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Since this gives a better negotiation position to the Greek government, I would say it also decreases the risk of Greece being forced out.
Nobody has argued against this, so I guess I had a point, even if it was mostly arguing by gut feeling.
To try to go beyond gut feeling, lets look at the main actors.
Eurogroup majority. Goals: continued austerity, not losing face. Tools: threat of Grexit.
Greek government. Goals: ending austerity, staying in power. Tools: power of Greek state aparatus.
If the power of Greek state aparatus makes the threat of Grexit less useful, I would say the best option for the eurogroup majority would be to makes noise to save face and not try to kick Greece out.
I must say that the last months actions has made it clear that my view of what it means to kick Greece out was incomplete.
Means to kick a country out of a currency:
What could ECB and or the eurogroup do if it really, really wants Greece to start using something other then euros?
Meanwhile Greece would formally remain in all of the various governing boards in the EU and Eurogroup and be able to vote and veto as appropriate. They could make life miserable, if not as miserable, for other states as well as for Greece. At some point the Russian card might well get played, and just blocking certain actions that adversely affect Russia would really upset some in the Eurogroup as well as the USA. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
To add to your list:
Eurogroup: Tools: Capital controls, see Cyprus. Goals: Excluding outsiders from power, crushing of the Class enemy.
Commission: Grabbing as much power from the Eurogroup as possible. Tools: Bureaucratic infighting. Collaboration with the Class Enemy. Everything else that can be done without a budget.
Not only are Syrizia political outsiders, this would be the first leftwing government in Europe since [fill in once an example comes to mind]. I'm sure the reactionaries will go to extremes if they fail to force a surrender/betrayal.
Not only are Syrizia political outsiders, this would be the first leftwing government in Europe since [fill in once an example comes to mind].
No longer clearing transfers with the Greek central bank would be pretty final.
Such an action would also provide a justification for Syriza and Greece to make any deal they could find with Russia and China, along with any one else who would accept payment in currencies other than the Euro, US$, of various western major currencies. It might be awkward for the US Treasury and/or the BIS to prevent an oil exporter such as Indonesia or Brunei from settling for oil shipments in their own currency or Chinese Yuan. I certainly don't know, nor do I suspect does anyone else with a high degree of certainty.
I think it would be a high stakes roll of the dice. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
Greece is staring to make contingency plans; Ambrose Evans-Pritchard reports that the government has designed new drachmas. But he argues that neither side holds the upper hand, since the prospect of a powerful Grexit is a powerful weapon. That view may be part of what is informing the sometimes self-sabotaging aggressive Greek posture. And it may not be accurate. The US and UK press have expressed more concern about the risk of a Greek departure from the Eurozone. And recall that it took a lot of external pressure on Germany, not just from the US and UK governments, but from NATO too, to get Merkel to rein in Schauble. However, the concern that led Eurogroup to relent may not have been about a Greek departure, but a disorderly Grexit. If enough of the hardliners (the ECB, the IMF, and the more bloody-minded members of the Eurogroup) share that view, Greece's likely assumptions about its negotiating leverage, and what degree of concessions its "partners" are prepared to make would prove to be off base.
Greece is staring to make contingency plans; Ambrose Evans-Pritchard reports that the government has designed new drachmas. But he argues that neither side holds the upper hand, since the prospect of a powerful Grexit is a powerful weapon.
That view may be part of what is informing the sometimes self-sabotaging aggressive Greek posture. And it may not be accurate. The US and UK press have expressed more concern about the risk of a Greek departure from the Eurozone. And recall that it took a lot of external pressure on Germany, not just from the US and UK governments, but from NATO too, to get Merkel to rein in Schauble.
However, the concern that led Eurogroup to relent may not have been about a Greek departure, but a disorderly Grexit. If enough of the hardliners (the ECB, the IMF, and the more bloody-minded members of the Eurogroup) share that view, Greece's likely assumptions about its negotiating leverage, and what degree of concessions its "partners" are prepared to make would prove to be off base.
Now, I must say I disagree with most of what Yves' writes in this article. There is no good faith here, the negotiations are at least partly conducted for the benefit of the audience and there is no way that Spain and Portugal will be anything less than hostile. One of the few assets Greece has is that the Eurogroup's case is macoeconomic nonsense and in a fair discussion they look like clowns compared to Varoufakis. So letting him continue to talk with journalists is essential. Greece has no other way to plant a news story and would completely loose any track in the bigger societal discussion. She also puts still too much faith in stories based on "officials'" take on things even after the earlier draft wars have shown that the Euro side has no compunction about bare face lying.
still her take is based on years of experience negotiating in the financial sector and not an irrational fear of Tony Blair lurking under the bed.
Including the first paragraph. What Ambrose Evans-Pritchard actually reported was
Greece's new currency designs are ready. The green 50 drachma note features Cornelius Castoriadis, the Marxisant philosopher and sworn enemy of privatisation. The Nobel poet Odysseus Elytis - voice of Eastward-looking Hellenism - honours the 200 note. The bills rise to 10,000 drachma, a wise precaution lest there is a hyperinflationary shock as Greece breaks out of its debt-deflation trap at high velocity. The amateur blueprints are a minor sensation in Greek artistic circles. They are only half in jest.
The Nobel poet Odysseus Elytis - voice of Eastward-looking Hellenism - honours the 200 note. The bills rise to 10,000 drachma, a wise precaution lest there is a hyperinflationary shock as Greece breaks out of its debt-deflation trap at high velocity.
The amateur blueprints are a minor sensation in Greek artistic circles. They are only half in jest.
Alekos Flambouraris, the government affairs minister, has already begun uttering the fatal word "delay", as if were possible to delay an IMF payment without triggering a total collapse of confidence. Syriza insiders warn privately that default is becoming an alarmingly real possibility. "It is so bad that anything could happen. I can't talk any more, the phones are bugged," said one official. He blamed the European Central Bank (ECB) for setting off a "self-fulfilling deposit flight" from the banking system by refusing to accept Greek collateral in exchange for loans. This decision was made within days of Syriza's landslide election, and before EMU's elected leaders had issued any opinion. The ECB's pre-emptive move is seen in Athens as counter-insurgency warfare against the first radical-Left party elected in Western Europe since 1945. It will not be forgotten lightly. The outflows were brisk even before that. Deposit losses reached 12.8bn in January. This is showing up in the "Target2" payment data of the ECB system. The Greek central bank's liabilities to the rest of the EMU network rocketed from 49bn in December to 76bn in January as capital flight accelerated. They may have hit 100bn by now. This is double-edged. Creditors have even more to lose if Greece spins out of control. A full repudiation of debt to the EMU institutions and states would cost over 300bn. It would be the biggest default of all time, by an order of magnitude.
He blamed the European Central Bank (ECB) for setting off a "self-fulfilling deposit flight" from the banking system by refusing to accept Greek collateral in exchange for loans. This decision was made within days of Syriza's landslide election, and before EMU's elected leaders had issued any opinion.
The ECB's pre-emptive move is seen in Athens as counter-insurgency warfare against the first radical-Left party elected in Western Europe since 1945. It will not be forgotten lightly.
The outflows were brisk even before that. Deposit losses reached 12.8bn in January. This is showing up in the "Target2" payment data of the ECB system. The Greek central bank's liabilities to the rest of the EMU network rocketed from 49bn in December to 76bn in January as capital flight accelerated. They may have hit 100bn by now.
This is double-edged. Creditors have even more to lose if Greece spins out of control. A full repudiation of debt to the EMU institutions and states would cost over 300bn. It would be the biggest default of all time, by an order of magnitude.
I had read the same post by Yves but decided not to quote any of it. She spent years with Nomura and has the perspective and experience of a large bank bank executive. She has much more than that, but that was her home for so many years it is not possible not to be seriously influenced by that mind set. Bankers have never dealt easily with revolutionaries, except when they can easily have them crushed. And what is happening is much more political economics than economics a la 'mainstream' economics, which likes to pretend politics has nothing to do with economics. Yves knows this also, but it is hardly her long suit. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
If those hold true then yes the memo was total surrender since they conceded the right to evaluate their reforms to the institutions. This also turns their later communication strategy incoherent.
But do they? On the second point I clearly disagree. I'm more than halve convinced that the Spaniards would advocate blocking the ports and bombing the population centers if they could be seen as doing so. What limits the Euros' action phase is public perception and fear of an exit. At least Schäuble would have no future if he is seen to push Greece out of the Euro and then demands the 300 billion hole in the ECB's balance sheet be filled by fresh tax money. Which he probably would since he is a believer.
On the second I also disagree. A default in and of itself is no problem, except if used by the ECB to force capital controls. And at least in the case of the IMF the Greek position is that the ECB should just hand over the two billion they owe them to the Fund. If the ECB refuses and than uses the resulting default to murder the payment system they really need to be in control of the media narrative. Because otherwise that looks like a carrier limiting move.
Finally I think she puts too much importance on the exact language used since in private sector negotiations everything you say can resurface in court. Here the only court that matters is the one of public opinion.
I think the 300 billion are supposed to be the whole damage, including official creditors and central bank balances. Only a very small part of this involves private banks directly.
A nice graphic from the @WSJ On What #Greece owes and when pic.twitter.com/NnQeSKeEal— Anthony Barton (@antbarton89) febrero 25, 2015
A nice graphic from the @WSJ On What #Greece owes and when pic.twitter.com/NnQeSKeEal
I recall reading about 11% yields for holders of Greek treasuries in 2014. Many of them seemed to be hedge funds. I would bet that a lot of those bills are spread around Eurozone banks. They needed to get returns somewhere. Looks like about $15 billion in Treasury bills all together. More hits to the same suspects in 2016. Of course if they force a total debt repudiation by Greece the entire structure of the new ESFS will almost cerainly dissolve, unless the money to cover those out year liabilities is already in the fund, which I have trouble believing. So another piece of paper ass cover dissolves in the rain. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
In addition, the Eurozone core is convinced, especially Germany, that the financial risks are finally ringfenced and Grexit is manageable.
Finally, Syriza is from the radical left, so it is ideologically opposed to the EPP and ALDE, and a direct competitor to the PES. What this means is that there isn't a government in the Eurozone, or an EU Commissioner, that is friendly to Greece's government. At most the Social Democrats or Labour politicians will be condescendingly sympathetic, and that if they're from Latin countries (up to and including Belgium - compare the attitudes of Van Brempt MEP and Dijsselbloem, both Socialists/Labour).
So Greek default is probably a given, and thus Varoufakis' job is to on the one hand help create the conditions for Greece to survive it, and on the other hand to contaminate European public opinion with as much good macroeconomic sense as he can. Hence the disarming honesty, the refusal to give ballpark figures he's not confident he can deliver on, the "I'm the finance minister of a bankrupt country", and the "If we are snuffed out by the vested interests, it will be our honour to have fallen in fighting the good fight". A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
I think this is key.
While Germany believes that Grexit is manageable, Grexit gets ever more likely, because what reason is there for Germany to compromise?
And it has to be clear eventually to Syriza that it is impossible to satisfy Germany and save the Greek economy.
Hence - Grexit.
"Manageable" is not the same as "better than any alternative". The incentive can be that, while it may be manageable, a better situation could ensue without it. For different definition of better, depending on what they care about. For some, it could mean how history will judge them. Regrettably, Schauble is too old to care as much about his future as we would like and seems intent on leaving the wrong kind of trail. But maybe others will see things differently.
Anyway, I am not saying you are wrong necessarily, just that it may not be as direct a conclusion as it seems. Earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need, but not every man's greed. Gandhi
Spain's economy minister is happily wading in on the Greek debate again today after getting in to a bit of hot water earlier in the week. Luis de Guindos is sticking to his guns, repeating his comment that Greece will need a third rescue in the region of 30-50bn. De Guindos told a conference in Barcelona that Europe would use the four-month bailout extension secured by Greece to assess what progress has been made, and what the next move should be. We have given ourselves these four months to one, see what the real situation is, to see how Greece has met conditions and to try and establish what happens next ... which is fundamentally a third rescue. He added that ministers at next week's eurogroup meeting would consider Greece's liquidity needs and debt maturities. De Guindos comment earlier in the week that the eurozone was working on a third rescue package for Greece ruffled a few feathers. In response, a spokeswoman for eurogroup chief Jeroen Dijsselbloem insisted that finance ministers were not discussing a third bailout.
Spain's economy minister is happily wading in on the Greek debate again today after getting in to a bit of hot water earlier in the week.
Luis de Guindos is sticking to his guns, repeating his comment that Greece will need a third rescue in the region of 30-50bn.
De Guindos told a conference in Barcelona that Europe would use the four-month bailout extension secured by Greece to assess what progress has been made, and what the next move should be.
We have given ourselves these four months to one, see what the real situation is, to see how Greece has met conditions and to try and establish what happens next ... which is fundamentally a third rescue.
He added that ministers at next week's eurogroup meeting would consider Greece's liquidity needs and debt maturities.
De Guindos comment earlier in the week that the eurozone was working on a third rescue package for Greece ruffled a few feathers.
In response, a spokeswoman for eurogroup chief Jeroen Dijsselbloem insisted that finance ministers were not discussing a third bailout.
One assumes he's talking about an extend-and-pretend package like the last two, on condition that the Greeks stick to the rules that ensure it will be unsustainable...
Still, it seems surprisingly honest and lucid of him to say it. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
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