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Energy is just not a very significant factor in Putin's calculus regarding the Ukraine.  (And neither is international finance, which you did not mention, thought the finance types at Bloomberg and FT still do.)

It is true that there might be some short term considerations and high prices in Europe for gas, but, because of high demand globally, Russia will easily find other places to dump its oil and gas reasonably quickly while Europe scrambles for other sources as well,and Russia does not need to export to get by, so it can easily weather any delays in finding markets. Energy is at worst a moderate inconvenience when viewed at the geopolitical level, largely because of Russia's relative self-sufficiency in all things that have to do with Putin's capacity to govern the country.

What matters in the Ukraine to everyone concerned is raw political power and not much else. For Russia there is also an added concern of national security given the Ukraine's proximity, but it is really power -- Putin's ability to do his job at getting Russians to agree on things enough to engage in collective actions  -- that matters more than anything else.  And since this crisis started, Putin's capacity to govern in Russia has increased dramatically.  This is working out for him, so there is little reason for him to stop.

For this reason, I think the only thing that can really guarantee the prevention of Russian tanks moving into the Ukraine is an invitation by the current Ukrainian government for a temporary, lightly armed (incapable of protracted offensive action against Russia) contingent NATO peacekeeping forces -- 20,000-30,000 people -- to be deployed in Eastern Ukraine to secure military bases or other strategic assets.  Russia is aggressive with its military where the US isn't likely to be forced to shoot, so a movement of US and other NATO troops, essentially as human targets daring the Russians to kill them, as Putin has been using Russia forces lately, would almost assuredly prevent Russian incursions in the Ukraine. While other paths are possible, I really don't think any of them provide the kind of guarantee that forcing Russians to kill NATO soldiers in order to invade eastern Ukraine would provide.  

And this is exactly what Putin himself would do if he were head of NATO instead.

by santiago on Tue Apr 1st, 2014 at 01:25:10 PM EST
contingent NATO peacekeeping forces

What is your contingency plan if the austerity program leads to Greece-style riots, and some of them target some of these forces?

by gk (gk (gk quattro due due sette @gmail.com)) on Tue Apr 1st, 2014 at 02:15:01 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Santiago, I agree with your premises but not your recommendation. NATO troops of any sort would, inherently, be a provocation to Russia. UN peacekeeping forces might be less so. But addressing some of Russia's concerns about the government in Kiev via US and Russian diplomacy might help. The fact that right wing fascists in Kiev are calling such a prospect 'total capitulation' does not make it so. Absent a major blow-up in eastern Ukraine which targets ethnic Russians I don't see Putin doing more than just leaving his forces in place as a reminder. Even without invading there is a lot he can do inside Ukraine, especially eastern Ukraine. What he can do and what western NGOs and governments can do in Ukraine should be the subject of negotiations. The neo-cons need to be put in a box and sat on a shelf and Victoria Nuland needs to be reassigned. The latter would, especially, be a calming move.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Apr 1st, 2014 at 03:44:01 PM EST
[ Parent ]
That's my larger point here.  Putin is determined to use military force to secure his objectives and is willing to risk confrontation with the US to do it, betting that the US won't engage because that would be game over.  An anti-Russian government in the Ukraine is a major threat to Russia and to Putin's ability to govern in Russia. (As I've noted before, Ukrainians, despite the language differences, are a lot more like Russians that Texans are like Americans. The US would never stand for Russian-supported Tea Party government declaring in Texas, or even in Canada, so we should presume that Putin is highly motivated to secure either an allied government in the Ukraine or to annex at least eastern Ukraine.  

None of this has anything to do with energy. It's all about power, specifically Putin's power within Russia.  Unless we are willing to out-Putin Putin by quickly inserting military forces in the Eastern Ukraine (which is, btw, technically quite possible. US airborne forces could have 10,000 troops in eastern Ukraine within a couple of hours given US military assets already in Europe. Russia would not be able to move in ahead of them and would risk a shooting war if they tried, which is our gamble that Putin is unwilling to do.)  it makes more sense to tone it down and be ready and willing to just give Putin what he needs in the Ukraine.  So far this seems to be what is happening.

by santiago on Wed Apr 2nd, 2014 at 10:36:03 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Your tactical proposal--of moving NATO troops into the Ukraine--is frankly insane, not because it will lead to Global Nuclear War (a separate issue altogether) but because it can only have the opposite effect of its stated goal of keeping the Ukraine a single country.  

At the first hint of NATO movement out of NATO countries the Russians will seize those objectives they consider worthwhile--and do it first.  

Notice that the western Ukraine is not a region the Russians consider worthwhile.  They will never seek to annex it.  

The eastern Ukraine is a different matter--they would rather not, but if annexing it is what is required to keep NATO bases out, they will do it in a heartbeat.  

Putin's strategy is easy to understand, once you understand his goals.  His tactics--well, his tactics are clever, and are deliberately meant to surprise.  

His goals are basic:  The survival of Russia as a nation, which explicitly means preventing its subjugation to the West as a resource colony.  That means no neo-liberalization.  The reference point is the looting out of Russia by the West during the Yeltsin years.  Putin's first job in coming to power was to put an end to that, his second job was to create a regional (thank you, John Kerry) base of political and military power sufficient to prevent a re-invasion from the West.  

The Western response was less than good-natured.  In fact, since the time of Yeltsin the US has steadily pushing forward NATO bases deeper east into Europe.  The Cold War ostensibly being over, these bases have no purpose, but their real purpose is pretty obvious to everybody, certainly to the Russians who are used to the fact that every few decades they are invaded from the West.  

For his success in saving the Russian nation Putin remains immensely popular.  

His tactical success in Crimea could only increase that popularity.  The US attempted a coup to match the coup in Kiev (5 billion dollars, by the US own admission, going into the Kiev destabilization) but Putin anticipated this and secured the Crimea (a strategic necessity) without the use of main force.  

So you see this is not about "power"--except in the sense that for its own reasons (economic failure at home) the US has restarted the Cold War.  

If you were really interested in peace in the Ukraine (not a US objective), you would consider how to reconstitute the remaining provinces into a multi-national, multi-linguistic federation of autonomous regions.  

It is already too late for that.  The IMF austerity is being implemented, fating the Ukraine to become a failed state.  

The Russians may yet be forced to peal off the East and South for their own protection.  The privatization of Ukranian agricultural lands will not go as well as Western oligarchs think.  The remainder will sink it into open chaos.  

--Gaianne  

The Fates are kind.

by Gaianne on Wed Apr 2nd, 2014 at 02:37:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]
At the first hint of NATO movement out of NATO countries the Russians will seize those objectives they consider worthwhile--and do it first.

NATO has been concerned that they are no longer able to monitor crucial Russian internal communications. How do they know that the Russians cannot monitor their own communications. If so, NATO paratroops might land in fields occupied by Russian tanks and trucks to transport them back to a friendly nation. I doubt NATO would take that risk.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Apr 2nd, 2014 at 03:00:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Speed and stealth is everything, and it is one thing the US is very good at still. It is very likely that NATO would win any race to critical transit points in eastern Ukraine even if Russia received word just as NATO forces did. As long as lightly armed US troops are physically controlling key roads and transit passes, it would mean that Russia would have to shoot them to get by. Since that would likely be unacceptable to Russia for obvious reasons, it's the only real way to insure no Russian invasion. The problem is that it risks nuclear war, which is something that Putin has proven willing to do in Crimea (and Russia also did in Kosovo). But Russia has a lot more at stake in the Ukraine than the US does, so I think it is unlikely we will see Obama agree to that kind of gamble.
by santiago on Wed Apr 2nd, 2014 at 04:10:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Speed and stealth is everything, and it is one thing the US is very good at still. It is very likely that NATO would win any race to critical transit points in eastern Ukraine even if Russia received word just as NATO forces did.
Russia beat the US to Berlin in 1945, to Sarajevo in the 1990s and to Crimea this year. In the latter case, with speed and stealth.

Where has the US used speed and stealth for large troop movements recently?

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Apr 2nd, 2014 at 04:18:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Those are not the same things at all. In neither of the cases you listed was the US trying to reach them with a small force before the Russians did. (Although they probably should have.) The problem for the Russians in the Ukraine is that they have to move large forces, in this case in order to occupy eastern Ukraine against a potential fight with Ukrainians, whereas a small group of US or British special forces on the NATO side is sufficient to achieve the American objective of blocking roads and transit for Russian forces. If the Russians have to shoot at NATO in any way, they lose, so there is no need for a comparable sized force to match the Russians.

US speed and stealth has been very effective and has had, and continues to get even now, almost continuous, real battle condition experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, etc. It is very unlikely that the Russians would be able to win such a race in the Ukraine, even starting from a much closer distance.  

by santiago on Wed Apr 2nd, 2014 at 05:26:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
In neither of the cases you listed was the US trying to reach them with a small force before the Russians did. (Although they probably should have.)
That is exactly my point - wherever the US has gone in my lifetime it has been with massive force with a slow buildup and in technicolor and quadraphonic sound. But it appears to be elementary strategy that if you can put a small force in charge of airstrips and communication centres it doesn't matter that the other guys can beat you with massive force. After all, the US still does not want to get into an actual shootout with Russian troops. So, while the US wonders about how to deliver a crippling blow, maybe Russia will simply take control of Donetsk or Kharkiv with a small force. And then you'll come back to tell us that the US is still superior in speed and stealth.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Apr 3rd, 2014 at 05:37:23 AM EST
[ Parent ]
And no, Panama and Grenada don't count.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Apr 3rd, 2014 at 05:39:08 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, I agree that such a move on the part of NATO would be the kind of risk-taking that they presently don't do, operationally, outside of the early reconnaissance and special forces things, which is what winning the race to to parts of eastern Ukraine would have to entail. I'm not at all convinced that anyone in the US or NATO establishment has the kind of strategic, "outside-the-box" thinking that such a move would require and that Putin has shown himself to be so good at. But I am pretty certain that such a move is about the only way to actually stop Russian tanks from rolling into the Ukraine if Russia intends to send them sometime soon.
by santiago on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 01:20:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]
And, given that Russia may well have much better human intelligence on NATO than NATO has on Russia, Russia may have a heads up days before and then hours before the event. And Russian vehicles and personnel could well push physically right past lightly armed NATO airborn units in any case without firing shots. Would NATO then fire the first shots against a superior force backed by armor and air power? And in eastern Ukraine it would likely be NATO troops that would need protection from angry mobs of civilians. And what reason do you have to believe that the Ukraonian military either would remain neutral, split or not side with Russia vs. NATO?

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Apr 2nd, 2014 at 05:12:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The US, like Russia, has been placing human intelligence assets throughout the Ukrainian government and military since 1990. (They even recruited two native Ukrainian speakers right out of my high school, one of whom later went on to become an astronaut instead.)  This is the one place in the world where the US may actually prepared for something intelligence-wise, but yes, clearly it would require a sounding from Ukrainian generals that they are against the Russians. (And perhaps they've already sounded and found lacking, which may be why we haven't seen anything like this yet, since is otherwise exactly the the thing NATO forces have been training for in Europe since the fall of the Warsaw Pact.)

There are always choke points in transit routes where it is impossible to push past -- bridges, tunnels, cut passes, etc.  Those are where units from both sides would be racing to get to first, but NATO only has to reach some of them to be successful. Russia would have to capture nearly all of them because it is the side that has to move in a sufficiently large invading force.  NATO's objective would not be to defend eastern Ukraine against Russian forces, but merely to force the Russians to have to kill some Americans to get by.  Russia actually needs to insert a full army into the area to be successful if the Ukranian army looks like it won't stand down.  As long as NATO can reach some of key sites first, it means Russians would have to shoot to move them to secure a position capable of defending against a possible Ukrainian counter attack.  Since Russia would be the invader, NATO can shoot at Russians even, without the same consequences, and NATO would be betting on Russian beliefs about notoriously trigger-happy American troops for this kind of poker stand-off anyway.  

It's really just classic Saul Alinsky with armed forces instead of civil groups:  Get a some people in the way and force the opponent have to deal with the problem, a strategy that Putin himself has already mastered and thus completely understand if he's been outplayed at it.

by santiago on Wed Apr 2nd, 2014 at 05:53:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You seem to be assuming that:

  1. Nato troops inserted into Eastern Ukraine would be greeted as liberators rather than occupiers (now where have we heard this before?)
  2. Russia would not shoot at "lightly armed Nato troops" inserted there.  Why ever not?  They can always claim Nato troops started the shooting first.  They could just bulldoze their way past NATO checkpoints. They could insert their own special forces (with unmarked uniforms)to take them on and claim they were local freedom fighters.

And what would "the West" do then?

Whinge

"The West" cannot win a conventional war against Russia in Eastern Ukraine. It would be the most ignominious climbdown since - well Afghanistan - another war of occupation which isn't going very well.

Why take Russia on on precisely the terms it is best equipped to win on - a conventional war close to its own borders and amidst a region who's indigenous population is not disposed to support "the West"?

The West might win concessions using sanctions and trade and diplomacy. But only the truly stupid start a war they can't win.

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Thu Apr 3rd, 2014 at 04:03:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm going to assume neither Russia nor the US have the stomach for shooting at each other right now. So you might get a tense standoff after which Russia would negotiate conditions for a withdrawal.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Apr 3rd, 2014 at 05:18:21 PM EST
[ Parent ]
So you might get a tense standoff after which Russia would negotiate conditions for a withdrawal.

Including negotiation of who withdraws.


"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Thu Apr 3rd, 2014 at 05:40:11 PM EST
[ Parent ]
No, I'm with Santiago here that the US probably has the ultimate upper hand militarily, but at atrocious cost and Russia really wants neither a failed state nor a smoking crater in the heart of the old Rus.

The failed state risk is an important perspective in my opinion. The US doesn't have a problem with failed states as buffer states, especially far away from the US mainland. And clearly the trigger for Russian action in Crimea has been a collapse of state power in Ukraine including things like a (short-lived, but that just adds to the perception that Ukraine does not have a functioning state) repeal of legal protections for minorities.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 04:56:23 AM EST
[ Parent ]
An ultimate GEO-political consideration might be that this civilization is past its peak and is heading towards a nasty overshot fast --- fundamentally because of (gasp!) energy limitations, plus global warming.

If so, things like international trade, financial markets, cultural wars, even LBGT rights, technological advances are just games to distract beta (etc) players. Russia would be then in a unique position (only Norway would compare) to be fully self-sufficient to last longer in a civilized form --- if only it won't be looted in the last minute by Western corporate-financial monsters. Preparing for the Mad Max world, ain't it fun?!

by das monde on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 05:18:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Ain't it fantasy?
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 06:11:05 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Ain't it fun-tastic?

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 06:22:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I think it was a minor miracle no one "lost the head" and started shooting in Crimea - with wildly unpredictable results.  The chances of the same happening with NATO troops (and Russian special forces) inserted all over Eastern Ukraine must be close to zero - whatever the armchair generals in neo-con think tanks might think in their game playing scenarios.  Don't forget there are many actors on both sides who might actually want a shooting war...and the situation could very quickly spiral out of control.

Index of Frank's Diaries
by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Thu Apr 3rd, 2014 at 06:44:01 PM EST
[ Parent ]
There are no such assumptions. If Russia shoots US troops that are simply defending themselves while trying to keep a Russian army from advancing into Eastern Ukraine, the US will probably to go to war scale war with Russia.  It's that simple.  It doesn't matter what Russia claims because it is the US population and political class that makes that call, not international opinion.  Same has been the case with Putin's risking of Russian forces.  Full on war with the US means the game would be over for Putin, since Putin doesn't want a war, and neither does anybody else.  Putin knows this, but he has been betting that the West won't take the same risks that he is doing, largely because he knows that Ukraine really isn't very important, resource or strategic-wise, to the US or Western Europe.

The chess match that Putin has been playing involves putting his forces in places that risk nuclear war or full-on conventional war to remove them.  Like the classic prisoner's dilemma game, it means only a willingness to do the same on the part of the West is capable of thwarting Putin's strategy, a condition which is inherently unstable because of the uncertainty involved and so unlikely to be made by the West.

If the Ukrainians were to react negatively to US troops entering their country, which is always a possibility, then such a strategy to match Putin's risk-taking won't work, I agree.  It is dependent upon support from Ukrainians.  My sense right now, however, having talked to many different Ukrainians over the last few weeks, Russian as well as Ukrainian speaking, is that such support would be forthcoming for the US at the present time.  They really don't want Russia coming any further right now.

The West, meaning the US all alone, certainly can "win" a conventional war against Russia in the Ukraine. Such an outcome is not guaranteed, but both Russian and US generals know that this is the case. A conventional war in Eastern Europe is actually the war that the US is best equipped to fight as well, and it is the one that it has spent more resources, time, and preparation training for than any other, Afghanistan and Iraq notwithstanding.  The US is still equipped mostly with pre-2000 era heavy equipment exactly designed for that very fight, so although that scenario is also the one Russia is best equipped for, it is still the one NATO has always had all the equipment already in place in Europe to do as well. That's what makes this crisis such a scary prospect, similar to the conditions at the beginning of WWI.

However, if a war of any kind starts, it's a loss for everyone, because it really would be a big one, and both sides know this and are specifically trying to avoid it while bluffing each other and making strategic moves that require the other side to back away when war is the only other option. So far Putin has outplayed NATO in every way in this chess game, largely because he has been willing to take risks the West has not.  He has been willing to play chicken with the prospect of full on war with the West, which means that unless the West is willing to do the same, it cannot possibly gain an equivalent standing in any negotiation.  

Not being willing to do that means allowing Putin to have the upper hand in negotiations.  To me, that's perfectly okay and is probably the best thing for the West to do in this case, precisely because the Ukraine really isn't that important to anyone except Russia, and really should never have been staked out as a NATO objective in the first place.  

by santiago on Thu Apr 3rd, 2014 at 10:03:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]
santiago:
If Russia shoots US troops that are simply defending themselves while trying to keep a Russian army from advancing into Eastern Ukraine, the US will probably to go to war scale war with Russia.  It's that simple.  It doesn't matter what Russia claims because it is the US population and political class that makes that call, not international opinion.

This is how this works:

In 1969 the British sent troops into Northern Ireland to help protect Catholics who were being burnt out of their houses and attacked by protestants mobs with the shadowy support of the protestant police force and B Special auxiliary police  force.

They were welcomed by the overwhelming majority of the Catholic citizenry.

However a small minority of catholic nationalists/republicans didn't want British troops on their turf and started some semi covert attacks on the troops from the cover of local knowledge. The troops responded unskillfully and started inadvertently killing innocent Catholics in response.  Within months the entire Catholic community was turned against the troops and turned a blind eye when a full scale guerrilla war against the troops gradually emerged.

It won't take so long in the Eastern Ukraine, because unlike Northern Ireland (where the troops  gained the support of the majority protestant community) US troops have basically to legitmate reason for being in Uktraine.

If, as you say, the US political classes will make the call, at some point, to go to war with Russia in response, they are simply setting themselves up for a bigger disaster than Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam combined.  The US will lose its dominant position - economically and politically, in the world regardless of military outcomes in Ukraine.

And don't make the mistake of thinking Russia won't go full scale thermonuclear in response to (say) the US using Neutron or other battlefield nuclear weapons in the Ukraine.  (You use nuclear weapons on our turf, don't think we won't do so on yours).

It never ceases to amaze me that deapite Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq - all wars the US essentially lost -  the "US political classes" still think they can win such wars such is their imperial arrogance. And Russia is not Vietnam. You will be creating an enemy many orders of magnitude stronger.

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 04:32:49 AM EST
[ Parent ]
It seems that Israeli troops really were welcomed by locals during the first invasion of Lebanon. It didn't last.....
by gk (gk (gk quattro due due sette @gmail.com)) on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 04:50:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Those wars were largely there for the mil-ind establishment to make money from government hand-outs, not as genuine military or geopolitical operations.

The US is actually a fake military state - like North Korea, with better PR and advertising. It doesn't matter that it's not good at winning wars. What matters is the fake patriotism (for the proles) and the state spending (for the CEOs) that keep the pantomime running.

Practically, a lot of super-expensive hardware simply doesn't work. E.g. the F35 program is a disaster. So there's a good chance the US would quickly get its arse kicked in a real non-nuclear superpower war.

I think the US political classes know this. Hence the huffing and puffing over the Ukraine, and the complete absence of concrete action.

In fact when the US wants to do geopolitics, it sends in the spooks and creates a coup, or sends in the bankers. (See also Gene Sharp, Venezuela, Greece and Spain, etc.) Actually blowing shit up is largely for PR purposes these days.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 07:57:56 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The West, meaning the US all alone, certainly can "win" a conventional war against Russia in the Ukraine.
Sounds like destroying the Ukraine in order to save it, though.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 04:43:50 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Did you speak to any Ukranians living in Ukraine, or expats? Because, let me tell you, expats are not the best people to rely on for a sense of what the natives at home think, looking at the Irish experience during the Troubles.
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 04:48:23 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I did speak with actual Ukrainians presently living in the Ukraine, but visiting abroad for a variety reasons, not expats. Here in NYC we recently held couchsurfing/airbnb party that ended up being made up mostly of Russian, Ukrainian, and Estonian students and visiting academics, abroad for only a month or two at most, all far left of center politically. Even the Pussy Riot-supporters among the Russians were quick to circle the wagons in support of any criticism of Putin.  While the Ukrainians, some from Crimea as well as other non-Kiev areas, were quite hostile and genuinely fearful of the prospect of losing political independence, even those who didn't like the new fascists in Kiev. Is this representative of the masses in the region?  Probably not, but I kind of expected to see more ambivalence on the part of the Ukrainians regarding the prospect of Russians moving into the eastern Ukraine, but hostility to that idea was pretty universally felt. Everyone except the Russians are kind of tired of the authoritarian stuff that they continue to identify with Russia and Putin.
by santiago on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 12:51:41 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It is a cliche that Russians have long preferred stability to liberty. Might that be different for the Ukrainians? And I wonder if envy of Russia having an effective leader, especially compared to Ukraine, since Putin came to power might play a part. Envy easily leads to hatred.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 01:19:24 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The idea that the people in Kiev are fascists is 100% Russian disinformatiya. The government is supported by exactly the same parliament which supported Yanukovich. Are there extremists in the Rada? Yes. Were they their previously as well? Yes. Is the Ukraine the only country with nasty political forces? No. In what country are they the mainstream? Russia.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Sat Apr 5th, 2014 at 03:01:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Between 1/5th and 1/3rd of the Ukrainian cabinet are from Svoboda or Pravy Sektor. In other words, unreconstructed Nazis.

I really don't think Ukraine has anything to let Russia know about the mainstreaming of far-right thugs.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Apr 5th, 2014 at 04:16:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Here in the Astoria area of New York where I am there are lots of Ukrainians (in Bayside, Brooklyn are the Russians), and as developments have changed in their home country this week, so have their feelings about what their compatriots back home are thinking. Among expats especially, there is now a new sense that Russia will also have to annex eastern Ukraine and that people both support it and that it is probably best for everyone anyway. Some are even resigned to the rest of Ukraine being made part of Poland. It's a much different attitude than the more strident, pro-Ukrainian sentiment last week, and I doubt that a NATO visit to eastern Ukraine would be well received by locals anymore.  That window seems to have past and a sense of inevitability regarding the return of at least eastern Ukraine to Russia seems to now be setting in.  
by santiago on Wed Apr 9th, 2014 at 01:15:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
It's going to be supremely ironic for Poland to partition another country with Russia...

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Apr 9th, 2014 at 02:04:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Not to mention NATO acquiring a long border with Russia after all....
by gk (gk (gk quattro due due sette @gmail.com)) on Wed Apr 9th, 2014 at 02:19:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I have a hard time seeing this actually happen.  If nothing else, Polish annexation of Western Ukraine would add something like 20 million people to the Polish population. ~60 million.  Putting on order with the big countries like the UK, France, Germany, and Italy.

A rump Ukraine seems more likely. I do think that union between Moldova and Romania is likely if the Russian try to annex Transnistria. Between this and separatist movements, it's going to be a very different Europe.

And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg

by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Wed Apr 9th, 2014 at 03:09:11 PM EST
[ Parent ]
the Ukraine really isn't that important to anyone except Russia, and really should never have been staked out as a NATO objective in the first place
The flashpoint here was not NATO, but the EU. I suspect the US foreign policy establishment must be really pissed off at the way the EU (and Merkel) has handled Ukraine. Total fantasist rookies, if you ask me.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 04:50:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I read somewhere that Ukraine is a job for EU to show itself relevant.
by das monde on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 05:20:38 AM EST
[ Parent ]
They have their job cut out for them.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 05:30:26 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I suspect the US foreign policy establishment must be really pissed off at the way the EU (and Merkel) has handled Ukraine. Total fantasist rookies, if you ask me.

Mutual scapegoating? In the other pan of the balance put Victoral Nuland, $5 billion in US aid, the US AID,l and everything else that came up with a bunch of foaming fascists and flag-waving Nazis as their accomplishment. Is it even clear that the US opposed the EU's 'us or them' offer? I suspect the focus was on who would get the prize.  

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 10:18:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I suspect the US foreign policy establishment must be really pissed off at the way the EU (and Merkel) has handled Ukraine. Total fantasist rookies, if you ask me.

Unlike the perfect execution of the Iraq and Afghanistan adventures, I suppose?

Look, the entire European establishment bought into the idea we had a post-realist world order in Europe. They didn't even have the phrase "sphere of influence" enter their heads during the trade negotiations with Ukraine last fall, because they don't think in those terms any longer. I've kept telling people for years this is totally wrong, but they needed this kind of brutal wake-up call to get it.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Sat Apr 5th, 2014 at 03:05:24 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Putinism and the Anti-WEIRD Coalition

[...]

Americans of all stripes have a well-honed ability to ignore inconvenient facts, and our better educated citizens seem particularly prone to this (as I noted with our "expert" inability to see what North Korea believes, even though they aren't shy about it). At root, I suspect Obama and many Americans refuse to accept the in-our-face reality of Putin and his regime because they represent a past version of ourselves, caught up in retrograde views that are entirely unacceptable to our elites, therefore they pretend they do not exist, because they don't actually exist in their world.

Simply put, Vladimir Putin is the stuff of Western progressive nightmares because he's what they thought they'd gotten past. He's a traditional male with "outmoded" views on, well, everything: gender relations, race, sexual identity, faith, the use of violence, the whole retrograde package. Putin at some level is the Old White Guy that post-moderns fear and loathe, except this one happens to control the largest country on earth plus several thousand nuclear weapons - and he hates us.

Of course, this also happens to explain why some Westerners who loathe post-modernism positively love Putin, at least from a safe distance. Some far-right Westerners - the accurate term is paleoconservatives - have been saying for years that the West, led very much by America, has become hopelessly decadent and they've been looking for a leader to counter all this, and - lo and behold - here he is, the new "leader of global conservatism." Some paleocons have stated that, with the end of the Cold War, America has become the global revolutionary power, seeking to foist its post-modern views on the whole planet, by force if necessary, and now Putin's Russia has emerged as the counterrevolutionary element. Cold War 2.0, in this telling, has the sides reversed.

[...]

We are entering a New Cold War with Russia, whether we want to or not, thanks to Putin's acts in Ukraine, which are far from the endpoint of where the Kremlin is headed in foreign policy. As long as the West continues to pretend there is no ideological component to this struggle, it will not understand what is actually going on. Simply put, Putin believes that his country has been victimized by the West for two decades, and he is pushing back, while he is seeking partners. We will have many allies in resisting Russian aggression if we focus on issues of freedom and sovereignty, standing up for the rights of smaller countries to choose their own destiny.

However, too much emphasis on social and sexual matters - that is, telling countries how they must organize their societies and families - will be strategically counterproductive.



Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Mon Apr 7th, 2014 at 06:46:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I am quite familiar with the WEIRD concept, but I don't actually think it applies here, especially between the two groups really making the decisions in this -- Russians and Americans.

On matters of political strategy and military affairs at least, Russians and Americans are so uncannily alike in their thought processes and ways of looking at the world that "mirror image" is really the best way of characterizing them. After all, these are the two peoples who have been studying each other, for billions of man-hours, over a nuclear chess board for almost 70 years now.  That's why so many Americans have man-crushes on Putin, after all. We really do understand and appreciate the guy.  And contrary to what many in the commentariat have been writing in the past few weeks, Putin, and Russians in general, have displayed an amazingly accurate understanding of how Americans think strategically as well.  

by santiago on Wed Apr 9th, 2014 at 01:28:48 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Yet the author's points about the differences between Russia's perspectives and those of the USA stand. Especially attitudes about gender and national myths such as The Third Rome and how those factors will work in this situation. While I am certain that there are many others in the US defense and intelligence community who also understand these differences they certainly have not been on display in public pronouncements recently. Steve Cohen has been the most outspoken in US media and his reach is limited. Had having Putin and Russia move more towards western values been a goal the best means would have been to leave Ukraine alone - by both the EU and the USA. All that will happen now is that the views that the WEIRD find objectionable will only be strengthened, at least for the short and medium term. That is just how dialectical processes work.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Apr 9th, 2014 at 01:55:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, the points about the differences between Russian actions and what I will refer to as the interpretation of the West's "chattering classes" do stand, but not with respect to the actual policy actions of the US or of the defense and policy thinkers who have the most influence on outcomes. Also, they do not stand with respect to the author's own theory of a sort of anti-neoliberal ideological basis for Putin's actions.  

All of Putin's actions, and those of the US, are completely explained the the realist theory of international relations -- that the interests of power always take precedence, and that "the strong will do what they must while the weak can only do what they can."  No ideological explanation is necessary, and it appears doubtful that Putin is really interested at all in anti-neoliberal or any other post-modernist inspired discourse. He has never indicated, in his entire, well publicized life, any interest in such thinking.

Realism, on the other hand, is the same principal of foreign policy (and all policy really) that has dominated thinking in the affairs of statecraft since Thucydides first made the observation, and later re-popularized by Machiavelli,  Henry Kissinger, and now still be taught and argued by people like John Mearsheimer and Steven Walt, as well as having comprised the core pedagogy of both US and Russian military staff colleges for over a century, at least.  

Realism is how US and Russians think and how their soldiers and diplomats have been educated, and it is how they expect the other to interpret events and actions, and nothing that has actually transpired in events in Europe, right down to the infamous "fuck the EU" phone call and exposure by Russia, contradicts a purely realist interpretation of what is going on in both Russian and American policymakers' minds.  Only the blogosphere, and perhaps various EU heads of state, appear to be consistently duped by US and Russian press releases.

by santiago on Wed Apr 9th, 2014 at 03:48:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Washington and NATO's New Surrealpolitik    Finian Cunningham

--------  As the unelected Kiev junta sends armed balaclava-clad paramilitaries to quell protests in Ukraine's eastern cities it declares the operation «anti-terrorism». The acting (sic) president in Kiev Oleksandr Turchynov has labeled all those seeking political autonomy in Kharkov, Donetsk, Lugansk and other pro-Russian cities in the east of the country as «terrorists and criminals»; a new set of laws cobbled together by the junta - two months before scheduled official elections have taken place and therefore of dubious legality - gives the self-appointed politicians in Kiev the power to prosecute any one that does not recognize their self-imposed authority...

Meanwhile, NATO has warned Moscow to «step back» from alleged military aggression (from within its own borders!) towards Ukraine - even though the US-led alliance has escalated the presence of its fighter jets and troops in Russia's neighboring countries. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, secretary general of the 28-member NATO organization, has also led calls for speeding up the incorporation of Georgia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina into the nuclear-armed pact. This is in addition to a deal hastily worked out by NATO and the NATO-backed junta in Kiev for joint military exercises to be carried out on Ukrainian territory.

This constitutes a new genre of politics, which one might dub «surrealpolitik». The former realpolitik of the bygone Cold War decades may have been cynical and callous, but at least such thinking was based on an objective reality that vying sides could commonly recognize and therefore negotiate. In the new genre of surrealpolitik, one side's version of reality seems more in the realm of fantasy, which makes any dialogue between political contentions nearly, if not totally, impossible.

 

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Fri Apr 11th, 2014 at 09:34:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]
From the article cited above:
NATO installs an unelected regime in Kiev through a coup d'état against a legally elected government. That is a fact. Yet in the surreal world of Washington and its NATO allies, this fact is inverted into a fictional notion that what happened in Kiev during February was the culmination of «a democratic revolution». Airbrushed from the objective narrative are details such as the new regime arrogating administrative power through a campaign of Western-backed street violence and terrorism, including the fatal shooting of police officers by covert snipers.

Without supporting evidence, the sniper-assisted regime in Kiev, which was promptly accorded the authority of «government» by Western capitals and their media, has since counter-charged Russian secret services and the ousted President Viktor Yanukovych of orchestrating the shootings. Of course, the incriminating leaked telephone conversation, dated February 26, between EU ministers Catherine Ashton and Estonia's Urmas Paet on Western-backed covert snipers is conveniently deleted from the official Western record.



"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Fri Apr 11th, 2014 at 09:45:04 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Perhaps some in Washington and Brussles don't realize that the US Reality Creation Machine's effect does not extend to Ukraine and Russia.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Fri Apr 11th, 2014 at 09:59:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
There's two ways to interpret what is going on when one side is engaged in actual use of agents of force to obtain an objective and the other side, with the same or better force capabilities, does things like merely warn the force-using side to stop, or else...

The wrong interpretation is to imagine that anything new, like a new surrealpolitik paradigm, has infected the thinking of the non-aggressive side, which is what I see all over the blogosphere, like in your blockquote here.

The right interpretation is that the NATO side has already determined that use of force in Ukraine is not worth the effort, so it is writing the Ukraine off but cannot tell that to their allies in the Ukraine and elsewhere because it sounds too ruthless and unsupportive of justice, democracy, and the rule of law, the shared values for which any use of force must be consistent in the first place.  In Realpolitik, when someone uses words and official statements rather than actions, it is code for: you're not that important to us right now.  No one should infer from this that policymakers on the NATO side have a different view of reality at all.

As a young community organizer in Chicago, President Barrack Obama used to lead intense organizer trainings, called "week-longs" where trainees learned to abandon the "justice junkie" mindset and adopt Saul Alinsky's unique style of Machiavellian street politics. The week's training begins by reading Thucydides' "Milean Dialogue," the core text for the Realist school of international relations. The exercise that Obama, like all trainers then, like now, taught was to divide the trainees into the Melians and Athenians, and let them try to negotiate an outcome.  One of the key lessons was to not think like the stupid, self-righteous, but sympathetic Melians, but to think instead as ruthlessly and strategic as the Athenians.  Don't waste your resources on something where you can't build power as an outcome.

I really doubt Obama has forgotten this formational part of his entry into politics. Nothing else he has done indicates that he has. I'm pretty sure the US and NATO just aren't seeing where it helps them build power to get involved militarily in  Ukraine at the present time, or they would have already done so.

by santiago on Tue Apr 15th, 2014 at 03:12:19 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Perhaps you are right and I have just missed those occasions where Obama has exercised realpolitik. Then it is also possible that I simply disagree with what he saw as a realpolitik decision -- such as giving Wall Street a pass in '09. Perhaps that is an acceptable decision if you consider that temporary stability is more important than the long term survival of a viable society.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Apr 16th, 2014 at 12:45:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]
And so what about Obama's decision in '09? A calculated decision to let the financial cancer rage, considering that this would likely get him his best shot at two terms and that "Après moi, le déluge"? Even had he failed to get a second term he could have gone down as the most important single term president in US history? He could have brought about a reset that would have given the nation another three generations.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Apr 16th, 2014 at 09:38:47 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You have to take into account who Obama's advisors were: Summers and Geithner...

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Apr 16th, 2014 at 10:04:04 AM EST
[ Parent ]
And who chose those advisors.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Apr 16th, 2014 at 10:49:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]
They were "serious".

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Apr 16th, 2014 at 10:50:51 AM EST
[ Parent ]
My point is that, while understanding the implications of realpolitik is necessary, it is not a sufficient guide to decision making. And that there courageous acts of realpolitik as well as cowardly acts. It is one thing to apply realpolitik dealine with Chicago politics while backed by the Pritzkers and quite another to apply it in Washington dealing with Wall Street while having been backed by Wall Street. In Washington crossing powerful economic interests can get your balls stomped - or worse.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Apr 16th, 2014 at 10:57:19 AM EST
[ Parent ]
And what about the whole business of letting Victoria Nuland, AID, etc., etc. carry out the activities that so signally furthered the downfall of Yanukoviych? Mis-calculated realpolitik?

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Apr 16th, 2014 at 12:55:51 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, I think that was a case of miscalculated Realpolitik, and I think they didn't realize until the phone call how much the Russians knew about what they had been up to there, but by then it was too late. In any case, it a created a problem that Putin HAD to resolve while the US only has to hover around and take advantage of any opportunities that may or may not present themselves.  So, strategically, it was a pretty ruthless and low-risk (for the West) move that would have impressed Saul Alinsky, if not Henry Kissinger.  I think Putin proved himself better player and politician than they expected to him to be.  
by santiago on Wed Apr 16th, 2014 at 08:58:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
It's only effective realpolitik if at least half the participants are still alive at the end.
by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Wed Apr 16th, 2014 at 09:02:05 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So, strategically, it was a pretty ruthless and low-risk (for the West) move that would have impressed Saul Alinsky, if not Henry Kissinger.
Poor European Atlanticist, they're not "The West" but just its useful idiots.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Apr 16th, 2014 at 09:56:08 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Eastern Ukraine's future: Do Kiev and Moscow actually agree?   Christan Science Monitor

Earlier this week, Russia laid out its vision for eastern Ukraine and how Ukraine can move toward reestablishing its stability and territorial integrity - or what's left of it. Ukrainian officials called the Russian road map, published on the foreign ministry's website, an "ultimatum" and a "completely unacceptable" demand. But, as Yatsenyuk's speech showed, the two sides share common themes with regard to Ukraine's east.

The prospect of a federalized Ukraine. Yatsenyuk promised government reforms that would transfer to Ukraine's regions "the broadest scope of authority and financial resources." The Russian memorandum also calls for decentralization in Ukraine - it called the process "federalization" - and said it should be written into the Ukrainian Constitution. Yatsenyuk's statement confirmed that this was being done.



"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Fri Apr 11th, 2014 at 09:40:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It may be relatively easy for Russia to re-route its oil trade stream towards Asia, primarily, China, although this would mean lower prices and higher delivery costs. I am not so sure about Russian natural gas, though.

I agree that any restrictions limiting use of the global financial and banking system (which I mentioned as similar to the sanctions Iran is subject to), would immediately affect Russia's industries exposed to foreign trade, and indirectly all others, including consumer market. Russia is much less self-sufficient and far more integrated into the global economy than the USSR ever was.

As for deploying NATO contingent in Ukraine, I see multiple issues with this. First of all, the alliance doesn't have a mandate for the presence of its troops in the country. Setting up a legal basis for this may take significant amount of time, and I'm not sure all member countries will get on board. Second, what government would be willing to commit its troops that are, for all intents and purposes, unable to even defend themselves?

Besides, Russian military would make its move into Ukraine at first signs of NATO potentially coming in there.

by aquilon (albaruthenia at gmail dot com) on Wed Apr 2nd, 2014 at 08:59:15 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Russia does not need to export anything for its economic well being during a crisis situation.  It is an essentially self sufficient country. Exports are gravy, and that's why economic consequences are simply not very important to Putin. Securing Russia from what he, and most Russians, see as a Western invasion is what matters to Putin with respect to the Ukraine. A hostile government in the Ukraine is an existential threat to Putin's capacity to govern in Russia, so he needs to be ruthless and take risks to secure the threat, something he has done exceedingly well so far.

NATO, relying on US assets in Europe, could have US airborne forces deployed in key transit sites within about 3 hours, which is how such an operation would likely go, with a secret request from Ukraine announced only afterward.  Russia would not be able to react in time to a US deployment without actually having to risk shooting US troops already in place, in which case it would be "game over" for Putin (and potentially for a lot more than him), just as it would have been "game over" for Ukrainians if anyone had shot Russian troops in Crimea (or, vice versa, if Russians had shot Ukrainian troops). That's the gamble of that strategy.  

Neither the US nor Russia has ever, historically, seriously relied on legal mandates for anything determined important enough to use military forces, so legal issues just aren't a serious factor here. Laws are a discursive, diplomatic tools, not a actual restrictive impediments, at the level of world powers like the US and Russia.

Putin risked the possibility of nuclear war in Crimea already, as well as the lives of his undefended and unmarked troops. That means, strategically, using simple Prisoner's dilemma game theory, only a similar willingness to risk such a thing on the part of the US can secure Ukraine from Russian tanks. Because Ukraine really isn't very important to the US, however, it's unlikely that Obama would sign off on that gamble, and all appearances are that the US would rather risk losing at least the eastern part of the Ukraine in an effort to satisfy Putin's needs, at least being able to claim the partial success of having installed a government hostile to Russia in Kiev, which was a major defeat for Putin from which he partially recovered with the invasion of Crimea. A unified Ukraine is less important to NATO, and Russia, than a buffer state Ukraine at this point, so I don't expect to see NATO forces deployed there, and I do expect to Russian forces entering eastern Ukraine at some point if the current set of Ukrainian Ukrainian leaders remain in Kiev.

by santiago on Wed Apr 2nd, 2014 at 02:14:20 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Perhaps the situation in Kiev will 'improve', from Putin's point of view, over then next few months, so he does not feel impelled to invade. And after a year of so of IMF 'aid' much of eastern and southern Ukraine will be clamoring for union with Russia, and much of the Ukrainian military might support them.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Apr 2nd, 2014 at 02:53:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, if by self-sufficiency you mean Russia's ability to survive adversity, then I am on board with this. The nation has demonstrated it numerous times throughout its history. However, if you are talking about the Russian economy shrugging off sanctions, especially, as stringent as in Iran's case, I respectfully disagree. Export makes up 1/5 of Russia's GDP, and brings cold hard cash to support various ambitious programs, like socio-economic development of the Arctic zone, or space exploration. Even without any serious sanctions in effect right now, Russia already faces outflow of investments and a possibility of zero or negative growth this year. Once living standards start go down, Putin's popularity will take a hit, and dissenting voices become louder.

Yes, unlike NATO, the U.S. government can fast-track decisions on use the military to "protect national interests". But making a case that Ukraine falls into this category in a war-weary country requires Houdini skills.

by aquilon (albaruthenia at gmail dot com) on Thu Apr 3rd, 2014 at 10:56:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]
 aquilon:
Yes, unlike NATO, the U.S. government can fast-track decisions on use the military to "protect national interests". But making a case that Ukraine falls into this category in a war-weary country requires Houdini skills.

Practically, it may not require, but it is certainly much easier for a Republican President to make that case. At present Republican warmongering is conflicted by the desire to make Obama and the Democrats 'look weak' on defense. I would bet that Putin has taken that into account.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sun Apr 13th, 2014 at 07:19:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Putin risked the possibility of nuclear war in Crimea already, as well as the lives of his undefended and unmarked troops. That means, strategically, using simple Prisoner's dilemma game theory, only a similar willingness to risk such a thing on the part of the US can secure Ukraine from Russian tanks.


A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 04:32:49 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Putin risked the possibility of nuclear war in Crimea already, as well as the lives of his undefended and unmarked troops. That means, strategically, using simple Prisoner's dilemma game theory, only a similar willingness to risk such a thing on the part of the US can secure Ukraine from Russian tanks.
Well put.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Apr 4th, 2014 at 04:36:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I see nuclear war having been mentioned a few times in this discussion. Frankly, I'm puzzled where it comes from. Nukes starting raining down because of Russia's takeover of Crimea? Sorry, I simply don't buy it.
by aquilon (albaruthenia at gmail dot com) on Sat Apr 5th, 2014 at 11:29:08 AM EST
[ Parent ]
How I agree.
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Sat Apr 5th, 2014 at 03:18:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I almost agree. Obama is either a pragmatist or simply doesn't care. Therefore, no nuke threats.

But that wouldn't have been true of President Palin, or some other future president of a similar stripe.

I wouldn't be surprised if Putin considered the US election cycle in his calculations.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Wed Apr 16th, 2014 at 09:06:04 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, I'm positive that was the case. Actually, even on the right fringes of GOP there has been no audible talk so far, about direct military support for Ukraine, let alone a nuclear strike. President Palin? As long as independent votes are a majority in the U.S., this is an unlikely scenario, even considering the two-step election process. The current GOP polls leader Rand Paul has seemingly inherited some libertarian genes from his father, and doesn't look inclined to get the nation too actively involved in European affairs this far to the East.
by aquilon (albaruthenia at gmail dot com) on Fri Apr 18th, 2014 at 12:54:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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