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Profit comes from giving people loans. Deposits are a way to get people in through the door so you can sell them the loan. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
Generating 74 percent of total payments related income, current accounts (known as DDA in the United States) are the core of the European payments business. In 2007, retail current accounts contributed 39 billion in profit, mainly from interest on balances, out of total payments-related profit of 68 billion. Corporate accounts added another 11 billion.
We are currently in a weird situation where banks do not have many places to invest deposits profitably. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/business/banks-flooded-with-cash-they-cant-profitably-use.html?pag ewanted=all
But your model of how depository banks work is wrong.
Not that I expect you to revise that, but anyway, here are two post you could read about it.
Naked Capitalism: Banks are not reserve constrained
Some people still believe in the money multiplier taught in old economic textbooks that fractional reserve banking has banks taking deposits, multiplying them as much as possible, subject to the reserve ratio, and making a much larger amount loans. That is not how it works. In practice, banks don't wait for the reserves to be available to issue loans. They make loans first and then borrow the reserves in the interbank market. The loans come first, not the reserves. Banks are never constrained by reserves or reserve ratios. Banks are capital constrained. In our fiat money system, the central bank uses reserves in the system to help the it hit a target interest rate. So, the central bank provides the system with enough reserves to meet any reserve ratio at its target rate. The reserves are about helping set interest rates, not about pyramiding money on a reserve base. Understanding this should also help you understand why QE has been a boon for financial speculation but a bust in the real economy:
Banks are never constrained by reserves or reserve ratios. Banks are capital constrained. In our fiat money system, the central bank uses reserves in the system to help the it hit a target interest rate. So, the central bank provides the system with enough reserves to meet any reserve ratio at its target rate. The reserves are about helping set interest rates, not about pyramiding money on a reserve base.
Understanding this should also help you understand why QE has been a boon for financial speculation but a bust in the real economy:
Lest it be said that I'm parodying neoclassical economics, or relying on what lesser lights believe when the leaders of the profession know better, here are two apposite quotes from Ben Bernanke and Paul Krugman. ... They are profoundly wrong on this point because neoclassical economists do not understand how money is created by the private banking system--despite decades of empirical research to the contrary, they continue to cling to the textbook vision of banks as mere intermediaries between savers and borrowers. This is bizarre, since as long as 4 decades ago, the actual situation was put very simply by the then Senior Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Alan Holmes. Holmes explained why the then faddish Monetarist policy of controlling inflation by controlling the growth of Base Money had failed, saying that it suffered from "a naive assumption" that:the banking system only expands loans after the [Federal Reserve] System (or market factors) have put reserves in the banking system. In the real world, banks extend credit, creating deposits in the process, and look for the reserves later. The question then becomes one of whether and how the Federal Reserve will accommodate the demand for reserves. In the very short run, the Federal Reserve has little or no choice about accommodating that demand; over time, its influence can obviously be felt. (Alan R. Holmes, 1969, p. 73; emphasis added)The empirical fact that "loans create deposits" means that the change in the level of private debt is matched by a change in the level of money, which boosts aggregate demand. The level of private debt therefore cannot be ignored--and the fact that neoclassical economists did ignore it (and, with the likes of Greenspan running the Fed, actively promoted its growth) is why this is no "garden variety" downturn.
...
They are profoundly wrong on this point because neoclassical economists do not understand how money is created by the private banking system--despite decades of empirical research to the contrary, they continue to cling to the textbook vision of banks as mere intermediaries between savers and borrowers.
This is bizarre, since as long as 4 decades ago, the actual situation was put very simply by the then Senior Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Alan Holmes. Holmes explained why the then faddish Monetarist policy of controlling inflation by controlling the growth of Base Money had failed, saying that it suffered from "a naive assumption" that:
the banking system only expands loans after the [Federal Reserve] System (or market factors) have put reserves in the banking system. In the real world, banks extend credit, creating deposits in the process, and look for the reserves later. The question then becomes one of whether and how the Federal Reserve will accommodate the demand for reserves. In the very short run, the Federal Reserve has little or no choice about accommodating that demand; over time, its influence can obviously be felt. (Alan R. Holmes, 1969, p. 73; emphasis added)
Do you think McKinsey is just making it up? Do you think that Citibank has $1trillion in notes just sitting in a vault?
If Goldman had no solvent customers to lend to, they would still be issuing those. Because they are not issuing them to fund lending, they are issuing them to arbitrage against the discount window (or the interbank market, but that comes to the same thing in the final analysis).
Now, it is certainly possible - in principle - for the central bank to create a high enough spread between the support rate and the main refinancing rate that the absence of solvent customers would disincentivise banks from accepting deposits. But that's not the case today, has not been the case historically, and there is no obvious reason for the central bank to ever do so in the future.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
But I repeat myself
We're in a liquidity crisis and banks want to be in an all-cash asset position.
Soooo... why don't the ECB lower their rates on excess reserves to zero?
They don't do it permanently, because the remuneration rate for excess reserves sets the floor under the interbank rate. Which the CB wants to do if it wants to conduct active interest rate policy. It shouldn't do that IMO (I favour a zero interest rate policy and conducting monetary policy at the exchange rate and margin requirements instead), but that's a subject for another time.
Or even a negative nominal number?
14. 23 Some fascinating comments from Draghi -- delivered with obvious relish -- on what he sees as the real potential benefits of the LTRO to the real economy. He stresses that the number of banks tapping the cheap three year finance jumped from some 500 in December to 800 this time. Many of the new takers were small banks in Germany and elsewhere. I would love to read you the places, the towns, the villages where these banks are but often they would be the only bank in towns so they could be identified. But this tells me one thing - this money is now closer to the small and medium-sized businesses than it was before. I'm not saying this money will necessarily go to SMEs but it is certainly closer. We have this in mind because 80 per cent of eurozone employment is SMEs.
I would love to read you the places, the towns, the villages where these banks are but often they would be the only bank in towns so they could be identified. But this tells me one thing - this money is now closer to the small and medium-sized businesses than it was before. I'm not saying this money will necessarily go to SMEs but it is certainly closer. We have this in mind because 80 per cent of eurozone employment is SMEs.
Imagine a fundamentally solvent European bank, ie a bank without periphery sovereign debt all over its balance sheet. Imaging that this bank has a number of customers who want to borrow money for certain projects, say a mine or a wind power project. Given the risk for the bank inherent in the project, the bank want the money bank back in three years, and a margin of at least 10 %. The bank can currently raise money at a cost of 4 %, and hence demand an interest rate of 14 % on the loan to issue it. This rate of interest turns the net present value of the project negative, so no loan is made and the project doesn't happen.
Imagine instead that the bank pledges some of its quality assets to the ECB and gets to borrow at 1 %. Hence, they only demand 11 % interest from the developer, which turns the NPV positive, the money is lent, the project happens and demand increases.
Or am I missing something here? Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
It's not really the LTRO money. The key here is 8 December 2011 - ECB announces measures to support bank lending and money market activity
The NCBs are allowed, as a temporary solution, to accept as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations additional performing credit claims that satisfy specific eligibility criteria. The responsibility entailed in the acceptance of such credit claims will be borne by the NCB authorising their use. Details of the criteria for the use of credit claims will be announced in due course.
Also, Steve Keen's Dude! Where's My Recovery?
This is bizarre, since as long as 4 decades ago, the actual situation was put very simply by the then Senior Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Alan Holmes. Holmes explained why the then faddish Monetarist policy of controlling inflation by controlling the growth of Base Money had failed, saying that it suffered from "a naive assumption" that: The banking system only expands loans after the [Federal Reserve] System (or market factors) have put reserves in the banking system. In the real world, banks extend credit, creating deposits in the process, and look for the reserves later. The question then becomes one of whether and how the Federal Reserve will accommodate the demand for reserves. In the very short run, the Federal Reserve has little or no choice about accommodating that demand; over time, its influence can obviously be felt. (Alan R. Holmes, 1969, p. 73; emphasis added)The empirical fact that "loans create deposits" means that the change in the level of private debt is matched by a change in the level of money, which boosts aggregate demand. The level of private debt therefore cannot be ignored--and the fact that neoclassical economists did ignore it (and, with the likes of Greenspan running the Fed, actively promoted its growth) is why this is no "garden variety" downturn. In all the post-WWII recessions on which Lazear's regression was based, the downturn ended when the growth of private debt turned positive again and boosted aggregate demand. This of itself is not a bad thing: as Schumpeter argued decades ago, in a well-functioning capitalist system, the main recipients of credit are entrepreneurs who have an idea, but not the money needed to put it into action: [I]n so far as credit cannot be given out of the results of past enterprise ... it can only consist of credit means of payment created ad hoc, which can be backed neither by money in the strict sense nor by products already in existence... It provides us with the connection between lending and credit means of payment, and leads us to what I regard as the nature of the credit phenomenon... credit is essentially the creation of purchasing power for the purpose of transferring it to the entrepreneur, but not simply the transfer of existing purchasing power." (Joseph Alois Schumpeter, 1934, pp. 106-107)
The banking system only expands loans after the [Federal Reserve] System (or market factors) have put reserves in the banking system. In the real world, banks extend credit, creating deposits in the process, and look for the reserves later. The question then becomes one of whether and how the Federal Reserve will accommodate the demand for reserves. In the very short run, the Federal Reserve has little or no choice about accommodating that demand; over time, its influence can obviously be felt. (Alan R. Holmes, 1969, p. 73; emphasis added)
In all the post-WWII recessions on which Lazear's regression was based, the downturn ended when the growth of private debt turned positive again and boosted aggregate demand. This of itself is not a bad thing: as Schumpeter argued decades ago, in a well-functioning capitalist system, the main recipients of credit are entrepreneurs who have an idea, but not the money needed to put it into action:
[I]n so far as credit cannot be given out of the results of past enterprise ... it can only consist of credit means of payment created ad hoc, which can be backed neither by money in the strict sense nor by products already in existence... It provides us with the connection between lending and credit means of payment, and leads us to what I regard as the nature of the credit phenomenon... credit is essentially the creation of purchasing power for the purpose of transferring it to the entrepreneur, but not simply the transfer of existing purchasing power." (Joseph Alois Schumpeter, 1934, pp. 106-107)
It provides us with the connection between lending and credit means of payment, and leads us to what I regard as the nature of the credit phenomenon... credit is essentially the creation of purchasing power for the purpose of transferring it to the entrepreneur, but not simply the transfer of existing purchasing power." (Joseph Alois Schumpeter, 1934, pp. 106-107)
This ensures that the liquidity for a mid-term project won't suddenly disappear in a poof of neo-Hayekian idiocy.
Mig argued that they had already done what you said they were doing when they expanded the eligibility for the MRO.
I agree with you that this has a greater scope, precisely because it can not be revoked with a week's notice. But I also agree with Mig that the scope is not as much greater as the BuBa (wants to) believe.
Angelo Baglioni Writing in Lavoce, Angelo Baglioni writes that very little of trillion euro LTRO shows is likely to end up with the real economy (a point also made by Fitch Ratings yesterday). He said the sole effect of this operation is to support government bonds. If the ECB were to assume the role of lender of last resort, it would favour a policy to strengthen the traditional banking lending channel. As it stands, however, the economy continues to be weighed down by credit constrains, which will exacerbate the recession.
Writing in Lavoce, Angelo Baglioni writes that very little of trillion euro LTRO shows is likely to end up with the real economy (a point also made by Fitch Ratings yesterday). He said the sole effect of this operation is to support government bonds. If the ECB were to assume the role of lender of last resort, it would favour a policy to strengthen the traditional banking lending channel. As it stands, however, the economy continues to be weighed down by credit constrains, which will exacerbate the recession.
Current accounts are the cornerstone of the European payments business.
They provide a stable and inexpensive source of funding for banks,
and interest on balances provides the major portion of payments-related income in Europe.
As banks' stickiest product, current accounts are an excellent basis for selling other products and building a broad relationship with a customer.
Important challenges loom, however. Even as overall payments revenue is projected to grow from 30 to 35 percent of total banking revenues in Europe between 2007 and 2012, income from current accounts is under attack.
0% current account deposit of 100 zlotys 5% mortgage for 100 zlotys
Profit!
And as we've pointed out repeatedly loans don't require deposit. They create deposits.
If I have 100 of your zloty and I lend 100 zloty to Jake, I credit 100 zloty to Jake's account so now you still have your 100 zloty deposit and Jake has a spanking new 100 zloty deposit. So my loan to Jake doubles my deposits from 100 to 200. I am not loaning to Jake from your 100. Your 100 are still available to you, as are Jake's 100. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
But you only have to satisfy the reserve requirement after Jake already has his loan. In extremis you will borrow the reserves from the central bank at a penalty rate. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
But that's actually incidental, because you make the loan to me, and turn around and rediscount the note with the CB on the very same day.
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