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Now on to substance. You are a bit more optimistic then I am, essentialy following the break-up of the Eastern bloc (at least until 8). My mental model is more of 1848 mixed with 1930ies.
If we see alliances, I don't think they will be north-south as then you largely ally with your neighbours, and it is with the neighbours the old border issues exist. Sweden could (extremely unlikely though) conjure up border issues with Finland (Åland islands) but not with Greece. A rise of Greater Hungary could quickly trigger a search for anti-Hungary alliances around Hungary, but Portugal would be uninterested. So if there is alliance building I rather think it will be a complex weave of enemy-of-my-enemy alliances. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
German policy has been driving basically all of the Eurozone's dysfunctions, which means that the successor bloc containing Germany is virtually guaranteed to be just as dysfunctional.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
The main problem with a northern trade bloc, nevermind a northern alliance, is that Germany has amply demonstrated that it is totally untrustworthy as a trade partner.
The countries most likely to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime against you, and tolerate that you abuse it in this manner, are the ones most likely to be your closest economic or geopolitical allies or clients. In other words, Germany has been pursuing - consistently - a strategy designed to retard the industrial development and stunt the economic strength of the trade bloc in which they are the hegemon.
Think of it as a version of mercantilism. But dumber.
If an NEU bloc does not maintain a common currency or fixed exchange rate regime, then Germany's economic strategy will implode, and the raison d'etre for an NEU bloc will be gone. If an NEU bloc attempts to maintain a common currency or fixed FX regime, then that bloc will inherit all the dysfunctions of the , and fall apart in turn in short order.
The German economic strategy of the last several decades has been to gain export market share through wage dumping.
How can that be? Prior to the Euro, the value of the DM has increased about fourfold in relation to the Pound. In other words, British labor has become cheaper and German labor has become more expensive.
The European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the precursor to the Euro, would periodically experience crises in which appreciation pressure on the DM featured prominently. The German response was always to absolutely refuse to defend the DM exchange rate, insisting that it was a problem with the other currency of the day. When the DM is almost always involved on the same side of a currency crisis between pegged European currencies, you should start wondering whether perhaps this is because Germany is deliberately running a harmful, disinflationary policy.1
Which is evidence of the mercantilist strategy, not evidence against it. The depreciation of the £ is the British defense against German wage dumping. (Well, that and the fact that the UK has been systematically dismantling its industrial plant for thirty years solid, which must eventually show up in your ability to afford imported goods, which in turn shows up in your exchange rate.)
If you devalue it means that you are not competitive.
"Uncompetitive," in this context, is simply another word for "overvalued currency." Nothing more, nothing less. There is nothing inherently wrong with fixing that through devaluation. Nor is there anything inherently wrong with running a higher rate of inflation than your trading partners and compensating with regular depreciation or periodic devaluations of the currency.
That policy regime sucks for rentier interests. But that's a feature, not a bug.
To compete on price these days (wage dumping) you would have to lower wages to Third World levels. The only way to maintain a high standard of living is by innovation.
With or without the EZone, the issue for Germany is not competition with Greece, the issue is competition with Japan, Korea and China.
Without a fixed exchange rate regime to prop up German exports, Germany's problem will be that German economic strategy requires that Germany is a net exporter. In the absence of a fixed FX regime it is only possibly to be a net exporter by discounting your currency. And Germany lacks the political will to get into a balls-to-the-wall competitive devaluation with countries who discount their currency to protect themselves from importing the unemployment caused by Germany's irresponsible policy mix.
- Jake
1The relationships between exchange rates and other macroeconomic variables are... non-trivial, and most contemporary attempts to model them quantitatively are, quite frankly, embarrassingly bad. So normally inferences of policy implications from exchange rate behavior should be treated with extreme caution. But in this case the effect is sufficiently large and persistent that a compelling case can be made. Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
Only if the hourly wage in £ has not grown faster relative to the hourly wage in DM.
"Uncompetitive," in this context, is simply another word for "overvalued currency."
With the Eurozone, China and the US have been playing middle-man for what was effectively Germany competing with Greece and Spain.
Big wage increases are no use if most of it is eaten up by inflation.
Germany has pursued a policy of a hard currency with low inflation and low currency fluctuation in order to increase predictability necessary for industrial investment.
In that context, even low wage increases will improve living standards more than high wage increase in soft currency high inflation economies.
With soft currencies, devaluation is an ongoing process. I.e., one devaluation hides the next devaluation.
There is nothing inherently wrong with running 5-8 % annual inflation and 3-6 % annual depreciation of the currency w.r.t. the D-Mark. It has a different distributional impact between rentiers, entrepreneurs, labor and mature industrial firms than rigidly running 2 % inflation and no depreciation versus the D-Mark. But it is not inherently worse. Just different.
Domestic industry can sell by price and does not have to increase productivity and innovation. Therefore, industry loses competitiveness.
First, wages, being kept high relative to the cost of capital by full employment, will push firms to substitute capital for labor. This will not cause unemployment, since the saved labor is kept employed via demand-side intervention. But it will increase the sophistication and extent of the capital plant.
Second, domestic industry is not homogeneous: Firms and sectors can gain at the expense of other firms and sectors in the domestic economy. If you do not innovate and improve, and your neighbor does, then your firm will lose market share. A balanced trade currency policy only ensures that the domestic sector will not lose market share in the aggregate, it does not protect any individual firm from competitive pressure.
German industry has had to face regular increases in the value its currency. It has become competitive by a) shifting from low-cost to high added value industries b) increasing productivity c) improving technological innovation. Therefore it has become competitive.
With the Eurozone, China and the US have been playing middle-man for what was effectively Germany competing with Greece and Spain. As a percentage of total German exports, exports to the EZone have fallen from 47 to 37% in the last decade. That trend is likely to continue in the future. European markets will continue to loose importance.
(The argument is identical to the one about firms in an open, floating-rate healthy-inflation economy.)
But I agree that the Euro is too cheap for German industry. This will compromise German competitiveness in the future
Anyways, the Germans don't need the exorbitant trade surplus they have now.
But there is no way of decreasing your competitiveness in relation to Spain while at the same time increasing your competitiveness to compete against China or Japan.
There is nothing wrong with activist currency policy, and there is nothing wrong with a healthy 5-8 % annual inflation rate. Foreclosing on activist currency policy and attempting to push the rate of inflation substantially below where it should be to ensure financial stability in an economy facing 0-1 % annual real growth serves no purpose except to enrich rentiers.
Jake, I think we basically disagree on the virtues of inflation and devaluation.
What I'm trying to figure out is why.
But structural debt, which is recurrent as is the case in the EZone periphery, cannot be dealt with in that way.
Investors (savers or whoever) will invariably factor in a country's propensity to erase debts by inflation/devaluation and make you pay through the nose.
High inflation invariably has a negative impact on society.
And to think that you can control inflation at 8 to 10% is absurd. High inflation invariably tends to spiral out of control
High inflation also encourages high-risk investments, i.e. speculation,
Preventing unwanted speculation requires heavy-handed and intrusive regulation of the financial sector. Attempting to prevent it by manipulating macroeconomic variables is like hunting bears by setting the forest on fire.
and discourages stable long term low interest investments need by the manufacturing industries.
Anyways, leaving aside the thin air of economic theory, the reality of the economic situation is that pumping more money into the periphery would reproduce the causes that led to the crisis in the first place and produce another consumer bubble without building domestic manufacturing industry.
If you wish to maintain the fixed exchange rate regime, then of course no action which exclusively targets the deficit countries can resolve the structural cause of the crisis, because the structural cause of the crisis is that surplus countries are running unsustainable current accounts surpluses.
However, a policy of forcing the surplus countries to underwrite the current account deficits of deficit countries would stabilize the system, end the humanitarian catastrophe, and encourage the surplus countries to stop pursuing harmful surplus-generating policies.
And to think that you can control inflation at 8 to 10% is absurd. High inflation invariably tends to spiral out of control and it can only be brought down again by very painful measures.
Not really. It is as far as I can tell a common idea that inflation is driven mainly by expectations so inflation triggers more inflation until you get to hyperinflation. But I don't think it matches reality. Hyperinflation tends instead to be a phenomena of its own and high stable inflation is possible.
Here is for example Inflation in Sweden 1831-2012
You can easily see a number of external events there - WWI&II, the 70ies oil crisis - but even those do not lead to out of control inflation.
Do you have any examples of high inflation spiraling out of control from mainly internal factors like inflation expectations? Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
It also tends to result in weak productivity growth, which IS a problem. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
I've not seen any good statistical evidence that the policy leads the drop in productivity growth, rather than vice versa.
Floating exchange rate, independent central bank, central bank mandate including both inflation targeting and financial stability, and fiscal stimulus when you hit the zero lower bound, seems like a completely sufficient policy outfit. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
Which is hardly the case.
As Kjell Olof Feldt, social democratic minister of finance during the 80's in Sweden said: devaluation is like peeing your pants; first it feels good - then it doesn't. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
Of course, the entire society could, in principle, decide that they want to not work so hard and just import less instead. But why is that not an acceptable policy decision? Sucks to be a rentier under that policy, but fuck the rentiers.
Notable events here are the reunification of Germany and the introduction of the euro.
If there is balanced trade you get a bit up some years and a bit down some years. Consistent surpluses as Germany has had since the introduction of the euro indicates a mercantilistic strategy. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
This ignores the key flaws in the Maastricht regime of the EMU and the true causes of the crisis. One original sin was to put no one in charge of minding the store of the giant integrated euro economy. No demand management was foreseen in good times, no lender of last resort in bad. Predictably, the Euroland economy has proved prone to protracted domestic demand stagnation and conspicuous reliance on exports for its meager growth, while crisis management has been by trial and error; and errors with no end it would seem. The second original sin was to forget what fifty years of European monetary cooperation were all about, namely to forestall the risk of beggar-thy-neighbor currency devaluation. The euro provided the coronation of that very endeavor in the sense that exchange rates disappeared with national currencies. But this only meant that under the EMU trends in national unit labor costs have taken on the role of determining intra-union competitiveness positions alone. The golden rule of monetary union therefore requires that national unit labor cost trends stay aligned with the common inflation rate that union members have committed to - when they didn't. It is a well-known fact that Germany's unit labor cost trend departed from the 2 percent stability norm, settling for zero under the euro regime. As Germany turned űber-competitive, its euro partners lost competitiveness just the way they would have in case of 20 percent deutschmark devaluation in pre-EMU times. Alas, the EMU has actually complicated matters as diverging unit labor cost trends essentially dealt the currency union an asymmetric shock that undermined the "one-size-fits-all" monetary policy. With wage repression and mindless austerity suffocating German domestic demand, the ECB's stance became far too tight for the former "sick man of the euro." By contrast, set to suit the average of the euro aggregate, the ECB's stance became far too easy for other euro members, nourishing property market bubbles and growing current account imbalances as a result. Prior to the crisis, Germany's soaring current account surplus was concentrated in Europe, about two thirds with its euro partners. Lending flows from Germany were instrumental in allowing intra-area divergences to persist and imbalances to build up. Herein rests the source of Germany's exposure to solvency problems in the euro periphery. While these basic facts should be well-known by now, their official reading pins the blame solely on debtor countries. Somehow everyone but Germany lost competitiveness. And somehow fiscal profligacy was the main villain in all this. A sober reading of these facts suggests requirements for crisis resolution that squarely defy the strategy currently pursued by the euro authorities.
It is a well-known fact that Germany's unit labor cost trend departed from the 2 percent stability norm, settling for zero under the euro regime. As Germany turned űber-competitive, its euro partners lost competitiveness just the way they would have in case of 20 percent deutschmark devaluation in pre-EMU times. Alas, the EMU has actually complicated matters as diverging unit labor cost trends essentially dealt the currency union an asymmetric shock that undermined the "one-size-fits-all" monetary policy. With wage repression and mindless austerity suffocating German domestic demand, the ECB's stance became far too tight for the former "sick man of the euro." By contrast, set to suit the average of the euro aggregate, the ECB's stance became far too easy for other euro members, nourishing property market bubbles and growing current account imbalances as a result. Prior to the crisis, Germany's soaring current account surplus was concentrated in Europe, about two thirds with its euro partners. Lending flows from Germany were instrumental in allowing intra-area divergences to persist and imbalances to build up. Herein rests the source of Germany's exposure to solvency problems in the euro periphery.
While these basic facts should be well-known by now, their official reading pins the blame solely on debtor countries. Somehow everyone but Germany lost competitiveness. And somehow fiscal profligacy was the main villain in all this. A sober reading of these facts suggests requirements for crisis resolution that squarely defy the strategy currently pursued by the euro authorities.
I think, on purely economic grounds, a Northern alliance will most likely follow an EU breakup. Most countries bordering Germany depend on the German market. This will create a bloc other countries will join by and by. Any Southern alliance is likely to be dysfunctional.
(Yes, the name "Neuro" is an intentional pun) I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland
I don't think so. This includes only four euro members and that counts latvia.
Austria, the Benelux countries, Slovakia, Slovenia and the non euro using Czech republic are even more intertwined with the german economy then the members of Baltic sea region.
And that said, even with my "realistic" additions only one of the four largest trade partners of Germany - the Netherlands- is included.
Plus Poland doesn't exactly have warm fuzzies for either Germany or Russia.
So it's complicated. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
The relationship between Poland and Germany hasn't been this good since the siege of Vienna. That is not the problem.
The relationship between Poland and Germany hasn't been this good since the siege of Vienna.
The Baltic countries will probably cling to Germany for safety whatever austerity may come. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
If it is about staying in a rump-EU, Sweden would stay. If it is a new alliance that comes close to EU in importance,
I'm no Techno-Utopian but it seems clear, to me, the global linkages allowed by the Internet will have profound consequences, some of which we can't even begin to imagine. As an example, what happens to Big-Box Brick-and-Mortar Stores when customers routinely purchase commodity consumer consumables over the internet? What happens to continual consumption (purchase) of consumer durables after somebody figures out they can make a bloody fortune by junking planned obsolesce and receive long-term income from parts and service?
A major change in Communications must lead to other major changes, across the board. See what happened after the invention of the moveable type, as an obvious 'bit of proof.'
Granted TPTB, who became TPTB under the previous circumstances, are going to do everything they can to prevent a phase transition. However under foreseeable meta-changes, e.g., Global Warming, I think, in the end, there is bugger-all they can do about it. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
So if EU fails I predict member states going their own ways with overlapping, weaker intergovernmental collaborations. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
I'm saying it's not an Either/Or situation. I submit Russia can manage to do two things at the same time.
:-) She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
any supra-national Baltic Sea organization that includes Germany and excludes Russia would have the latter freaking out
a) Under what geopolitical model is a Sino-German trade bloc possible independent of the American empire?
b) What does Germany offer as third wheel of a Sino-Russian trade bloc?
c) In which political universe is Germany going to accept being the (very) junior partner in a Russo-German trade bloc?
d) In what universe is the US going to tolerate a Russo-German trade bloc (remembering that the US has a number of current and potential clients in the ECE buffer states who will be more than eager to play spoiler on their behalf)?
If you want Germany and the Netherlands in the same economc bloc, we're looking rather at the North Sea basin: Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, France, UK, Norway, Denmark. But that replicates the situation with the old European Community (minus Italy) and the EFTA (UK, Denmark, Norway, etc). It didn't work out then (the EFTA countries remain outside the EU or are eurosceptic or uncommited members of it) so why should it work out now? I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
That said, I just looked at current trade. And there Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia are more dependent on trade with Germany then any country in the Baltic, with the exception of Denmark. Austria e. g. 38.2% of imports came from Germany and 31.2% of imports did go there.
And of course the largest trade partner of Germany is still France.
German exports in 2012:
Now, if a North Euro without France or even Italy would make sense is another question, but the economic facts as of now don't hint to a Baltic Empire. The Hanseatic League won't rise again. :-)
Wo einst St. Lucien Frieden nach Rhätien Hineingebracht. Dort an dem Grenzenstein Und längs dem jungen Rhein Steht furchtlos Liechtenstein Auf Deutschlands Wacht.
Frieden nach Rhätien
Hineingebracht.
Dort an dem Grenzenstein
Und längs dem jungen Rhein
Steht furchtlos Liechtenstein
Auf Deutschlands Wacht.
Danube Federations were very popular in the interwar years. And while the biggest trade partners of Germany and Austria mostly are the same, there is one exception: Hungary.
And of course the largest trade partner of Germany is still France. German exports in 2012: 1.France
1.France
Imagine a core Eurozone with Germany and France alone, and Germany retaining its 6% current account surplus. If their common currency continued to float freely and the core Eurozone had a neutral current account balance, France would have an 8% current account deficit.
So either Germany gives up its current account surplus or the rest of the world allows the core Eurozone to devalue its currency so that it can run a 3% current account surplus. Or Germany accepts fiscal transfers to France comparable to the size of the current account balances.
As none of the three possibilities are politically plausible, there cannot be a core Eurozone consisting of Germany and France. In fact, there cannot be a Eurozone consisting of Germany and anyone else (as the successive failures of Europe's attempts to fix exchange rates without fiscal transfers over 40 years demonstrate). I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
"In fact, there cannot be a Eurozone consisting of Germany and anyone else"
Is simply magical thinking. So Germany couldn't share a currency with the Netherlands because of their unbalanced trade?
German trade surplus with eastern europe = Hamburg
The German trade surplus basically happens in the southern half of the country. And that cargo goes to Bremen, Rotterdam and Trias (in roughly that order).
Two of these euro countries, three of those countries with a free floating currency.
So either Germany gives up its current account surplus or ...
Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
the problems of trade surplus and defiicits are internal to the eurozone
Some countries like Portugal have had a trade deficit for the last 60 years. That predates EZone and EU membership.
Trying to keep your currency overvalued will produce the trade deficit, and then the devaluation crisis. An overvalued currency, however, is great for the local elite to take their rentier income out of the country. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
First there was the Bretton Woods gold standard, ...
It must be solved by fiscal policy, and it can only be solved by fiscal policy if monetary policy doesn't work against it.
The EU allows no industrial policy, no independent fiscal policy, and has a monetary policy conducive to deflation, depression and unemployment. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
That is a structural problem that won't be solved by exiting EZone/EU
how can it be solved, in your opinion?
keynesian job creation? government investment of citizens' taxes to provide employment and teach skills to make them productive?
whose fault is it they don't get smart like the germans and invent more saleable stuff for the world economy, or price their labour cheaper than asia's?
if we are in a painful transition period between old and new capitalism, what is the goal the suffering is for? 'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
The Andrew Mellon way:
liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate farmers, liquidate real estate... it will purge the rottenness out of the system. High costs of living and high living will come down. People will work harder, live a more moral life. Values will be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up from less competent people.
whose fault is it they don't get smart like the germansBavarians and invent more saleable stuff for the world economy, or price their labour cheaper than asia's?
Edmund Stoiber once caused something of an uproar when he said "unfortunately, not everyone in Germany is as intelligent as in Bavaria".
Anyways, jobs in the South are lost to China and the emerging economies not to the North.
The simple fact of the matter is that countries in the South have priced themselves out of low-cost manufacturing without managing the transition to high value added production. That is a structural problem that won't be solved by exiting EZone/EU. That problem cannot be solved by monetary policy.
Therefore, the Eurozone must run a trade surplus with the rest of the world.
And the rest of the world is going to accommodate that without allowing their freely floating currencies to devalue, exactly why? I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
So either Germany gives up its current account surplus or ...No, its the other way around: we have to give up trade deficits.
If the surplus country won't play ball, the fixed exchange rate system breaks down. The story of the past, I don't know, 150 years? I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
No, its the other way around: we have to give up trade deficits.
That is the purpose of structural reforms,
This is not what is being done, therefore the purpose of structural reform is not to do away with trade imbalances (unless you wish to postulate that those who peddle structural reform are all idiots who do not understand elementary import substitution strategies).
which are necessary irrespective of whether we have the Euro or not.
It has nothing to do with the Euro. The problem is one of adapting traditional societies to the competitive environment of the modern world.
Competition is, after all, a policy, not an objective. If we can protect the interests of the bottom three quarters of the income distribution at the "cost" of wiping out the accumulated wealth of the top quarter, then that's a feature, not a bug.
The sum of all foreign trade must be zero.
Never going to happen. Latvia, say, is never going to have a viable domestic automotive industry and Germany, say, is never going to have autarky in food production. The relative production costs, thus purchase price, for manufactured goods versus agricultural commodities means a steady trade imbalance between the two regions. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
Human society, including economics, isn't natural.
No other species (unless our powers of observation are too limited for us to notice) has anything like the volume, complexity, and duration of human culture.
But the determining factor for the formation of a German-centered trade block following an EZone/EU collapse would be the question where Northern and Eastern countries export to. I'm pretty sure that to most Germany will be the most important export market.
And 2012 is of course the present, not the past, except in a hyper literal sense.
Even so, this guess includes six members of the EU and Switzerland.
I would like a source for that claim
It's a GS projection:
http://www.goldmansachs.com/s/GMeT_othermailings_attachments/63488662514238375059101.pdf
And no, trade figures for 2012 do represent the past of business that has been completed and payed for. File closed. Current order books and business plans have to take into consideration a horizon of 2020 at the very least.
And Goldman Sachs - in 2007 they probably made projections how Ireland would grow into the largest european economy or something.
Come back with a halfway credible source and then we can talk.
Proving a negative is hard, after all.
China will become the most important trade partner. Russia will overtake the US. France will loose it's top position and the South will be insignificant.
But the fact is, the rest of the world cannot be relied on to keep the Euro undervalued so it can avoid running a neutral current account balance. Because there's no way to coerce the BRICs, politically, to overvalue their currencies. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
Incidentally, my mental model is more 1914, which is suiting since we are soon to celebrate its 100th anniversary.
So his value as an authority is, perhaps, somewhat questionable.
Now he is talking, shortly before leaving office. And this time, no one accuses him of lying. Jean-Claude Juncker delivered a furious valedictory speech at the economic and monetary affairs committee of the European Parliament. This was picked up by the Spanish press in particular. Cinco Dias calls Juncker's intervention "a furibund attack on Berlin". The BBC has footage of the full 90-minute session. He said: that he disagreed with the rhythm of adjustments "imposed on certain countries", and that the Eurogroup has not made political valuations of the adjustments which too often were just rubber-stamping recommendations by the Commission, ECB and IMF "whose democratic legitimacy is not clear". that "the choice was made to make the adjustment fall on the weakest"; that certain countries who benefitted from capital flight out of Greece were not doing anything about it; that the mistake has been made to "underestimate the drama of unemployment" and to "give the impression that Europe is only there to punish" and by not rewarding the "program countries" for following through with their adjustment plans; that his successor would be well advised to "listen to all Eurozone members on an equal footing" even if it takes a long time to go through a meeting, or else "we'll see the results in 6 months if my successor doesn't"; that the ESM should have "some degree of retroactivity" and be able to "recapitalise banks" and not just address "new problems that may apply in the future"; that the results of the latest European Council were "disappointing", because "the original idea was to present a road map for the following decades"; in respect of economic policy coordination, that "we can't carry on with a system where the Frankfurt monetary arm is strong and the economic policy arm is feeble" and "those who refused [in 1997] are now the largest voices calling for this idea". And "we have to make sure that every time a government recommends a structural reform it is explained to the Eurogroup and that the ministers in charge explain the consequences and others say what the consequences of such reforms will be on policy in their countries"; "there's a need for all member states to agree on a 'minimum social wage'", a need for "a basis of minimum social rights for workers", as "otherwise we're going to lose the support of the working classes". There's a need to "agree on the elements of solidarity", "principle and ways and means of bank resolution", and "a deposit guarantee scheme"; that the Green party in Luxembourg will vote against the Fiscal Treaty because "they are fed up with what they see as a German diktat";
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