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In fact, lending creates deposits. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
Now suppose you apply for a loan. When the bank credits your account with the amount of the loan, that increases the deposit base of the bank and increases the amount of your deposit without you actually bringing in any cash or transferring balances from another bank. Therefore, loans create deposits. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
Why would anyone need deposit insurance in such a case?
As for the loan, what happens when I spend the money on my new Velocicopter. The Velocicopter company is not interested in what I have on deposit, they want cash. Where does that cash come from?
In any case you are aware that there isn't enough cash in existence to cash out all deposits? In other words, cash is just a collection of government-certified tokens issued in sufficient amount to cover people's demand for pocket money. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
That's really not how it works.
Profit comes from giving people loans. Deposits are a way to get people in through the door so you can sell them the loan. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
Generating 74 percent of total payments related income, current accounts (known as DDA in the United States) are the core of the European payments business. In 2007, retail current accounts contributed 39 billion in profit, mainly from interest on balances, out of total payments-related profit of 68 billion. Corporate accounts added another 11 billion.
We are currently in a weird situation where banks do not have many places to invest deposits profitably. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/business/banks-flooded-with-cash-they-cant-profitably-use.html?pag ewanted=all
But your model of how depository banks work is wrong.
Not that I expect you to revise that, but anyway, here are two post you could read about it.
Naked Capitalism: Banks are not reserve constrained
Some people still believe in the money multiplier taught in old economic textbooks that fractional reserve banking has banks taking deposits, multiplying them as much as possible, subject to the reserve ratio, and making a much larger amount loans. That is not how it works. In practice, banks don't wait for the reserves to be available to issue loans. They make loans first and then borrow the reserves in the interbank market. The loans come first, not the reserves. Banks are never constrained by reserves or reserve ratios. Banks are capital constrained. In our fiat money system, the central bank uses reserves in the system to help the it hit a target interest rate. So, the central bank provides the system with enough reserves to meet any reserve ratio at its target rate. The reserves are about helping set interest rates, not about pyramiding money on a reserve base. Understanding this should also help you understand why QE has been a boon for financial speculation but a bust in the real economy:
Banks are never constrained by reserves or reserve ratios. Banks are capital constrained. In our fiat money system, the central bank uses reserves in the system to help the it hit a target interest rate. So, the central bank provides the system with enough reserves to meet any reserve ratio at its target rate. The reserves are about helping set interest rates, not about pyramiding money on a reserve base.
Understanding this should also help you understand why QE has been a boon for financial speculation but a bust in the real economy:
Lest it be said that I'm parodying neoclassical economics, or relying on what lesser lights believe when the leaders of the profession know better, here are two apposite quotes from Ben Bernanke and Paul Krugman. ... They are profoundly wrong on this point because neoclassical economists do not understand how money is created by the private banking system--despite decades of empirical research to the contrary, they continue to cling to the textbook vision of banks as mere intermediaries between savers and borrowers. This is bizarre, since as long as 4 decades ago, the actual situation was put very simply by the then Senior Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Alan Holmes. Holmes explained why the then faddish Monetarist policy of controlling inflation by controlling the growth of Base Money had failed, saying that it suffered from "a naive assumption" that:the banking system only expands loans after the [Federal Reserve] System (or market factors) have put reserves in the banking system. In the real world, banks extend credit, creating deposits in the process, and look for the reserves later. The question then becomes one of whether and how the Federal Reserve will accommodate the demand for reserves. In the very short run, the Federal Reserve has little or no choice about accommodating that demand; over time, its influence can obviously be felt. (Alan R. Holmes, 1969, p. 73; emphasis added)The empirical fact that "loans create deposits" means that the change in the level of private debt is matched by a change in the level of money, which boosts aggregate demand. The level of private debt therefore cannot be ignored--and the fact that neoclassical economists did ignore it (and, with the likes of Greenspan running the Fed, actively promoted its growth) is why this is no "garden variety" downturn.
...
They are profoundly wrong on this point because neoclassical economists do not understand how money is created by the private banking system--despite decades of empirical research to the contrary, they continue to cling to the textbook vision of banks as mere intermediaries between savers and borrowers.
This is bizarre, since as long as 4 decades ago, the actual situation was put very simply by the then Senior Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Alan Holmes. Holmes explained why the then faddish Monetarist policy of controlling inflation by controlling the growth of Base Money had failed, saying that it suffered from "a naive assumption" that:
the banking system only expands loans after the [Federal Reserve] System (or market factors) have put reserves in the banking system. In the real world, banks extend credit, creating deposits in the process, and look for the reserves later. The question then becomes one of whether and how the Federal Reserve will accommodate the demand for reserves. In the very short run, the Federal Reserve has little or no choice about accommodating that demand; over time, its influence can obviously be felt. (Alan R. Holmes, 1969, p. 73; emphasis added)
Do you think McKinsey is just making it up? Do you think that Citibank has $1trillion in notes just sitting in a vault?
If Goldman had no solvent customers to lend to, they would still be issuing those. Because they are not issuing them to fund lending, they are issuing them to arbitrage against the discount window (or the interbank market, but that comes to the same thing in the final analysis).
Now, it is certainly possible - in principle - for the central bank to create a high enough spread between the support rate and the main refinancing rate that the absence of solvent customers would disincentivise banks from accepting deposits. But that's not the case today, has not been the case historically, and there is no obvious reason for the central bank to ever do so in the future.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
But I repeat myself
We're in a liquidity crisis and banks want to be in an all-cash asset position.
Soooo... why don't the ECB lower their rates on excess reserves to zero?
They don't do it permanently, because the remuneration rate for excess reserves sets the floor under the interbank rate. Which the CB wants to do if it wants to conduct active interest rate policy. It shouldn't do that IMO (I favour a zero interest rate policy and conducting monetary policy at the exchange rate and margin requirements instead), but that's a subject for another time.
Or even a negative nominal number?
14. 23 Some fascinating comments from Draghi -- delivered with obvious relish -- on what he sees as the real potential benefits of the LTRO to the real economy. He stresses that the number of banks tapping the cheap three year finance jumped from some 500 in December to 800 this time. Many of the new takers were small banks in Germany and elsewhere. I would love to read you the places, the towns, the villages where these banks are but often they would be the only bank in towns so they could be identified. But this tells me one thing - this money is now closer to the small and medium-sized businesses than it was before. I'm not saying this money will necessarily go to SMEs but it is certainly closer. We have this in mind because 80 per cent of eurozone employment is SMEs.
I would love to read you the places, the towns, the villages where these banks are but often they would be the only bank in towns so they could be identified. But this tells me one thing - this money is now closer to the small and medium-sized businesses than it was before. I'm not saying this money will necessarily go to SMEs but it is certainly closer. We have this in mind because 80 per cent of eurozone employment is SMEs.
Imagine a fundamentally solvent European bank, ie a bank without periphery sovereign debt all over its balance sheet. Imaging that this bank has a number of customers who want to borrow money for certain projects, say a mine or a wind power project. Given the risk for the bank inherent in the project, the bank want the money bank back in three years, and a margin of at least 10 %. The bank can currently raise money at a cost of 4 %, and hence demand an interest rate of 14 % on the loan to issue it. This rate of interest turns the net present value of the project negative, so no loan is made and the project doesn't happen.
Imagine instead that the bank pledges some of its quality assets to the ECB and gets to borrow at 1 %. Hence, they only demand 11 % interest from the developer, which turns the NPV positive, the money is lent, the project happens and demand increases.
Or am I missing something here? Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
It's not really the LTRO money. The key here is 8 December 2011 - ECB announces measures to support bank lending and money market activity
The NCBs are allowed, as a temporary solution, to accept as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations additional performing credit claims that satisfy specific eligibility criteria. The responsibility entailed in the acceptance of such credit claims will be borne by the NCB authorising their use. Details of the criteria for the use of credit claims will be announced in due course.
Also, Steve Keen's Dude! Where's My Recovery?
This is bizarre, since as long as 4 decades ago, the actual situation was put very simply by the then Senior Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Alan Holmes. Holmes explained why the then faddish Monetarist policy of controlling inflation by controlling the growth of Base Money had failed, saying that it suffered from "a naive assumption" that: The banking system only expands loans after the [Federal Reserve] System (or market factors) have put reserves in the banking system. In the real world, banks extend credit, creating deposits in the process, and look for the reserves later. The question then becomes one of whether and how the Federal Reserve will accommodate the demand for reserves. In the very short run, the Federal Reserve has little or no choice about accommodating that demand; over time, its influence can obviously be felt. (Alan R. Holmes, 1969, p. 73; emphasis added)The empirical fact that "loans create deposits" means that the change in the level of private debt is matched by a change in the level of money, which boosts aggregate demand. The level of private debt therefore cannot be ignored--and the fact that neoclassical economists did ignore it (and, with the likes of Greenspan running the Fed, actively promoted its growth) is why this is no "garden variety" downturn. In all the post-WWII recessions on which Lazear's regression was based, the downturn ended when the growth of private debt turned positive again and boosted aggregate demand. This of itself is not a bad thing: as Schumpeter argued decades ago, in a well-functioning capitalist system, the main recipients of credit are entrepreneurs who have an idea, but not the money needed to put it into action: [I]n so far as credit cannot be given out of the results of past enterprise ... it can only consist of credit means of payment created ad hoc, which can be backed neither by money in the strict sense nor by products already in existence... It provides us with the connection between lending and credit means of payment, and leads us to what I regard as the nature of the credit phenomenon... credit is essentially the creation of purchasing power for the purpose of transferring it to the entrepreneur, but not simply the transfer of existing purchasing power." (Joseph Alois Schumpeter, 1934, pp. 106-107)
The banking system only expands loans after the [Federal Reserve] System (or market factors) have put reserves in the banking system. In the real world, banks extend credit, creating deposits in the process, and look for the reserves later. The question then becomes one of whether and how the Federal Reserve will accommodate the demand for reserves. In the very short run, the Federal Reserve has little or no choice about accommodating that demand; over time, its influence can obviously be felt. (Alan R. Holmes, 1969, p. 73; emphasis added)
In all the post-WWII recessions on which Lazear's regression was based, the downturn ended when the growth of private debt turned positive again and boosted aggregate demand. This of itself is not a bad thing: as Schumpeter argued decades ago, in a well-functioning capitalist system, the main recipients of credit are entrepreneurs who have an idea, but not the money needed to put it into action:
[I]n so far as credit cannot be given out of the results of past enterprise ... it can only consist of credit means of payment created ad hoc, which can be backed neither by money in the strict sense nor by products already in existence... It provides us with the connection between lending and credit means of payment, and leads us to what I regard as the nature of the credit phenomenon... credit is essentially the creation of purchasing power for the purpose of transferring it to the entrepreneur, but not simply the transfer of existing purchasing power." (Joseph Alois Schumpeter, 1934, pp. 106-107)
It provides us with the connection between lending and credit means of payment, and leads us to what I regard as the nature of the credit phenomenon... credit is essentially the creation of purchasing power for the purpose of transferring it to the entrepreneur, but not simply the transfer of existing purchasing power." (Joseph Alois Schumpeter, 1934, pp. 106-107)
This ensures that the liquidity for a mid-term project won't suddenly disappear in a poof of neo-Hayekian idiocy.
Mig argued that they had already done what you said they were doing when they expanded the eligibility for the MRO.
I agree with you that this has a greater scope, precisely because it can not be revoked with a week's notice. But I also agree with Mig that the scope is not as much greater as the BuBa (wants to) believe.
Angelo Baglioni Writing in Lavoce, Angelo Baglioni writes that very little of trillion euro LTRO shows is likely to end up with the real economy (a point also made by Fitch Ratings yesterday). He said the sole effect of this operation is to support government bonds. If the ECB were to assume the role of lender of last resort, it would favour a policy to strengthen the traditional banking lending channel. As it stands, however, the economy continues to be weighed down by credit constrains, which will exacerbate the recession.
Writing in Lavoce, Angelo Baglioni writes that very little of trillion euro LTRO shows is likely to end up with the real economy (a point also made by Fitch Ratings yesterday). He said the sole effect of this operation is to support government bonds. If the ECB were to assume the role of lender of last resort, it would favour a policy to strengthen the traditional banking lending channel. As it stands, however, the economy continues to be weighed down by credit constrains, which will exacerbate the recession.
Current accounts are the cornerstone of the European payments business.
They provide a stable and inexpensive source of funding for banks,
and interest on balances provides the major portion of payments-related income in Europe.
As banks' stickiest product, current accounts are an excellent basis for selling other products and building a broad relationship with a customer.
Important challenges loom, however. Even as overall payments revenue is projected to grow from 30 to 35 percent of total banking revenues in Europe between 2007 and 2012, income from current accounts is under attack.
0% current account deposit of 100 zlotys 5% mortgage for 100 zlotys
Profit!
And as we've pointed out repeatedly loans don't require deposit. They create deposits.
If I have 100 of your zloty and I lend 100 zloty to Jake, I credit 100 zloty to Jake's account so now you still have your 100 zloty deposit and Jake has a spanking new 100 zloty deposit. So my loan to Jake doubles my deposits from 100 to 200. I am not loaning to Jake from your 100. Your 100 are still available to you, as are Jake's 100. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
But you only have to satisfy the reserve requirement after Jake already has his loan. In extremis you will borrow the reserves from the central bank at a penalty rate. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
But that's actually incidental, because you make the loan to me, and turn around and rediscount the note with the CB on the very same day.
Why in the world would anyone go into such a business?
Well, for one I am not certain that I did get more in interest last year then they nicked in fees, but anyhow there are a couple of possible reasons:
The difference is that central bank lending to banks is collateralised quite stringently, whereas customer deposits are not collateralised. In fact, they are guaranteed by the government and the cost to banks of taking part in deposit insurance schemes is rather low. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
If the bank lends you money, the opportunity cost of that money is the Fed funds rate. This, along with legal limits on how much lending it may pile on top of its equity, is the operational constraint on bank lending. This is irrespective of the rate it pays on deposits, or the volume of deposits.
Yes, it can use deposits to defray that expense, if it can obtain them at less than the Fed funds rate. But if it can obtain deposits at less than the Fed funds rate, it could also just place them in the interbank market or at the discount window to make the Fed funds rate on them. If the bank made no loans at all, it would still be trying to attract those deposits. And if the bank had no depositors, it would not alter one whit the quantity or interest rate of its lending.
OK, in Goldman's case this is not true. Goldman doesn't take deposits because of a business case for taking deposits. Goldman takes deposits so it can hold them hostage if the federal government decides that Goldman needs to go away. But Goldman is special.
Much to the displeasure of the Bank of Spain, the sector has been engaging in a deposit war now for several months in order to improve liquidity after the debt crisis in the euro zone cut off traditional wholesale funding sources for many lenders. Some banks are offering annual deposit rates of 4 percent, thereby, narrowing their margins and restricting their ability to lend. The practice also ends up increasing the borrowing costs of households and companies. The decree move follows repeated calls by the central bank to put an end to what it feels is a self-defeating practice.
Some banks are offering annual deposit rates of 4 percent, thereby, narrowing their margins and restricting their ability to lend. The practice also ends up increasing the borrowing costs of households and companies.
The decree move follows repeated calls by the central bank to put an end to what it feels is a self-defeating practice.
What does the bank get out of having that cash there?
The other banks can only create the money they lend. When they have to make an actual payment to another bank, they need actual money (i.e., liquidity). There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
"It holds it as custodian and pays interest on it."
So now it is used for interbank payments too?
The other banks can only create the money they lend. .
Not so, they create money when they spend as well, except that this spent money becomes the object of an (undated) demand deposit in the recipient's current account.
What happens with the (dated) loan is that the money is created, deposited and then instantaneously lent via what is essentially a repo of virtual (fiat 'look-alike') cash.
I find it useful to distinguish between dated and undated deposits.
Banks must always balance - in aggregate - dated (term-even overnight) deposits and dated (loan) assets.
Undated demand deposits (reserves) which are held by banks at the Central Bank are reflected in the balance sheet by:
(a) the (undated) ownership claim of the banks equity capital; and
(b) the (undated) claim of demand depositors in respect of their current account balances. "The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson
No wonder they are in trouble.
They lend to each other, and to customers, at whatever the respective markets will bear.
And it's not my theory. It is a fact Competition for deposits in 2010-11 got insane and they were offering up to 4% for demand deposits (not time deposits!) which did squeeze margins as they were not increasing what they were charging for their lending in a commensurate way. And so the Central Bank got worried, especially as competition for deposits is a zero-sum game among banks and does not improve the overall health of the banking system.
However, what deposits (as liabilities) do is allow banks to book cash as assets. At a minimum they can park this cash as central bank reserves making a measly 0.25%. And, as assets, central bank reserves and cash don't count as risk weighted assets and therefore don't count in capital adequacy requirements (i.e., they don't imply regulatory or market needs for additional equity) whereas a loan which may collect 7% or upwards as interest income is a risky asset which does count as risk-weighted assets for capital adequacy purposes and does lead to additional equity requirements. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
At a minimum they can park this cash as central bank reserves making a measly 0.25%. And, as assets, central bank reserves and cash don't count as risk weighted assets and therefore don't count in capital adequacy requirements
So they put some of it in the central bank, which increases their cash asset base which allows them to lend and buy more profitable assets - in theory. But suddenly, the deposit taking doesn't seem like a service business, it seems like a vital part of bank capital management. In order to lend, they must have some cash reserves. And one big source of cash reserves is - deposits!
To me you are taking a true observation: that with access to central bank reserves and fancy accounting, bank lending is not constrained to be a fraction of deposits, and then extending it over the cliff as an argument that deposits don't have any effect on bank lending capability - something you contradict in the quoted sentence above.
Then the interbank maket seized and it took with it Northern Rock and Lehman Brothers. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
Everything leading up to it is false, and it won't have the effect on the financial system you think it will. But it's still a good idea for other reasons.
US embassy cables: Mervyn King says in March 2008 bailout fund needed | Business | guardian.co.uk
The problem is now not liquidity in the system but rather a question of systemic solvency, Bank of England (BOE) Governor Mervyn King said at a lunch meeting with Treasury Deputy Secretary Robert Kimmitt and Ambassador Tuttle. King said there are two imperatives. First to find ways for banks to avoid the stigma of selling unwanted paper at distressed prices or going to a central bank for assistance.
I understand this to mean that banking as a whole since 2008 is in permanent crisis. This causing stuff like temporarily panics for deposits to short-term meet requirements that would otherwise send them into receivership or to government help centrals. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
This is what the ECB's LTRO is about: allowing banks to get into an all-cash position for up to 3 years to weather the coming storm. Draghi to banks: winter is coming and it's going to last at least a year. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
I must be dumb indeed, because here's what I understand Jake to be saying: the banks borrow from customers at 4% the banks deposit that money in the central bank at nearly zero interest. That would make no sense.
But suddenly, the deposit taking doesn't seem like a service business, it seems like a vital part of bank capital management.
In order to lend, they must have some cash reserves. And one big source of cash reserves is - deposits!
Having extended a loan, they must obtain some cash reserves. They can always do this (so long as they are solvent and the central bank defends a policy rate) by rediscounting the loan with the central bank.
In order to lend, they must have some cash reserves. And one big source of cash reserves is - deposits!Not so. Having extended a loan, they must obtain some cash reserves. They can always do this (so long as they are solvent and the central bank defends a policy rate) by rediscounting the loan with the central bank.
And, again, your point is? There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
I have called it insane. The Spanish Central Bank called it self-defeating and after a year of asking pretty please it issued a directive banning the practice.
So, your point is? There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
In the short term, price wars are good for consumers, who can take advantage of lower prices. Often they are not good for the companies involved. The lower prices reduce profit margins and can threaten their survival. In the medium to long term, they can be good for the dominant firms in the industry. Typically, the smaller, more marginal, firms cannot compete and must close. The remaining firms absorb the market share of those that have closed. The real losers then, are the marginal firms and their investors. In the long term, the consumer may lose too. With fewer firms in the industry, prices tend to increase, sometimes higher than before the price war started.
In the medium to long term, they can be good for the dominant firms in the industry. Typically, the smaller, more marginal, firms cannot compete and must close. The remaining firms absorb the market share of those that have closed. The real losers then, are the marginal firms and their investors. In the long term, the consumer may lose too. With fewer firms in the industry, prices tend to increase, sometimes higher than before the price war started.
So the motivation for this price war is somewhat elusive. The prestige of being a custodian and paying interest?
I'm more used to looking businesses that try make profits or at least revenue. This concept of borrowing money from depositors as a beneficent service has me befuddled.
Also it brings the customer in the door so they can be sold loans. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
But more importantly, depositors don't ask for collateral. The discount window does. So when your balance sheet is full of shit, you are willing to pay your depositors for the privilege of not being asked questions.
If your balance sheet is not full of shit, however, there is no particular reason to prefer creditors who do not ask questions over ones who do.
- Jake
1A lot of bankers (and, unfortunately, regulators) are witch doctors who target cutesy rules of thumb like "lending/deposit ratio," Taylor rules or "even banks around the rediscount rate." Most of these rules of thumb are bullshit, but pass for plausible under ordinary conditions, because they basically amount to "do the same thing you did yesterday." Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
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