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How can we expect intra-EU solidarity when we are busily destroying intra-country solidarity in every single one of our countries.

We're busy destroying intra-country solidarity under orders from the EU institutions, not least the ECB and the Commission. And governments which might have been inclined to oppose EU policy don't because that's not being a good European.

We'll see how long Hollande's brave opposition holds up.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 01:29:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Aren't you forgetting a 30-year worldwide political trend.

But that gets to our disagreement on the EU Constitution - I'm saying that the EU Commission + Parliament, despite all their flaws, were the only institutions able - and willing - to take on big corporates and win - and not having the legitimacy of a people-backed vote to back them robbed them of their ability to do any meaningful regulation, as they could have done. Instead they just went with the ideological flow.

Deeply ironic that the French destroyed Europe's ability to do decent technocratic regulation of business.

Wind power

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:37:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Eventually ideology gets condensed into institutional structure. Then you're fucked.

The Maastricht treaty did it. When we joined the Euro, we were fucked.

And the reason why countries joined the euro had nothing to do with economics but with stupid political notions of national pride and personal political legacies.

Because, you know, humans are morons.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:41:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Maastricht embedded Germany's strong money ideology - one we had to live with already anyway - not the anti-tax anti-government one.

It's not because today's ideologically acceptable 'solution' to public deficits is to cut taxes and cut social services even more that this is what the Euro treaties say. Nothing in the euro treaties prevents you from increasing corporate tax, income tax or whatever else - only corporate lobbying and ideological trends.

Wind power

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:47:02 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Maastricht embedded Germany's strong money ideology - one we had to live with already anyway - not the anti-tax anti-government one.

What? This was in Maastricht already:

Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as `national central banks') in favour of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments.
That is German anti-government ideology.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:48:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Nothing in the euro treaties prevents you from increasing corporate tax, income tax or whatever else - only corporate lobbying and ideological trends.

If debt is above 60% GDP and deficits would have to exceed 3%, then it is actually Maastricht that forces you to settle on increasing taxes in the middle of a recession. And increasing taxes in a deep balance-sheet recession is wrong. Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty forces us to take wrong macroeconomic policy decisions by outlawing certain options.

See Is Keynesianism now a thoughtcrime? and also Fiscal rules going mad ....

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 07:56:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Maastricht embedded Germany's strong money ideology - one we had to live with already anyway

"We" being limited to countries who are sentimentally attached to a particular D-Mark exchange rate.

Prior to entering the Euro, Greece, Spain and Italy did not share such silly superstitions.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 09:28:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Germany seems convinced hard-money policies will produce the same sort of soft landing it enjoyed (alone in the world) after the Panic of 1873 provided it can find someone to land on.  Listen up, Greece, no luxury taxes on those Beemers you import.  I wonder when Germany will remember that it got through that period so smoothly due to the huge stimulus program it implemented to build public infrastructure.
by rifek on Thu Mar 22nd, 2012 at 05:59:09 PM EST
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Migeru:
that's not being a good European.

You say this often, but what evidence do you have that this in fact motivates governments?

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 06:32:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I don't know what motivates governments, but every time it's part of the story we're told about why decisions are made.

There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 05:00:16 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Your memory's much better than mine, but I don't recall reading/hearing it cited as a motivation.
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Mon Mar 19th, 2012 at 01:29:22 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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