to pretend they are still worth face value - extend and pretend.
Worse, the depression that has resulted is making even prime mortgages worth only half or less of face value, as mortgagees lose jobs and become unable to pay. The same dynamic has played out in other areas and other countries. Recently Cyprus has emerged as a new Euro-zone problem with a massive title fraud problem.
ALL of these problems have to be resolved and the unsustainable debt has to be written down in order for a new cycle to begin, regardless of what may change in that new cycle. But those who issued and those who hold the bad MBSs, etc. are politically powerful and refuse to allow THEIR assets to be appropriately written down. The lawbreakers are in control. As any healthy economy relies on rule of law, we have another reason why the current system must change before recovery is possible.
Properly and lawfully resolving these problems, including prosecuting lawbreakers, would both eliminate unpayable debt and restore the rule of law. Otherwise it will be worse than Groundhog day, as the whole situation will just keep repeating, but each iteration will get worse. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
Yes and no.
Debt also allows you to invest more than you save, or to save more than you invest (in real terms).
When you work for me, and I pay you in an IOU rather than in the products of your labour, then I have invested your labour, but you have not accumulated any real stuff - only a claim on me. If you exercise that claim, then I have to give you money whether or not you intend to invest it in real stuff.
Debt therefore means that you can have periods in which everybody wants to save more than they want to invest in real stuff, which is what creates mass unemployment. It also means that you can have periods where people want to invest more than they want to save, which is a precondition for the growth rates we have come to associate with industrial society.
By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensibly necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they had no linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty, which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into without extreme bad conduct. Custom, in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person, of either sex, would be ashamed to appear in public without them. In Scotland, custom has rendered them a necessary of life to the lowest order of men; but not to the same order of women, who may, without any discredit, walk about barefooted. In France, they are necessaries neither to men nor to women; the lowest rank of both sexes appearing there publicly, without any discredit, sometimes in wooden shoes, and sometimes barefooted. Under necessaries, therefore, I comprehend, not only those things which nature, but those things which the established rules of decency have rendered necessary to the lowest rank of people. All other things I call luxuries, without meaning, by this appellation, to throw the smallest degree of reproach upon the temperate use of them. Beer and ale, for example, in Great Britain, and wine, even in the wine countries, I call luxuries. A man of any rank may, without any reproach, abstain totally from tasting such liquors. Nature does not render them necessary for the support of life; and custom nowhere renders it indecent to live without them.
In that view, "austerity" is just a scary term for leaving the economy to its own devices.
The point of contention is how quickly this entirely fictitious long run, which never appears in any real world long term trends, takes to make its appearance. The New Keynesians can see the short run stretching out for multiple years, and so while their approach points to expansionary austerity "in the long term", it points to actual expansion "in the short term".
Purer mainstream macroeconomic approaches, even more radically divorced from reality than New Keynesian economics, see the long run kicking in more quickly. If it is supposed to kick in on the order of six months or less, that is inside the normal lags for discretionary fiscal policy, and so the thing that discretionary fiscal policy should always be doing is acting as if we were already at that full employment equilibrium.
Sensible real world economic policy advisors, of course, only ever pay attention to the mainstream dogm... errh, approaches when they are useful for rationalizing something that you want to do for some other reason that is less convenient to say than "support employment". I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
That does not, of course, mean that all of the economists that ascribe to the majority of the mainstream approaches would support all of the austerity programs in every details ~ but certainly if the austerity programs were replaced by their preferred policy, it would still be an austerity policy stance, even if different in the details. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Claiming that the market will move towards a full employment equilibrium in the long run if left alone (which Keynesians think
Ahem.
There is no good reason to think that "the market," if left to its own devices, will ever trend towards a full employment equilibrium - or indeed any general equilibrium at all.
* Unless it gets stuck in a non-full employment equilibrium. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
Yes, that's Walras' Postulate. It also works the other way around: If you enforce clearing in the labour and goods market through a determined full-employment policy, then you make financial market clearing easier (because then all you have to do is prevent large discontinuities, and Walras' Postulate will take care of the rest).
All mainstream approaches have thoroughly rejected Keynes in the long run
Neoclassical theology pretends that being poorer in the short run will make us richer in the long run, because (a) short-run unemployment has no long-run costs and (b) short-run unemployment will reduce wage demands, which raises long-run return to capital investment (remember point (a)), thus incentivising capital accumulation, which is the driver of long-run growth.
The central fallacy, of course, is the assumption that capitalists will produce in order to warehouse their goods. That works - sort of - in a barter economy. Not so much in an industrial one.
The thing you refer to as mainstream seems like nothing but Austrian morality play ("we've spent more than we have - now we must face the painful but healthy catharsis"). Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
From a lost essay by Freud on anal Austerianism.
Yes, they really do believe this. I'd quote you chapter and verse, but I don't have my textbooks at hand.
Whereas, in the real world, there is no distinct long-run growth path, and we are living inside a permanently smaller opportunity frontier if we pursue austerity policies. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
If you don't buy that assumption ~ good. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
This would not include Krugman, DeLong, Stiglitz, Yves Smith or Thomas, for a start.
I don't really have time to read many more. But really, you can't say "no-one in the mainstream" is saying something that Krugman, co-author of one of the main university manuals, is banging the drums about day and night. Earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need, but not every man's greed. Gandhi
Its been a while since I've read Krugman's work, as opposed to his op-eds ~ I'd thought I would have heard it if he had abandoned New Keynesian economics for some other approach, but I'd be happy to have the citation to a paper where he does so. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
I think that is almost certain to be the case for decades in the USA, whether the slope is taken from the growth rate prior to 1970, 1990, 2000 or 2007. I guess the "mainstream" can just keep redefining the slope forever in preference to admitting their assumptions are fallacious. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
... that after the short term costs, the assumption that the same long term growth path still exists for the economy to return to. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
This may not seem like a particularly profound piece of advice, but it runs directly counter to the long-run assumptions of central tradition macro.
Our employment is more akin to physical fitness ~ leaving workers unstressed reduces our immediate capacity for work, if we are put to work and subjected to the regular stresses and strains of working, our immediate capacity for work increases. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
In the General Theory, the neoclassical long run does not exist, since uncertainty in the General Theory is not restricted to stochastic risk, but extends to true uncertainty, in the face of which the information required for a neoclassical long run equilibrium does not exist.
Note that true uncertainty is not just an absence of information ~ it is actively created by our actions, since the interactions of decisions not yet arrived at will affect the future in ways that we cannot at present anticipate. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Accepting that long run tendency in "New Keynesian" economics follows from building the theory on the foundation of the long since falsified neoclassical utilitarian theory of Microeconomic behavior. Samuelson's project to create a hybrid of Keynes' theory and neoclassical micro ~ the project that Joan Robinson famously labeled "Bastard Keynesian" economics ~ didn't work, after all, and so the New Keynesian project is to create space for a simulcra of a Keynesian system in the neoclassical short run out of a set of impediments to the rapid achievement of the neoclassical long-run equilibrium.
Now, a neoclassical long-run equilibrium is the equilibrium which occurs if we project all knowable aspects of today into the future and allow market forces to fully work themselves out. No sensible person with real world experience would imagine that this projection will bear any resemblance to what will actually happen, nor that the long-term experience of economic history corresponds to some approximation of the long run projections of the economic state of previous periods, since crucial decisions will be made in the future that will dominate the "long run tendency" of today's economic state.
The long run could only play out if, in contradiction to all historical experience, we stop making crucial decisions and both economic institutions and technology stop evolving. Hence, as per Keynes witty quip, "in the long run, we are all dead" ~ which is to say, the only certainty is mortality, and also to say, in an economy with living people in it, the people themselves keep erasing old long runs with their actions. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Did Keynes ever buy into the idea that "debt doesn't matter" that is so popular with the NCE crowd? Did Keynes ever repudiate Fisher's Debt Defaltion Theory of Great Depressions?
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