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For one, I think it all goes to fast. There are bounds between elites to be severed, there are institutional connections (not least in the deep states) that would be a counterweight against open warfare, and there needs to be more propaganda to make warfare acceptable among European states again.

Same for the development of the EU. Even if the southern states left the north would run with the same institutions until they were reformed within the rules of the institution or abandoned for something else. The League of Nations for example existed until 1946 when it was dissolved and assets transfered to the United Nations. For the EU I think institutional paralysis is a more likely fate then quick re-boot. Once interests start heading in different directions there will not be enough collaboration to either reform or start something new.

The US is rather absent. Though I think the case of Slovenia is all to realistic, surely they would have opinions on NATO troops fighting and blockading each other all over western Europe. Unless they have gone isolationistic and elected Palin in 2016?

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by A swedish kind of death on Tue Feb 10th, 2015 at 08:13:38 AM EST
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I think my scenario actually includes some of what you are missing, some explicit, some implicit. The bounds between elites are severed by elites-disposing elections. For the EU, I think France's departure (in contrast to the departure of other southern European states until 2017) would be a major shift, giving Britain (and its occasional Scandinavian  ex-EFTA allies) much greater weight. France's exit would also mean the end of Strasbourg as EU sear, in addition, the split of Belgium I hinted at would incapacitate Brussels, all of which would IMHO necessitate a new start.

Regarding the USA and NATO, I think both are too focused on external enemies and loyalty to the hegemon, and Cyprus and lesser Turkish–Greek conflicts of the past show that they would have difficulty stopping a serious conflict between allies. This would be even more true for allies even less enthusiastic than de Gaulle: do you think Le Pen or Jobbik leader Vona would listen to appeals from the USA? What remains is siding with the victim militarily, on which point my scenario includes the establishment of a precedent for not applying Article 5. The USA would also have to hold back vs. France because of its nuclear deterrent and UNSC permanent membership.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Tue Feb 10th, 2015 at 12:32:29 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The bounds between elites are severed by elites-disposing elections

It's nowhere near that easy, I suspect.

by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2015 at 12:44:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, it "worked" in the Ukraine.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Tue Feb 10th, 2015 at 12:49:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]
On second thought, I edited the first paragraph of the diary, after all, the war in the Ukraine was also on my mind (see the parallel discussion on Merkel in Moscow and Washington in the same diary).

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Tue Feb 10th, 2015 at 12:53:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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