The European Tribune is a forum for thoughtful dialogue of European and international issues. You are invited to post comments and your own articles.
Please REGISTER to post.
Remember the 1930's: Spain had a civil war in 1936-39 and Europe's liberal democracies sat back, preferring to allow the Axis powers and the Soviets to battle it out in a proxy war. Not even the invasion of Poland by Germany got France and Britain to wake up (see the phoney war). It took the invasion of Belgium to get France to wake up, and then it was too late.
France only abandoned the Gold Standard in 1937, whereas Britain had done so in 1931 and the US in 1933.
Conclusion: the ECB will not accept debt monetization unless and until Germany itself is in depression. Currently it's in a very mild recession. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
I'll try to look up a source later, but I remember reading that France (and Britain) were actually concerned about the insufficiency of their military potential (partly falling for Third Reich propaganda about German military potential) and first wanted to arm themselves. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
I mean, once the war did come around they spent four years getting their asses handed to them pretty much everywhere they actually had to fight anybody who could shoot back.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
The Luftwaffe was effective, but its strength was as much in the terror it caused in the high command of the Allied powers, and in its use in support of paratroop attacks on key points. It helped, but on the few big battles in Belgium prior to Allied encirclement, it was hardly decisive. In those battles, the main German army was stopped cold.
The armored division was something that took everyone by surprise. The Allied powers were utterly ignorant of it, and the German command didn't think it would work as Guederin said it would. The key was it speed of movement behind the lines. Guederin crossed into France at a point where the Allies had believed terrain would prevent armored advance, and thus had defended lightly. Breaking the scattered defenders, the armored division was able to move very quickly in a Sickle Cut to completely cut off the main Allied army in Belgium. Neither side believed it was possible for an effective fighting force to move as quickly as Guderins panzers moved, and before any reaction was possible the Allied army in Belgium was surrounded. Cut off and unable to break out, they were forced to Dunkirk.
The Blitzkrieg legend was developed after the fact to explain this sudden victory. It was not a matter of fighting, though, so much as operational surprise. British and French tanks were better, and gave the Germans fits. Their troops fought hard. Had the Allied planners thought such an attack was at all conceivable, it would have been impossible.
Further, had the Allies pushed into Germany during the occupation of Poland, the war may well have ended right there, or been fought in large part on the banks of the Rhine.
Likewise, had Stalin not kept himself willfully blind to the imminent, and increasingly obvious German attack, the German advance to the gates of Moscow would never have happened.
That's another case where the memory of the last big war, and another Potemkin element, the Westwall (Siegfried Line) made the Allies stop in front of a ghost. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
In 1939-40, 45% of the army was at least 40 years old, and 50% of all the soldiers had just a few weeks training.[60] Contrary to what the blitzkrieg legend suggests, the German Army was not fully motorised. Just 10% of the Army was motorised in 1940 and could muster only 120,000 vehicles, compared to the 300,000 of the French Army. The British also had an "enviable" contingent of motorised forces.[60] Most of the German logistical tail consisted of horse-drawn vehicles.[61] Only 50% of the German divisions available in 1940 were combat ready,[60] often being more poorly equipped than their equivalents in the British and French Armies, or even as well as the German Army of 1914.[62] In the spring of 1940, the German army was semi-modern. A small number of the best-equipped and "elite divisions were offset by many second and third rate divisions".[62]
In 1939-40, 45% of the army was at least 40 years old, and 50% of all the soldiers had just a few weeks training.[60] Contrary to what the blitzkrieg legend suggests, the German Army was not fully motorised. Just 10% of the Army was motorised in 1940 and could muster only 120,000 vehicles, compared to the 300,000 of the French Army. The British also had an "enviable" contingent of motorised forces.[60] Most of the German logistical tail consisted of horse-drawn vehicles.[61]
Only 50% of the German divisions available in 1940 were combat ready,[60] often being more poorly equipped than their equivalents in the British and French Armies, or even as well as the German Army of 1914.[62] In the spring of 1940, the German army was semi-modern. A small number of the best-equipped and "elite divisions were offset by many second and third rate divisions".[62]
In other words, Germany's army at the time was to a significant part a Potemkin army. If the Allies didn't know that, it's no wonder that they were afraid, especially seeing that they themselves had poorly equipped divisions, too. The situation was reversed for German military leaders, who originally only wanted to delay an all-out confrontation on the Western Front until 1942 when they could arm themselves in turn.
This (fairly well-referenced) Wikipedia article also points out that the Blitzkrieg narrative was created after the fact, that is, the invasion was more successful and victory more decisive than planned. From what I gather, the key factors were the use of communication by the (otherwise inferior) German motorised forces, and the French leadership's mistaken expectation of an attack focused on the Belgian-Dutch border (a more southerly attack cut up their lines). *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Still, and I suppose I wasn't really clear on this, I didn't really refer to the eventual superiority of German officers on the Army Group, Army or Corps level, but rather on the platoon, company, batallion, brigade and division level. If I recall correctly, to be comissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Wehrmacht required 5 years of higher studies at the officer school, or whatever.
As we're already a bit off topic I'll end with a quote from one of my favourite Wehrmacht generals, Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord.
"I divide my officers into four groups. There are clever, diligent, stupid, and lazy officers. Usually two characteristics are combined. Some are clever and diligent -- their place is the General Staff. The next lot are stupid and lazy -- they make up 90 percent of every army and are suited to routine duties. Anyone who is both clever and lazy is qualified for the highest leadership duties, because he possesses the intellectual clarity and the composure necessary for difficult decisions. One must beware of anyone who is stupid and diligent -- he must not be entrusted with any responsibility because he will always cause only mischief." Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
After that the driving factor was the reenactment of WWI France and Britain had planned. Since defense had the advantage, invading Germany was ruled out (after some preliminary expeditions in Saarland). To lessen the costs for France this time the key was to open up more fronts and strangle Germanys access to raw materials. One such way was to get a Nordic front and stop the flow of iron to Germany.
Like occuping the minefields
During the Winter War the Norwegian authorities secretly broke with the country's own neutrality by sending the Finns a shipment of 12 Ehrhardt 7.5 cm Model 1901 artillery pieces and 12,000 shells, as well as allowing the British to use Norwegian territory to transfer aircraft and other weaponry to Finland.[2] This presented an opportunity to the Allies who, while genuinely sympathetic to Finland, also saw an opportunity to use the pretence of sending troop support to additionally occupy ore fields in Sweden and ports in Norway.[11] The plan, promoted by the British General Edmund Ironside, included two divisions landing at Narvik, five battalions somewhere in Mid-Norway, and another two divisions at Trondheim. The French government pushed for action to be taken to confront the Germans away from France.[12]
During the Winter War the Norwegian authorities secretly broke with the country's own neutrality by sending the Finns a shipment of 12 Ehrhardt 7.5 cm Model 1901 artillery pieces and 12,000 shells, as well as allowing the British to use Norwegian territory to transfer aircraft and other weaponry to Finland.[2]
This presented an opportunity to the Allies who, while genuinely sympathetic to Finland, also saw an opportunity to use the pretence of sending troop support to additionally occupy ore fields in Sweden and ports in Norway.[11] The plan, promoted by the British General Edmund Ironside, included two divisions landing at Narvik, five battalions somewhere in Mid-Norway, and another two divisions at Trondheim. The French government pushed for action to be taken to confront the Germans away from France.[12]
However:
The proposed Allied deployments never occurred, after protests from both Norway and Sweden, when the issue of transfers of troops through their territory was suggested. With the Moscow Peace Treaty on 12 March 1940, the Finland-related Allied plans were dropped. The abandonment of the planned landings put immense French pressure on Neville Chamberlain's British government, and eventually led to the Allied mining of the Norwegian coast on 8 April.[12][13]
So try again
This was soon changed to a plan involving the mining of Norwegian waters to stop iron ore shipments from Narvik and provoke Germany into attacking Norway, where it could be defeated by the Royal Navy.[19]
And this succeeded! Except the part about defeating Germany. And the part about reenacting the Western front from WWI.
So, in conclusion, Britain started war planning after March 1939, but their plans and action only makes sense in that they planned to fight the last war. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
The countries will be violently liquidated, but the creditor countries will not wake up, preferring to fall back on the comfortable "those lazy southerners really don't know how to govern themselves".
I really hope they don't manage to underperform that, because I don't see a lot of room to underperform that and still avoid a fourth Franco-German war...
Just what could a new war possibly accomplish? Isn't it more reasonable to junk the whole European concept and restart from scratch as painful as that may be? Hey, Grandma Moses started late!
Just what could a new war possibly accomplish? Isn't it more reasonable to junk the whole European concept and restart from scratch as painful as that may be?
the very idea of modern french and germans becoming nationalistic enough to go to war... it's too surreal and improbable to even seriously consider.
as for canning the project and starting again, it would be a good idea, though the breakup would be messy, it's by no means certain it would be worse than what's happening now, and no policy turnarounds in sight.
creating a new european union that would please everyone is obviously utopian, but at least one thing is clear... creating a common currency without an euro-equivalent of the U.S. Federal Reserve and a union-wide fiscal policy.
the probability of a second attempt being a quantum leap forward is high- the mistakes are so fresh in our minds, and the results of doing it wrong so flamingly evident.
besides, there already is a war, between the 1% and their henchmen and the rest of us.
maybe they will have to win that one to realise how stupidly suicidal a victory it was first. some juggernauts are unstoppable- seems like that's what we have to endure seeing how successfully the propaganda of neolib brain rot has taken root.
it will crash and burn, the present setup, but without european countries taking up arms against each other, that seems utterly insane, hopefully europeans have created enough cross-border cultural awareness and appreciation for each other that we will be immune to the kind of parochial patriotism that was relatively easily whipped up in WWs 1 and 2.
wars these days are exercises in democracy building in geographical backwaters where resources are plentiful, with few divisions to protect them.
/snark 'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
Earlier an army was needed to grab lands, goods, extract tithes. Now that is all much easier. Especially when the other side is clueless what and how they are loosing.
I will start a job at Athens University next month, by the way. Will it get interesting in one year?
Just what could a new war possibly accomplish?
Which is why it isn't in my prediction range.
by Frank Schnittger - Oct 2 4 comments
by gmoke - Sep 27
by Frank Schnittger - Sep 17
by Oui - Oct 81 comment
by Oui - Oct 8
by Oui - Oct 74 comments
by Oui - Oct 67 comments
by Oui - Oct 56 comments
by Oui - Oct 4
by Oui - Oct 41 comment
by Oui - Oct 31 comment
by Oui - Oct 24 comments
by Frank Schnittger - Oct 24 comments
by Oui - Oct 214 comments
by Oui - Oct 121 comments
by Oui - Oct 124 comments
by Oui - Sep 30
by Oui - Sep 303 comments
by Oui - Sep 2819 comments
by Oui - Sep 28
by Oui - Sep 276 comments
by Oui - Sep 271 comment