Top Diaries

Again, the euro is not the problem.

Yes, it is.

Right wing policies are the problem.

The euro is governed by institutionalized right-wing policies.

It is possible to do left wing policies and solidarity with a strong currency and limited public debt.

"If we only had the right people in charge...."

Be nice to America. Or we'll bring democracy to your country.

by Drew J Jones (pedobear@pennstatefootball.com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 12:08:37 PM EST
[ Parent ]

I still think the policies and ideologies of the people in charge do matter.

by IM on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 12:11:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]

I do, too, but that doesn't mean the crisis would cease to exist if the EU were governed by socialists.

Be nice to America. Or we'll bring democracy to your country.

by Drew J Jones (pedobear@pennstatefootball.com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 12:13:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]

why not? A different reaction to crisis will give different results?

by IM on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 12:14:28 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Because reactions the other way are hamstrung by the nature of the system.

There's also the obvious problem that all of the so-called socialists are with the austerians on this lunacy.

Be nice to America. Or we'll bring democracy to your country.

by Drew J Jones (pedobear@pennstatefootball.com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 12:18:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]

I don't believe in unchangeable systems. Or in unchangeable directions of political parties, for what. The future is still unwritten etc.

by IM on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 12:20:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]

That's fine if you're talking about five or ten years from now (at best), but that's a bit late here.

Be nice to America. Or we'll bring democracy to your country.

by Drew J Jones (pedobear@pennstatefootball.com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 12:23:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Let's have that conversation in 6 months (4.00 / 2)

if the socialists win in France and trigger a new Europe-wide debate on the treaties. Hollande is saying a lot of good things today.

Wind power

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 12:42:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Let's have that conversation in 6 months (4.00 / 4)

Clegg was saying a lot of good things before he was elected.

Now it's clear it was all lies and PR, and his real interest is in abetting the Tory agenda to the maximum possible extent.

This has been a consistent pattern by 'left' leaders since at least the mid 90s.

Hollande is already something of a Third Way-ist. So excuse my cynicism if I don't expect great things of him. (Although I'll be delighted if I'm proved wrong.)

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 05:14:50 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Let's have that conversation in 6 months (none / 1)

Eurointelligence Daily Briefing: Complacency watch: Why raise the size of the ESM when the markets are calming? (19.03.2012)

Hollande does not manage to get an explicit support from the European left to renegotiate the fiscal pact
According to Les Echos, Francois Hollande on Saturday managed to overcome the impression of being isolated in Europe by bringing his European counterparts like SPD chairman Sigmar Gabriel and Italy's Democratic Party leader Pier Luigi Bersani others to a common electoral rally to Paris. According to Le Figaro he mocked the ,,holy alliance" that conservative Europeans leaders like Angela Merkel, David Cameron, Mario Monti and Donald Tusk had put in place by agreeing not to meet with him during the election campaign. But the announcements about a renegotiation of the fiscal pact stayed very vague and the idea of a common ,,Paris Declaration" that Hollande would have liked to publish was dropped because of a lack of agreement on what to say on the fiscal pact, the paper writes. According to Les Echos, Gabriel said he was in favour of ,,complementing the treaty with a real European initiative in favour of growth" but he said nothing that the SPD would use its influence on the vote to force Merkel's hands. According to Financial Times Deutschland, however, Gabriel wants to wait for the French presidential elections before ratifying the fiscal pact in order to be able to force her to agree to an EU growth initiative.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 05:28:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Let's have that conversation in 6 months (4.00 / 4)

The Holy Alliance (also called the Grand Alliance) was a fourth coalition of Russia, Austria and Prussia created in 1815 at the behest of Czar Alexander I of Russia, signed by the three powers in Paris on September 26, 1815, in the Congress of Vienna after the defeat of Napoleon. Ostensibly it was to instill the Christian values of charity and peace in European political life, but _in practice Klemens Wenzel von Metternich made it a bastion against revolution. The monarchs of the three countries involved used this to band together in order to prevent revolutionary influence (especially from the French Revolution) from entering these nations. It was against democracy, revolution, and secularism. The Alliance is usually associated with the Quadruple and Quintuple Alliances, which included the United Kingdom and (from 1818) France with the aim of upholding the European peace settlement concluded at the Congress of Vienna. The Alliance was conventionally taken to have become defunct with Alexander's death in 1825.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 05:30:05 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Let's have that conversation in 6 months (none / 1)

The Holy Alliance (Russia, Austria and Prussia) refused Ferdinand's request for help, but the Quadruple Alliance (Britain, France, the Netherlands and Austria) at the Congress of Vienna in October 1822 gave France a mandate to intervene and restore the Spanish monarchy. On 22 January 1823, a secret treaty was signed at the congress of Verona, allowing France to invade Spain to restore Ferdinand VII as an absolute monarch. With this agreement from the Holy Alliance, on 28 January 1823 Louis XVIII announced that "a hundred thousand Frenchmen are ready to march, invoking the name of Saint Louis, to safeguard the throne of Spain for a grandson of Henry IV of France". At the end of February, France's Chambres voted an extraordinary grant for the expedition. Châteaubriand and the ultra-royalists rejoiced - the royal army was going to prove its bravery and devotion in the face of Spanish liberals, fighting for the glory of the Bourbon monarchy.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 05:33:29 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Let's have that conversation in 6 months (4.00 / 3)

Otto, Royal Prince of Bavaria, then Othon, King of Greece (Greek: Ὄθων, Βασιλεὺς τῆς Ἑλλάδος, Óthon, Vasiléfs tis Elládos; 1 June 1815 - 26 July 1867) was made the first modern King of Greece in 1832 under the Convention of London, whereby Greece became a new kingdom under the protection of the Great Powers (the United Kingdom, France and the Russian Empire).
The second son of the philhellene King Ludwig I of Bavaria, Otto ascended the newly created throne of Greece while still a minor. His government was initially run by a three-man regency council made up of Bavarian court officials. Upon reaching his majority, Otto removed the regents when they proved unpopular with the people and he ruled as an absolute monarch. Eventually his subjects' demands for a Constitution proved overwhelming and in the face of an armed but peaceful insurrection, Otto granted a Constitution in 1843.

by Katrin on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 05:49:38 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Let's have that conversation in 6 months (4.00 / 2)

I didn't know we were that close to success in the project to reverse the French Revolution...

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 06:03:07 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Nobody says Fico will save us! But if a critical mass is reached - perhaps after the elections in France. So in half a year, a year things could change.

by IM on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 12:48:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Though he was for me the last Democrat left standing I still gave Obama six months before I despaired of his doing anything constructive about the problems with the banks and finance, so perhaps we should give Hollande at least until the summer solstice. In truth, from what I have seen of his positions on ET, I am not too optimistic of his being able to make the sort of fundamental challenges to the course and policies being followed to be able to succeed in effecting basic change.

Since the fall of 2008 I have believed and maintained that the problems with the existing system and the reasons why it must be reformed must be forcefully presented to the public in order to prepare them to accept and then demand basic reforms. But the existing system remains a quasi-sacred order and candidates will only talk about changes at the margins. I find it hard to see that changing absent an even more fundamental collapse of that system - one that cannot be papered over with fiat currency created and given only to bankers.

At present all remain caught in the spell of the existing system. In Europe that takes the form of the myth of the EU and the Euro. It is as though the bankers have left us as wasps leave victim insects - paralyzed but alive as food for their larvae. Someone or some event must break the spell. The sooner the better.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 06:29:02 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: solidarity (4.00 / 3)

Obama is finally beginning to make some noises about finance.

But it is an election year, so some cynicism is reasonable.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 05:17:56 AM EST
[ Parent ]

See here about Obama and the "Hedge Fund Democrats"

Actually, I've seen this in action at meetings where financial big wheels and professors mingle. You'd think that the people with the big bucks would be confident; on the contrary, they're insecure, because they want respect for their minds. And I know for a fact that some of Obama's big-money early backers were motivated in large part by the lure of being in the inner circle in a way that someone like Hillary, with her long record and connections, couldn't offer.

They supported Obama because as a relative Washington outsider they though he'd sell slots in his inner circle? And now after 4 years Obama has developed the Washington connections and doesn't need the Masters of the Universe any more? Is that it?

And now Obama says what anyone paying attention would: that these big-money people were, to some extent, making their money in socially destructive ways -- and they go insane, precisely because in their hearts they know that he's right.
And because money talks in politics, this pettiness, this display of ego and hurt vanity, may have disastrous consequences.

(Krugman)

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 05:25:21 AM EST
[ Parent ]

From my experience, the big wigs from different elites (financial and academical in this example) are as a rule insecure when they meet, because they need each other to confirm that they are indeed important and great men. And as a rule they get it.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 07:50:43 AM EST
[ Parent ]

After all the purpose of power, according to psychologist David A. McCelelland, at an individual psychological level, is to feel powerful. Ain't life grand.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Fri Mar 30th, 2012 at 02:31:56 PM EST
[ Parent ]

This is Rorschach. The concept of 'Power' in its broadest assertive sense is unknown to the vast majority living on this planet. The word the majority relates to, even if they are unable to express it directly or clearly, is 'dignity'.

Dignity is the perception that individual life is worthwhile, giving is rewarding, and that one is not powerless to effect change where injustice is witnessed.

You can't be me, I'm taken

by Sven Triloqvist on Fri Mar 30th, 2012 at 02:43:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]

I believe what McClelland was trying to assess was how 'power' was perceived by those who were perceived to have it - across three cultures, but it has been >35 years since I read the work. The title of his book was Power - The Inner Experience 1975. At the time he was head of the Dept. of Psychology at Harvard.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Fri Mar 30th, 2012 at 05:19:20 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Those who have power demand dignity. Those with out power simply want dignity.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Fri Mar 30th, 2012 at 05:20:52 PM EST
[ Parent ]

On this point, you might refer IM to Yes, Minister and Yes, Prime Minister.

by rifek on Thu Mar 22nd, 2012 at 05:15:02 PM EST
[ Parent ]

The euro is governed by institutionalized right-wing policies.

Precisely. The Euro makes neoliberal la-la-land the law of the land. Which means not only that sensible economic policies are subversive, but that the system is on a collision course with economic reality (Fisher's debt deflation).

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 01:27:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Again - lower taxes and balanced budgets are NOT THE SAME THING. German austerians are not against tax increases to balance budgets. It's the combination with neoliberal policies which is absolutely toxic.

And when your creditworthiness is decided in London, being prudent with debt is not geostrategically silly. We worry about our energy coming from Russia, but we should worry about our money being valued by the Anglos.

Wind power

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 06:54:30 PM EST
[ Parent ]

We should also worry about the ECB being the only sovereign in the Eurozone.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 06:56:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]

When will you drop the Anglo paranoia? There's enough idiocy on display in Brussels, Frankfurt and Basel without needing to blame the City.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 06:57:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]

I think I must agree with Migeru here. The rating agencies and Wall Street banks might carry huge culpability in creating the US crisis (as predicted by Jerome here on the ET), but the Euro crisis is entirely homegrown.

Remember; it's not like investors always even care about the rating agencies. Japan was downgraded years and years ago, and their sovereign rates have been falling ever since. When S&P downrated the US, US bonds soared, while it was the stock market which went into the toilet.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:01:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]

caring about ratings (4.00 / 8)

is a purely anglo thing, coming from reliance on capital markets (rather than debt lending) for finance. It has led to the quest for valuing everything in monetary terms (so that it can be traded), liquidity (or lack thereof) in everything, the concept of riskless assets, and a general lack of due diligence in your lending practices. You rely on the rating rather than on your own analysis (and I've seen this from the inside - using ratings are the absolutely easiest way to be lazy inside a bank).

The lack of due diligence should not be a problem if the stupid money is punished (and not bailed out - this is where financial capitalism will break), but the reliance on monetising and valuing everything through the prism of finance brings short-termism, the "there is no society" mindset and, in the absence of a strong State, runaway greed & al.

So "anglo" is a short cut for the Reagan/Thatcher ideology, but there are roots for it where it came from.

Wind power

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:17:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: caring about ratings (4.00 / 2)

using ratings are the absolutely easiest way to be lazy inside a bank

Heh. Everytime the guys from the bank come and suggest we buy this or that corporate bond (I help manage some research stipend money) and say that it has this or that rating, I give them a look and mutter something about MBS's or CDO's or the S&P downrate of the US, and then they look rather sheepish. :)

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:23:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: caring about ratings (none / 0)

In a society where everything is market-based, everything has either a market value or no value. And no fair factoring back in the externalities the market makers have so cleverly swept under the rug.

I've always found it amusing that the Royals were generally fans of Maggie when her markets-ueber-alles approach was directly contrary to every interest and tradition of the monarchy.

by rifek on Thu Mar 22nd, 2012 at 05:31:22 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: solidarity (4.00 / 4)

Migeru:

There's enough idiocy on display in Brussels, Frankfurt and Basel without needing to blame the City.

If the City (and Wall St) impinge on the Eurozone situation, should that be ignored? When it's pointed out that either rating is a superfluous function, or should not be in the hands of private City/Wall Street corporations, the response is invariably, "the rating agencies didn't cause the euro crisis". No, but they have arguably exacerbated it at every turn by publishing (often correct) analyses and consequent rating changes with an acuity and rigour that were so strikingly absent concerning American financial bubble-and-fraud in the lead-up to the first leg of this crisis. Is it absurd to find logical that US interests (and those of Britain, the GBP having been sidekick to the dollar for decades) lie in avoiding the loss, in the financial crisis, of the world-reserve-currency status of the dollar, and therefore in seizing an opportunity to weaken the relative status of the main contender for replacement? Or that global financial capitalism (to a considerable extent offshore but pre-eminently centred on New York and London, currently at least) abhors the regulatory tendency the EU represents at world level?

Why place a theoretical ring-fence round continental Europe (where, I'm not denying, our "leaders" bear huge responsibility for driving us over the cliff) and ignore global power struggles? If, tomorrow, the euro fell apart and our countries were severally sovereign, would those power struggles have no relevance?

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 06:27:23 AM EST
[ Parent ]

There is a line beyond which pointing out malign foreign interests becomes an exercise in excuse-making for domestic collaborators and general idiocy, rather than analysis. And reasonable people can disagree on which side of that line Jerome's comment is on, given that it is made in response to the observation that the Euro elevates liberal (neo- or ordo-, doesn't matter - they agree on this particular delusion) fantasy world economics into the law of the land.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 09:34:37 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: solidarity (4.00 / 5)

There may also be a line beyond which continually imputing defensiveness and excuse-making to other participants here may be improductive of debate and analysis.

I was not writing to defend Jerome's comment, he can do that himself, but to support the view that excluding global power struggles from the field truncates the discussion, which then appears to conclude that Europe's problems are solely self-inflicted and that sovereign nation-states will be either the inevitable result of those self-inflicted problems, or the correct response to them. Well-adapted macroeconomic policies for those states may be suggested (with great confidence, even), but it's legitimate to have doubts about, not their theoretical effectiveness, but their chances of being applied in real conditions - will global finance go away, will laissez-faire neoliberalism go away, will economists change their spots, will right-minded governments emerge from the polities we have, will global imbalances and their attendant pressure to race to the bottom disappear, because the euro is no more and we have independent nation-states? Luis's (self-admittedly) doomer scenario above has the merit of putting the subject on the table. It's not enough to reply (hyperbole for hyperbole) that what's happening within the euro is just as bad, or that all a government needs to do is this or that. A serious (probably multi-scenario) description of what might and what is likely to happen to our several nation-states in the event of leaving the euro or of a general euro collapse, is called for. Alongside which (though great doubts may be legitimate on this score too), the chances of a return to the '80s to re-debate and identify an acceptable construction sans Maastricht for what has become the EU (including what the outlines of an acceptable construction would be), need to be assessed. Vast programme.

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 12:47:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: solidarity (4.00 / 4)

I'm not sure I fully understood all of that and so my point may be similar: There is a distinction between academic and policy analysis. Academic analysis should be wholly objective/fact driven - but rarely is. Policy analysis focuses on the policy leavers and factors over which you actually have some influence/control. So it makes sense for those of engaged primarily in the EU policy/politics space to focus on the shortcomings of the EU/Eurozone itself. That is not to say anglo neo-liberal influences haven't exerted a baleful influence on EU policy/decision makers and may indeed be the cause for a lot of our ills. But it is easier to address the known and obvious defects in the design of the Eurozone project itself rather than to be tilting at generalised neo-lib shibboleths and windmills all the time... If we could fix the structural defects and lack of solidarity in the Eurozone architecture, we wouldn't have to worry over-much about what the City/Wall street are up to.

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 11:11:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]

That is right. You could crowd out Migerus german paranoia.

by IM on Wed Mar 21st, 2012 at 06:47:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]

we should worry about our money being valued by the Anglos

Nothing secondary market purchases by the ECB with a stated cap on yields wouldn't solve faster than you can say 'Weimar'.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:02:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Were it not for the fact that the ECB has been busy undermining the credibility of its own sovereign debt purchases.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:03:51 PM EST
[ Parent ]

The EU is still trying to have a sovereign currency without a sovereign. Not a good mix.

by rifek on Thu Mar 22nd, 2012 at 05:34:57 PM EST
[ Parent ]

The ECB is the only sovereign, it just pretends that it isn't.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Mar 22nd, 2012 at 06:03:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]

On the contrary, it seems to rather enjoy being the sovereign. It's just an old-fashioned sort of sovereign. Specifically, the sort of which went out of style around 1792. For reasons and in ways that the ECB may yet come to experience first-hand if they persist in the destruction of European society.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Mar 22nd, 2012 at 08:47:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]

ReporterNet.com | Tax on Luxury Cars to be Abolished

Again - lower taxes and balanced budgets are NOT THE SAME THING.

Low taxes is not the only form of fantasy economics practised on by the right wing.

Balanced budgets are fine, whatever, as long as they are regarded as an incidental circumstance rather than an actual policy objective.

And when your creditworthiness is decided in London,

... then your central bank is not doing its job.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 09:23:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: solidarity (4.00 / 5)

Jerome a Paris:

German austerians are not against tax increases to balance budgets.

Taxes on the poor is ok, but a luxury tax on cars in Greece was not allowed.

The government is expected to abolish the luxury tax on private cars with ex-factory prices of more than €20,000 for new and €16,000 for used, according to statements by Deputy Finance Minister Pantelis Oikonomou, who cited European legislation.
"In order to prevent the country from being referred to the European Court, a draft provision has been prepared for the abolition of the luxury tax on private cars," he said in Parliament.
Luxury tax rates vary between 10% and 40%, depending on the ex-factory price.
Oikonomou said the ministry is also preparing a more favorable tax regime for imported used cars. Greece has already lost a case at the European Court on this issue.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 03:50:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Slashing the salaries of psychologists to less than what some would earn stocking shelves in a grocery store here, and then taxing them higher through their utilities, is Very Serious.

Just don't you dare tax BMWs.

Be nice to America. Or we'll bring democracy to your country.

by Drew J Jones (pedobear@pennstatefootball.com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 09:52:51 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: solidarity (4.00 / 4)

How can we expect intra-EU solidarity when we are busily destroying intra-country solidarity in every single one of our countries.

We're busy destroying intra-country solidarity under orders from the EU institutions, not least the ECB and the Commission. And governments which might have been inclined to oppose EU policy don't because that's not being a good European.

We'll see how long Hollande's brave opposition holds up.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 01:29:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: solidarity (4.00 / 7)

Aren't you forgetting a 30-year worldwide political trend.

But that gets to our disagreement on the EU Constitution - I'm saying that the EU Commission + Parliament, despite all their flaws, were the only institutions able - and willing - to take on big corporates and win - and not having the legitimacy of a people-backed vote to back them robbed them of their ability to do any meaningful regulation, as they could have done. Instead they just went with the ideological flow.

Deeply ironic that the French destroyed Europe's ability to do decent technocratic regulation of business.

Wind power

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:37:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Eventually ideology gets condensed into institutional structure. Then you're fucked.

The Maastricht treaty did it. When we joined the Euro, we were fucked.

And the reason why countries joined the euro had nothing to do with economics but with stupid political notions of national pride and personal political legacies.

Because, you know, humans are morons.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:41:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Maastricht embedded Germany's strong money ideology - one we had to live with already anyway - not the anti-tax anti-government one.

It's not because today's ideologically acceptable 'solution' to public deficits is to cut taxes and cut social services even more that this is what the Euro treaties say. Nothing in the euro treaties prevents you from increasing corporate tax, income tax or whatever else - only corporate lobbying and ideological trends.

Wind power

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:47:02 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Maastricht embedded Germany's strong money ideology - one we had to live with already anyway - not the anti-tax anti-government one.

What? This was in Maastricht already:

Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as `national central banks') in favour of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments.

That is German anti-government ideology.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:48:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Nothing in the euro treaties prevents you from increasing corporate tax, income tax or whatever else - only corporate lobbying and ideological trends.

If debt is above 60% GDP and deficits would have to exceed 3%, then it is actually Maastricht that forces you to settle on increasing taxes in the middle of a recession. And increasing taxes in a deep balance-sheet recession is wrong. Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty forces us to take wrong macroeconomic policy decisions by outlawing certain options.

See Is Keynesianism now a thoughtcrime? and also Fiscal rules going mad ....

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:56:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Maastricht embedded Germany's strong money ideology - one we had to live with already anyway

"We" being limited to countries who are sentimentally attached to a particular D-Mark exchange rate.

Prior to entering the Euro, Greece, Spain and Italy did not share such silly superstitions.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 09:28:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: solidarity (4.00 / 3)

Germany seems convinced hard-money policies will produce the same sort of soft landing it enjoyed (alone in the world) after the Panic of 1873 provided it can find someone to land on. Listen up, Greece, no luxury taxes on those Beemers you import. I wonder when Germany will remember that it got through that period so smoothly due to the huge stimulus program it implemented to build public infrastructure.

by rifek on Thu Mar 22nd, 2012 at 05:59:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Migeru:

that's not being a good European.

You say this often, but what evidence do you have that this in fact motivates governments?

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 06:32:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]

I don't know what motivates governments, but every time it's part of the story we're told about why decisions are made.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 05:00:16 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Your memory's much better than mine, but I don't recall reading/hearing it cited as a motivation.

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 01:29:22 PM EST
[ Parent ]

How would the 40-80% cut in wages that most workers and pensioners suffer in a disorderly devaluation be any better than the current ordeal?

Easy: they would retain their jobs and the public sector would retain the ability to run social transfers and employ people.

The morons in charge are not only gutting intra-EU solidarity. They're destroying the concept of state action. And they're doing so because the EU treaties and the Euro rules mandate it.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 01:32:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Also, I'm not sure this is due only to the political figurehead morons are responsible for this. It's their expert advisors and the civil service itself that's infested with neoliberal ideologues.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 01:33:30 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Migeru:

It's their expert advisors and the civil service itself that's infested with neoliberal ideologues.

they only know that solution to problems, anything else endangers their status quo, and is as repellent to their worldview as theirs is to anyone not brainwashed by the propaganda.

their model made billions for the usual suspects, the last 60 years has seen western economies transform, especially in the PIIGS, from basically peasants-with-shoes (china just getting there...) into booming economies and they fully expected their model to scale up without glitches and if it was so magical as to transform our postwar societies then it seemed logical to go global and give everyone access to the unrestrained capitalism unicorn's magical blessings, what's not to love?

especially when communism embodied their terror of losing the right to private property, totalitarian state control, parrot media and food lines, no consumer goods.

without the nemesis to combat, capitalism looks like a collapsed souffle, its contradictions within a democracy ever more nakedly, basely inhuman, as we watch them taken to their logical outcomes, ie 1% of the most cunning and unscrupulous cornering the market on anything that moves and screwing the 99% too decent or dumb to figure out how to join the club.

it's just as disgusting as those monolithic iron curtain, just as heartless... it's heading for fascism, the cain to abel's communism.

as the 1% connive to raise the drawbridge now and enjoy their ill-gotten winnings behind the moat of their security systems, hoi polloi are out in the cold, and from inside the strains of merriment drown out for the moment the dull, thunderous grumble outside the stockades.

in the devil's workshop the tools are making ever more refined tools of their own, all the better to game the risks of life, to rig the wheel to better screw the johns, the muppets, useful idiots to the wall of social despair.

don't like it? tough... no one asked your parents to reproduce! not our problem, is it?

we don't owe you anything, not our fault you can't afford to live... go away and die, or throw yourselves at our stormtroopers and die that way, but just die anyway. you are surplus, we don't even need you for cannon fodder or to run the factories, you aren't worth investing in, period. don't want to give up and fade to black? then go figure out how to serve the borg in novel ways, learn to lie while smiling for the media, or to slice and dice odds and stats to help us trap any dummies still unfleeced and shear them more efficiently.

then you can join the club... otherwise you are just evolutionary compost, deal with it.

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 03:13:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]

It is possible to do left wing policies and solidarity with a strong currency and limited public debt.

How do you do that without a federal level redistribution mechanism (also known as Fiscal transfers)?
Why do you want a strong currency?

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 01:47:23 PM EST
[ Parent ]

1. You could either have a federal investment arm to create demand in times of need. This wouldn't be needed on a massive scale at all times, as liquidity traps are rare, and localized recessions caused by the "wrong" (ie Frankfurt-focused) interest rate, by their nature are localized.

Alternately or complementary, you could create a strong federal financial regulatory agency to fight debt buildups, including in the private sector. Current account imbalances will then have to be financed mainly by equity transfers while they are evened out, not debt issuance. This should create strong political and popular pressures to deal with current account balances. On top of this, remove the taboo of sovereign default.

2. A strong currency protects the purchasing power of consumers, making vital imports like gasoline, coffee, bananas (and foreign vacations!) cheaper, while imposing a powerful competitive pressure on the export industry, making it lean and constantly focused on improvement.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 04:09:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]

You could either have a federal investment arm to create demand in times of need.

Did you know that the European Investment Bank has a stack of projects ready to fund in Greece, but it cannot fund them because half of the funding needs to come from the member state concerned and austerity policies don't allow Greece to spend any money on such projects?

A strong currency protects the purchasing power of consumers, making vital imports like gasoline, coffee, bananas (and foreign vacations!) cheaper

The EU has balanced external trade. Do you think monetizing sovereign Eurozone debt would change that?

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 05:53:21 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Yes. And you can't blame me for those stupid rules. :)
I don't see your point. The EU as a whole needs imports, and the stronger the currency, the cheaper they'll be. And trying to repair weak competitiveness with devaluations might work once, but it's hardly a long-term fix. See Sweden in the 70's and 80's.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 06:29:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]

My point re:2 is that we wouldn't be in a crisis without the wrong, irrational belief that monetizing sovereign debt weakens the currency and/or creates inflation.

After all, apparently, monetizing toilet paper created by the shadow banking system does nothing of the sort.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 06:50:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Look, I'm not saying monetizing debt would create inflation either - not as long as we're stuck in the liquidity trap.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 06:57:04 PM EST
[ Parent ]

What is a liquidity trap?

by kjr63 on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 01:05:25 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: solidarity (4.00 / 3)

Its when everybody (people, corporations, banks) hoards cash, because they think there will be tough times ahead. Nobody invests, and presto, tough times it is.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 01:16:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]

From Wikipedia: "A liquidity trap is a situation described in Keynesian economics in which injections of cash into the private banking system by a central bank fail to lower interest rates and hence to stimulate economic growth. A liquidity trap is caused when people hoard cash because they expect an adverse event such as deflation, insufficient aggregate demand, or war. Signature characteristics of a liquidity trap are short-term interest rates that are near zero and fluctuations in the monetary base that fail to translate into fluctuations in general price levels."

In short, as interest rates are already zero, they can't be cut any further. Hence something else is needed to stimulate the economy, like infrastructure spending or quantitative easing (and the efficacy of the latter is somewhat questionable in my opinion).

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 01:49:25 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Jake's explanation is interesting, but there's the Wikipedia:

From Wikipedia: "A liquidity trap is a situation described in Keynesian economics in which injections of cash into the private banking system by a central bank fail to lower interest rates and hence to stimulate economic growth.

Private sector is loaned up. No more (credible) debt takers.

A liquidity trap is caused when people hoard cash because they expect..

The confidence fairy?

..an adverse event such as deflation,

Rotschilds were very handy creating deflation (according to the movie "Money Masters").

by kjr63 on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 02:18:11 PM EST
[ Parent ]

From Wikipedia: "A liquidity trap is a situation described in Keynesian economics in which injections of cash into the private banking system by a central bank fail to lower interest rates and hence to stimulate economic growth.

This actually suggests that we don't have a liquidity trap. Central bank has lowered interest rates. Mortgages are cheaper than ever. They just can't go below zero.

Also this suggests that lower interest rate to private sector necessary stimulates economic growth. It does not, if the private sector is over-indebted already.

by kjr63 on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 02:44:41 PM EST
[ Parent ]

We're at the zero lower bound.

See Paradox of Thrift

Two caveats are added to this criticism. Firstly, if savings are held as cash, rather than being loaned out (directly by savers, or indirectly, as via bank deposits), then loanable funds do not increase, and thus a recession may be caused - but this is due to holding cash, not to saving per se. Secondly, banks themselves may hold cash, rather than loaning it out, which results in the growth of excess reserves - funds on deposit but not loaned out. This is argued to occur in liquidity trap situations, when interest rates are at a zero lower bound (or near it) and savings still exceed investment demand. Within Keynesian economics, the desire to hold currency rather than loan it out is discussed under liquidity preference.

This is a better explanation than the one at liquidity trap. Basically, what's going on is that extreme liquidity preference would require negative interest rates in order for "savings not to exceed investment". As the zero lower bound makes that impossible (Ahem... See Negative interest rates: when are they coming to a central bank near you? by WIllem Buiter on May 7, 2009) then you find yourself in a liquidity trap where injections of money into the economy fail to stimulate lending.

The problem with the Wikipedia articles about economics, unlike the ones about, say, physics, is that the causal chains are not very clear in the mind of the article writers (possibly because the theory itself is broken).

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 05:08:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]

The causal chain is unclear to the writers because they are not describing a causal theory, they are relating a just-so story.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 06:35:57 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Or the banks could be getting cash from Central but are sitting on it because they know their paper is at least half garbage, and they need to make up the difference in case someone has the bad form to make a reserve audit.

by rifek on Thu Mar 22nd, 2012 at 06:11:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]

On the contrary, sitting on a time bomb would make them more inclined to gamble big rather than go home. After all, it is impossible to go double-bankrupt.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Mar 22nd, 2012 at 08:49:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Oh, they aren't going home, they're playing Extend and Pretend: Phase II, in which they don't even have to cook their books to make the collateral look double what it is, they just use tax money to make it all look good.

by rifek on Fri Mar 23rd, 2012 at 07:22:29 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Yeah, but extending and pretending doesn't get you out of the insolvency, it just prevents you from being resolved immediately. Sitting on shit until it matures doesn't, barring direct divine intervention, make it not-shit, let alone give it a gilt edge. If you want to dig yourself out of a serious insolvency, you need to make something happen to your balance sheet.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Mar 23rd, 2012 at 11:04:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]

You're forgetting the first rule of investment bankers: When it hits the fan, IBG-YBG (I'll be gone, you'll be gone.).

by rifek on Sun Mar 25th, 2012 at 12:33:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]

It's what MIT school economists call it when you hit the zero bound of nominal interest rates. Since MIT school economists subscribe to the loanable funds fallacy, they believe that the central bank lowers interest rates by creating more liquidity, rather than creating more liquidity in consequence of its decision to lower interest rates.

The "liquidity trap," then, is the point where no amount of additional liquidity can reduce borrowing costs.

It's got nothing to do with liquidity, and it's not a trap. It's an operational constraint on the use of interest rate policy in macroeconomic planning. And it should not come as a surprise to anybody, but it repeatedly does, because neoclassical economists have an unhealthy infatuation with irrationally excluding discretionary fiscal and industrial policy from the realm of macroeconomic planning.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 01:50:24 PM EST
[ Parent ]

...neoclassical economists have an unhealthy infatuation with irrationally excluding discretionary fiscal and industrial policy from the realm of macroeconomic planning.

It probably goes down better with most to just instinctually reject those policies they know in their guts will provoke the ire of TPTB, or, especially, of those agents of TPTB who have influence over their careers. Gaffney showed rather clearly how this got started through the power of patronage over US private universities, it has been ongoing for over a century and Krugman's blindness to even the role of debt probably only seems willful.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 07:27:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Bloomberg Op-Ed: The Sorrow and the Pity of Another Liquidity Trap: Brad DeLong Jul 5, 2011

A financial crisis initiates a sudden flight to safety among bondholders -- widening interest-rate spreads, diminishing the private sector's desire to sell bonds to raise capital and encouraging individuals to save more and consume less as they, too, hunker down. Thus bond prices rise, and interest rates drop. As rates fall, firms see that they can get capital on attractive terms and so issue more bonds; households see the low interest rate earned on their savings and lose some of their desire to save. The market heads toward equilibrium.
...
In responding to a small financial disruption, the Federal Reserve can inject more money into the economy by buying bonds for cash, increasing the amount of cash so that even at the lower velocity of money we retain the same volume of spending. This eases the decline in interest rates, spending, employment and production into a decline in interest rates alone.
But when rates become so low that there's little difference between cash and short-term government bonds, open-market operations cease having an effect; they simply swap one zero- yielding government asset for another, with their hunger to hold more safe, liquid assets unsatisfied.
This is the liquidity trap.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 20th, 2012 at 01:02:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Starvid:

And trying to repair weak competitiveness with devaluations might work once, but it's hardly a long-term fix. See Sweden in the 70's and 80's.

I know that it is a common opinion that the 70's and 80's devaluations were bad, but the same time there is no opinion for abandoning the floating currency today. And the strong currency policy of the early 90ies was just a huge failure.

I suspect the 70's and 80's devaluations were really a sympthom of RoW catching up to Sweden. Skipping the carnage and destruction of ww2 is not an advantage that was going to last forever.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 04:00:52 PM EST
[ Parent ]

There is a crucial difference between devaluing within a fixed-rate system and floating your currency.

If you devalue in a fixed rate system, you have to defend the new, lower exchange rate, a rate which is prima facie incredible (you just devalued - why should anybody trust you to not do it again). Which means that you have to jack up interest rates almost as high to defend the new exchange rate as you had to to defend the old.

If you float, on the other hand, you are not committing to defending any particular exchange rate. So if people dislike holding your new, lower valued, currency, you can go "too bad, so sad" and keep the interest rate low for the benefit of your domestic industry.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 06:28:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]

1. You could either have a federal investment arm to create demand in times of need. This wouldn't be needed on a massive scale at all times,

Sure, it would only need to be maybe 2-5 % of total GDP when you average it over every year of operation.

as liquidity traps are rare,

Only if you run silly, growth-destroying interest rate policies like Taylor rules. Under a more sensible zero interest rate policy, you are always in a "liquidity trap." Because it's not actually a "liquidity trap." It the zero bound on nominal interest rates. Liquidity has nothing to do with it.

Alternately or complementary, you could create a strong federal financial regulatory agency to fight debt buildups, including in the private sector.

This requires a public sector able and willing to print and spend money as needed, in order to compensate for waxing and waning private demand.

2. A strong currency protects the purchasing power of consumers,

So what? Protecting the (purchasing) power of "consumers" is not an objective of left-wing policy. "Consumers" includes plenty of people whose interests are not ordinarily considered important in the formulation of left-wing policy.

making vital imports like gasoline, coffee, bananas (and foreign vacations!) cheaper,

At the cost of leaving a poorer country for the next generation. Foreign goods cost what they cost. You're not going to be able to change what they cost without fancy diplomatic footwork or old-fashioned gunboat diplomacy. When you use your "strong currency," so-called, to obtain cheap vacations, you are paying for those vacations with your children's wealth.

while imposing a powerful competitive pressure on the export industry, making it lean and constantly focused on improvement.

Because raising the average quality of your firms by destroying solvent and, on their merits, profitable going concerns because they are not profitable enough is obviously an awesome way to encourage industrial development.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 09:42:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Sure, it would only need to be maybe 2-5 % of total GDP when you average it over every year of operation.

Instead, what's being suggested as a bold "growth" policy is to recycle unspent structural funds into paying down debt. And let's not forget the structural funds are part of the 1% of GDP EU budget...

So, yeah, the EU Council and Commission are full of vision and courage.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 09:58:12 PM EST
[ Parent ]

It is possible to do left wing policies and solidarity with a strong currency and limited public debt.

If you start out from small amounts of private debt and let the private sector finance the imbalances, sure, and that's what happened in the first 10 years of the Euro. Until the private debt bubble pops and then it's impossible to have an economy if you insist on low headline inflation and low public debt.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 02:10:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]

The imbalance problem could have been solved with very simple 'right-wing' tools: applying the law - in that case bankruptcy laws and tax laws.

Private default is a very simple way to deal with intra-zone imbalances. But we 'saved' the banks (or rather, their senior unsecured lenders). Again, the scale of the transfers caused by that decisions are so huge as to overwhelm the materiality of any other policy discussion.

Wind power

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 06:49:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Bankruptcies are the emergency rooms of the financial system. A financial system which relies on regularly having large cascades of bankruptcies to cope with elementary design flaws like the Grief and Stupidity Pact is going to be expensive and messy and will produce greatly inferior results compared to fixing the actual problem. Which is that members have no sustainable way to defend against inadequate inflation other member states.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 09:16:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]

The way we "fixed" this messiness here in the US was to slam the bankruptcy court door (on little people, not on players) and make the trial courts an arm of the collection industry.

by rifek on Thu Mar 22nd, 2012 at 06:19:23 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Ah, yes, closing the emergency room will allow you to avoid dealing with the mess and expense of running an emergency room.

In other recent news, breaking the thermometer will make the patient better. True fact.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Mar 22nd, 2012 at 08:50:25 PM EST
[ Parent ]