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But now that you mention it, I have a hard time working out how to get there.
A re-distributive program with popular support but without a popular revolution needs the support of the military (or at least not active resisitance from them). The higher echelons of the military will be hit by a re-distributive program. Someone they trust could convince them that it needs to be done, so an officer (like Peron) or a security establishment figure (like Putin) would be a candidate. So far so good.
But since Egypt is import dependent I think the real issue is what the US finds acceptable. And I think a populist figure that performs redistribution would not be, while a conservative figure that does the same might be.
In a bit of a longer run, import substitution could lessen the trade dependency, today Egypts main exports are:
crude oil and petroleum products, cotton, textiles, metal products, chemicals, processed food
So by focusing agriculture more on feeding its own population and electrification and renewables (solar+wind, they already have plenty of hydro for balance) to decrease dependence on foreign hydrocarbons, they could make themselves less dependent on world trade, and thus get more liberty to choose direction. But that takes time that no government is likely to have.
Or that is as long as things stay relativly stable and Tahrir is the pivotal point in deciding government. If the military splits over a coup attempt, civil war could lead to a faction gaining power with social justice, economic independence, and political sovereignty on the agenda (as wikipedia describes Peronism). Probably also wrapping themselves in religion. Having won a civil war they would probably not hesitate to use tanks on Tahrir if poeple gets restive while they suffer sanctions and waits for the programs to give results.
Of course, that goes the other way too. If there is a civil war and a conservative side wins, their military would also use tanks on Tahrir. Unlike Mubarak's commanders on the ground they would not refuse orders because they would see demonstrators as on par with the enemies they had just defeated. Pinochet style terror follows.
So tanks or Bismarck (if the US accepts it). Not any good options there. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
In low income food surplus nations, that is reasonably common, but I don't know whether its the case for Egypt. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
If your CA deficit is driven by food and fuel, then redistribution from rich to poor will drive up your CA deficit. OTOH, if your CA deficit is driven by food and fuel, then failure to redistribute from rich to poor is liable to get you a new constitution.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
... while with food deficit countries like Egypt, its not so cut and dried, and even if the balance is in the positive, the impact will still be substantially muted by the netting out of the increase food consumption of the poor.
You'd at the very least want to accompany it with programs to increase in domestic production of foods that are aspirational consumption items by the poor. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
If anyone has a better breakdown of Egyptian imports it would be interesting. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
More insight in economic developments past decades ...
Economic Reform In Egypt In A Changing Global Economy - 1997 [pdf] By the early 1980s, the Egyptian economy already largely depended on oil export revenues, Suez Canal dues and remittances from Egyptians working abroad to pay for imports of food and capital goods (see Table 2). Substantial investments were meanwhile made in highly capital-intensive industries, which obviously did not ease unemployment. The fall in oil prices in the mid- 1980s cut oil revenues and remittances and worked its way through the economy. ... Egypt's participation on the Western side in the Gulf War in 1990-91 led to vast transfers of funds from Western and Arab donors and the promise of debt relief. The latter was conditional on the IMF's certification that Egypt had sound policies leading towards macroeconomic stabilisation. In turn, the IMF required Egypt to adopt a comprehensive economic and structural adjustment programme which, irrespective of the government's enthusiasm, led to economic progress. The Paris Club agreement has been part of Egypt's international economic relations since 1991. ... Egypt's balance of payments on current account (Table 2) brings out its structural trade deficit, which averaged $6.2 billion a year from 1990-95 and shows no sign of falling. This is partly made up for by income from invisible transactions, mainly workers' remittances, tourism receipts and Suez Canal dues. In 1990-94, workers' remittances averaged $4.8 billion a year and receipts from tourism $1.7 billion. In a typical year, Egypt's exports of petroleum and gas, tourism, official transfers, Suez Canal dues and workers' remittances add up to between a fifth and a quarter of GNP. These receipts are a sort of economic rent, deriving from Egypt's geological, historical and strategic situation. They are only partly influenced by domestic economic policies and tend to be volatile. ... The policy of the European Community (later the European Union) towards Egypt has been typical of its policy towards non-member Mediterranean states. A trade agreement has given preferential treatment to Egypt's exports, while financial protocols have helped finance improvement in the country's supply capacity. The co-operation agreement of January 1977, which was updated as the European Community grew bigger, provides for broad co-operation and, being of indefinite duration, established a stable contractual framework for long-term programming decisions. Four successive financial protocols to the agreement covered the period 1977-96.
By the early 1980s, the Egyptian economy already largely depended on oil export revenues, Suez Canal dues and remittances from Egyptians working abroad to pay for imports of food and capital goods (see Table 2). Substantial investments were meanwhile made in highly capital-intensive industries, which obviously did not ease unemployment. The fall in oil prices in the mid- 1980s cut oil revenues and remittances and worked its way through the economy.
... Egypt's participation on the Western side in the Gulf War in 1990-91 led to vast transfers of funds from Western and Arab donors and the promise of debt relief. The latter was conditional on the IMF's certification that Egypt had sound policies leading towards macroeconomic stabilisation. In turn, the IMF required Egypt to adopt a comprehensive economic and structural adjustment programme which, irrespective of the government's enthusiasm, led to economic progress. The Paris Club agreement has been part of Egypt's international economic relations since 1991.
... Egypt's balance of payments on current account (Table 2) brings out its structural trade deficit, which averaged $6.2 billion a year from 1990-95 and shows no sign of falling. This is partly made up for by income from invisible transactions, mainly workers' remittances, tourism receipts and Suez Canal dues. In 1990-94, workers' remittances averaged $4.8 billion a year and receipts from tourism $1.7 billion.
In a typical year, Egypt's exports of petroleum and gas, tourism, official transfers, Suez Canal dues and workers' remittances add up to between a fifth and a quarter of GNP. These receipts are a sort of economic rent, deriving from Egypt's geological, historical and strategic situation. They are only partly influenced by domestic economic policies and tend to be volatile.
... The policy of the European Community (later the European Union) towards Egypt has been typical of its policy towards non-member Mediterranean states. A trade agreement has given preferential treatment to Egypt's exports, while financial protocols have helped finance improvement in the country's supply capacity. The co-operation agreement of January 1977, which was updated as the European Community grew bigger, provides for broad co-operation and, being of indefinite duration, established a stable contractual framework for long-term programming decisions. Four successive financial protocols to the agreement covered the period 1977-96.
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