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There is simply no majority in Europe to give the EU that much power over money.
If you want to change it, you need to abolish the Euro.
That exactly is the problem. Democracy and policies required to hold the Eurozone together have become mutually exclusive.
Therefore, what you claim there is a popular majority implies rolling back to before the Maastricht Treaty. If you are not convinced, try it on someone who has not been entirely debauched by economics. — Piero Sraffa
However, both leaving the Euro and introducing different legal tender from the Euro would break a number of EU laws. If you are not convinced, try it on someone who has not been entirely debauched by economics. — Piero Sraffa
The ECB move, which analysts said was aimed at stepping up pressure on Athens to adhere to the commitments of its EU/IMF bailout, will force Greek banks to turn to their national central bank for Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) funds. Those funds will be more expensive than funds available in the ECB's regular liquidity operations. The ECB said the collateral exclusion was due to the expiration of a temporary 35 billion euro scheme agreed with Greece and euro zone leaders whereby the ECB would continue to accept Greek bonds after they went into default this year. ... European and IMF officials are due to visit Athens next week to decide whether Athens merits another tranche of aid from its latest bailout package and analysts said the ECB move was designed to step up pressure on Greece ahead of the visit.
The ECB said the collateral exclusion was due to the expiration of a temporary 35 billion euro scheme agreed with Greece and euro zone leaders whereby the ECB would continue to accept Greek bonds after they went into default this year.
...
European and IMF officials are due to visit Athens next week to decide whether Athens merits another tranche of aid from its latest bailout package and analysts said the ECB move was designed to step up pressure on Greece ahead of the visit.
One question, if one member-state were to retire from the euro, how legitimate would be the claim that euro-denominated debts are in its own currency, and that a change first of name, then of value, would not imply a revaluation of the foreign debt in euros?
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
As far as power over the ECB is concerned, you need to remember that the member states still hold the ultimate weapon. They can leave the Euro.
There is a popular majority that will force a regression to the pre-Maastricht state, but not a popular majority that desires this. As usually the voters want to eat and keep the cake.
That is a very peculiar definition of sovereignity. One which the general public does not share.
The general public is not ready to hand over power of budgets, taxes, health care and pensions to the EU.
It would take that to make EU institutions more powerful than the member states.
As for leaving the Euro we are approaching a very ugly area. The EU has quite limited means to enforce its treaties. If a member state insisted on leaving the Euro, the EU probably could make it leave the EU altogether. However, it is doubtful that the EU as a political project would survive that. The lawyers would be told to find some way and nobody would look closely at it. A bailout was also supposed to be strictly forbidden once.
You can tell the voters that an earlier generation of politicians screwed everyone. Or you can tell them that other political parties screwed everyone. That's what happened in Greece with Syriza and his 30-something-year-old leader eating PASOK's lunch. If you are not convinced, try it on someone who has not been entirely debauched by economics. — Piero Sraffa
This is the second most consistent historical experience in economics (the first one being that no, this time is not different).
If the European Council presently holds pre-eminent power, then moves toward democratizing the European Council would give leverage to the process. For instance, each state could send three members, head of government and at least two non-cabinet Parliamentary representatives. Council representatives limited to no more than three votes each and heads of government limited to no more than five votes would from 2 to 7 Parliamentary Representatives in addition to the Head of Government. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
... to which many but not all have surrendered their economic sovereignty. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
The last sentence is not very clear despite the typo "from" "form?"
13 votes. 13/3=4rem1. So Parliament elects 3 members on a proportional basis, with 3 votes each, and the PM is the fourth member with 4 votes.
3 votes. Minimum 3 members, so Parliament elects 2 members on a proportional basis, with 1 vote each, and the PM is the third member with one vote. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Using the existing votes to determine how many members the parliament will send on a proportional basis is because those existing votes have already been hammered out and are enshrined in treaty, so leaving them alone makes sense ... precisely because the exact number of votes of each member is not the primary source of the problem. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
You may want the EU as a whole to act. But it lacks the money. Either you give it much more taxes or the money comes from the ECB. But for either extension of EU power there is no majority.
But the money has to be authorized. That needs a parliamentary majority. As long as the member nations act, they need to speak as one.
What does this mean to say?
If it means to say that there would be a structural tension of it was possible to form cross-national coalitions in Council with ensuring the authorization of the money to carry out the program of the Council majority ... why, yes, there would be.
A proposed reform that would be sufficient to solve the structural problems of the EU is by its nature the most difficult type of structural reform to get through.
But contrast, if a proposed reform doesn't set up a structural tension with the status quo, there's no point to pursuing it, since its just a paint job.
So what is required are structural reforms that establish arenas in which it is possible to make substantial progress. And any such reform will be a source of structural tensions if its worth anything at all. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Or was the intended reading A swedish kind of death:
Then the Parliament and its elected Commission can confront the Council.
Then you'd discover the unfortunate truth. They who pay the bill call the shots. There is simply no majority in Europe to give the EU that much power over money.
But my comment applies to the normal decision making process (where much of the Councils real power stems from the collaboration of the Commission). Today we get a Council+Commission proposal that with the narrowest of margins has to pass the Parliament, with a Commission appointed in real terms by the Parliament we would get a Parliament+Council proposal that has to pass the Council. It changes the dynamics within the current treaties.
I suspect what you are refering to is the crisis managment that falls with the ECB and the member countries - in and outside Council meetings. That will not change until we get the Parliament to appoint a majority in the ECB board or a federal treasury or something like that. This would take treaty changes that currently would never be proposed, never mind accepted. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
As we have seen from the Merkel-Sarkozy meetings, even the Council is not all that important, it is just the member states (with budget powers and the guns to back up an exit) and the ECB. This makes it a seperate structure from the EU legislative process (which can be important, ACTA for example sure appears to have caught the interest of many).
I struggle to find anything to compare it to, but perhaps there are times in the process of parliaments gaining power over the kings in catholic Europe where the church held a similar untouchable position of power outside legislative, executive and judicial power. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
We know this because the ECB is too thoroughly infested with quacks to reform itself from the inside, and it is key to resolving the present crisis. Ergo, the crisis can only be resolved when a power group external to the ECB seizes control of it. The most obvious group to do so is the Commission.
And once you have the printing press, you have the power of the purse, with the added pleasure of exercising it over the pitiful wailing of the gold bugs and deflationists.
The Commission is also thoroughly infested with quacks, also known as "mainstream economists trained after 1980". If you are not convinced, try it on someone who has not been entirely debauched by economics. — Piero Sraffa
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