That was probably Jerome's solution (he's repeatedly asked why would a Greek default be so terrible for the Eurozone?).

I was more in favour of something along the lines of this

Nothing will scare those betting against Europe more than unleashing the unlimited balance sheet. Only the ECB fits this bill. The ECB needs to turn the fire hose in support of the sovereigns on the firing line. They have already been pinning Spanish and Italian debt at around a 5% yield. They may soon need to support France. But rather than being stealthy about it, they need to commit to it up front. Worrying about undermining reform resolve in Italy and Spain, while understandable, is, at this point, a second order issue. There are other ways to scare the passenger without threatening to drive your own car over the cliff. The ECB should either state or heavily imply that until further notice they are willing to subjugate their single mandate to this objective. Those worried about inflation should take comfort from the experiences of Japan and the US. And, lastly, of course there must be continued liquidity support for the banking sector even after the recapitalization. This will be a hard, but necessary sell.

If they had done this with Greece in February 2010 (no, the bond purchases since then don't count because the ECB has been shy and apologetic about them, very much un-marketmaker-like) none of this crisis would have happened.

Economics is politics by other means