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How can that be? Prior to the Euro, the value of the DM has increased about fourfold in relation to the Pound. In other words, British labor has become cheaper and German labor has become more expensive.
The European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the precursor to the Euro, would periodically experience crises in which appreciation pressure on the DM featured prominently. The German response was always to absolutely refuse to defend the DM exchange rate, insisting that it was a problem with the other currency of the day. When the DM is almost always involved on the same side of a currency crisis between pegged European currencies, you should start wondering whether perhaps this is because Germany is deliberately running a harmful, disinflationary policy.1
Which is evidence of the mercantilist strategy, not evidence against it. The depreciation of the £ is the British defense against German wage dumping. (Well, that and the fact that the UK has been systematically dismantling its industrial plant for thirty years solid, which must eventually show up in your ability to afford imported goods, which in turn shows up in your exchange rate.)
If you devalue it means that you are not competitive.
"Uncompetitive," in this context, is simply another word for "overvalued currency." Nothing more, nothing less. There is nothing inherently wrong with fixing that through devaluation. Nor is there anything inherently wrong with running a higher rate of inflation than your trading partners and compensating with regular depreciation or periodic devaluations of the currency.
That policy regime sucks for rentier interests. But that's a feature, not a bug.
To compete on price these days (wage dumping) you would have to lower wages to Third World levels. The only way to maintain a high standard of living is by innovation.
With or without the EZone, the issue for Germany is not competition with Greece, the issue is competition with Japan, Korea and China.
Without a fixed exchange rate regime to prop up German exports, Germany's problem will be that German economic strategy requires that Germany is a net exporter. In the absence of a fixed FX regime it is only possibly to be a net exporter by discounting your currency. And Germany lacks the political will to get into a balls-to-the-wall competitive devaluation with countries who discount their currency to protect themselves from importing the unemployment caused by Germany's irresponsible policy mix.
- Jake
1The relationships between exchange rates and other macroeconomic variables are... non-trivial, and most contemporary attempts to model them quantitatively are, quite frankly, embarrassingly bad. So normally inferences of policy implications from exchange rate behavior should be treated with extreme caution. But in this case the effect is sufficiently large and persistent that a compelling case can be made. Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
Only if the hourly wage in £ has not grown faster relative to the hourly wage in DM.
"Uncompetitive," in this context, is simply another word for "overvalued currency."
With the Eurozone, China and the US have been playing middle-man for what was effectively Germany competing with Greece and Spain.
Big wage increases are no use if most of it is eaten up by inflation.
Germany has pursued a policy of a hard currency with low inflation and low currency fluctuation in order to increase predictability necessary for industrial investment.
In that context, even low wage increases will improve living standards more than high wage increase in soft currency high inflation economies.
With soft currencies, devaluation is an ongoing process. I.e., one devaluation hides the next devaluation.
There is nothing inherently wrong with running 5-8 % annual inflation and 3-6 % annual depreciation of the currency w.r.t. the D-Mark. It has a different distributional impact between rentiers, entrepreneurs, labor and mature industrial firms than rigidly running 2 % inflation and no depreciation versus the D-Mark. But it is not inherently worse. Just different.
Domestic industry can sell by price and does not have to increase productivity and innovation. Therefore, industry loses competitiveness.
First, wages, being kept high relative to the cost of capital by full employment, will push firms to substitute capital for labor. This will not cause unemployment, since the saved labor is kept employed via demand-side intervention. But it will increase the sophistication and extent of the capital plant.
Second, domestic industry is not homogeneous: Firms and sectors can gain at the expense of other firms and sectors in the domestic economy. If you do not innovate and improve, and your neighbor does, then your firm will lose market share. A balanced trade currency policy only ensures that the domestic sector will not lose market share in the aggregate, it does not protect any individual firm from competitive pressure.
German industry has had to face regular increases in the value its currency. It has become competitive by a) shifting from low-cost to high added value industries b) increasing productivity c) improving technological innovation. Therefore it has become competitive.
With the Eurozone, China and the US have been playing middle-man for what was effectively Germany competing with Greece and Spain. As a percentage of total German exports, exports to the EZone have fallen from 47 to 37% in the last decade. That trend is likely to continue in the future. European markets will continue to loose importance.
(The argument is identical to the one about firms in an open, floating-rate healthy-inflation economy.)
But I agree that the Euro is too cheap for German industry. This will compromise German competitiveness in the future
Anyways, the Germans don't need the exorbitant trade surplus they have now.
But there is no way of decreasing your competitiveness in relation to Spain while at the same time increasing your competitiveness to compete against China or Japan.
There is nothing wrong with activist currency policy, and there is nothing wrong with a healthy 5-8 % annual inflation rate. Foreclosing on activist currency policy and attempting to push the rate of inflation substantially below where it should be to ensure financial stability in an economy facing 0-1 % annual real growth serves no purpose except to enrich rentiers.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
Jake, I think we basically disagree on the virtues of inflation and devaluation.
What I'm trying to figure out is why.
But structural debt, which is recurrent as is the case in the EZone periphery, cannot be dealt with in that way.
Investors (savers or whoever) will invariably factor in a country's propensity to erase debts by inflation/devaluation and make you pay through the nose.
High inflation invariably has a negative impact on society.
And to think that you can control inflation at 8 to 10% is absurd. High inflation invariably tends to spiral out of control
High inflation also encourages high-risk investments, i.e. speculation,
Preventing unwanted speculation requires heavy-handed and intrusive regulation of the financial sector. Attempting to prevent it by manipulating macroeconomic variables is like hunting bears by setting the forest on fire.
and discourages stable long term low interest investments need by the manufacturing industries.
Anyways, leaving aside the thin air of economic theory, the reality of the economic situation is that pumping more money into the periphery would reproduce the causes that led to the crisis in the first place and produce another consumer bubble without building domestic manufacturing industry.
If you wish to maintain the fixed exchange rate regime, then of course no action which exclusively targets the deficit countries can resolve the structural cause of the crisis, because the structural cause of the crisis is that surplus countries are running unsustainable current accounts surpluses.
However, a policy of forcing the surplus countries to underwrite the current account deficits of deficit countries would stabilize the system, end the humanitarian catastrophe, and encourage the surplus countries to stop pursuing harmful surplus-generating policies.
And to think that you can control inflation at 8 to 10% is absurd. High inflation invariably tends to spiral out of control and it can only be brought down again by very painful measures.
Not really. It is as far as I can tell a common idea that inflation is driven mainly by expectations so inflation triggers more inflation until you get to hyperinflation. But I don't think it matches reality. Hyperinflation tends instead to be a phenomena of its own and high stable inflation is possible.
Here is for example Inflation in Sweden 1831-2012
You can easily see a number of external events there - WWI&II, the 70ies oil crisis - but even those do not lead to out of control inflation.
Do you have any examples of high inflation spiraling out of control from mainly internal factors like inflation expectations? Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
It also tends to result in weak productivity growth, which IS a problem. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
I've not seen any good statistical evidence that the policy leads the drop in productivity growth, rather than vice versa.
Floating exchange rate, independent central bank, central bank mandate including both inflation targeting and financial stability, and fiscal stimulus when you hit the zero lower bound, seems like a completely sufficient policy outfit. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
Which is hardly the case.
As Kjell Olof Feldt, social democratic minister of finance during the 80's in Sweden said: devaluation is like peeing your pants; first it feels good - then it doesn't. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
Of course, the entire society could, in principle, decide that they want to not work so hard and just import less instead. But why is that not an acceptable policy decision? Sucks to be a rentier under that policy, but fuck the rentiers.
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