reference
In re Debs et al Art. 1, interstate commerce clause--applied and inferred--on the occasion of crushing the ("mostly black") Pullman strike of 1895: Brewer WHO?

3 'No trace is to be found in the constitution of an intention to create a dependence of the government of the Union on those of the states, for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. Its means are adequate to its ends, and on those means alone was it expected to rely for the accomplishment of its ends. To impose on it the necessity of resorting to means which it cannot control, which another government may furnish or withhold, would render its course precarious, the result of its measures uncertain, and create a dependence on other governments, which might disappoint its most important designs, and is incompatible with the language of the constitution.' Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405, 424.

4  'Both the states and the United States existed before the constitution. The people, through that instrument, established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the states.' Chief Justice Chase in Lane Co. v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76.

5 'We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle that the government of the United States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the power to keep the peace to that extent.'

a. The Foundations of the Equitable Remedy

Equitable remedies have a long been established as tools available to courts, predating the Constitution itself. See Irvine v. Marshall, 61 U.S. 558, 565 (1857) ("[C]ases in equity are to be understood [as] suits in which relief is sought according to the principles and practice of the equity jurisdiction, as established in English jurisprudence"). The federal judicial power extends to "all cases, in law and equity, arising under [the] Constitution[,]" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, through which grant of authority "adopt[s] equitable remedies in all cases . . . where such remedies are appropriate." Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, at 475 (1917). As Justice Scalia [LOL!] has explained, suits in equity to "enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers" are a judge-made remedy deeply rooted in American jurisprudence, reflecting "a long history of judicial review . . . , tracing  tracing back to England [LOL!]." Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015) (quoting Jaffe & Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins, 72 L.Q. REV 345 (1956)).

The exception "rests on the fiction . . . that because a sovereign state cannot commit an unconstitutional act, a state official enforcing an unconstitutional act is not acting for the sovereign state and therefore is not protected by the Eleventh Amendment." Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 411 (5th Cir. 2001). Because state officials lack sovereign immunity protection in a suit brought by the United States, this Court need not address whether their conduct falls within the Ex parte Young exception.⁴⁰ Even so, the Supreme Court's reasoning for creating the Ex parte Young exception informs this Court's determination. The exception "is based in part on the premise that sovereign immunity bars relief against States and their officers in both state and federal courts, and that certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers must therefore be permitted if the Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land." Alden, 527 U.S. at 747. It is rooted in the "supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U.S. at 167.

Lacking the protections of sovereign immunity, an injunction against the State also would run as to people who act as an arm of the state, such as state judicial officials like judges and court clerks. Given that it is the threat of S.B. 8 lawsuits that deters providers from offering abortion care services, see supra Section IV(B)(1)(a)(i), an injunction must halt existing S.B. lawsuits and prevent new suits from being maintained by the state judiciary. Even though private individuals file S.B. 8 lawsuits, the state judiciary plays a role in the lawsuits through several official actions including docketing, maintaining, hearing, and rendering relief in an S.B. 8 lawsuit.41
[...]
Any argument that the State, through its judicial system and judges, is not involved in the enforcement of S.B. 8 lawsuits is contradicted by the plain language of the statute and by the reality of how state courts operate as an arm of the state to enforce the law, especially when the State has intentionally crafted a statute to employ private citizens[sic] as its proxy. Put simply, the State's participation in enforcing S.B. 8 lawsuits amounts to actionable state action. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 18 ("[I]t has never been suggested that state court action is immunized from the operation of [the Fourteenth Amendment] simply because the act is that of the judicial branch of the state government.").
[...]
In Jackson, the Fifth Circuit's analysis of its appellate jurisdiction over a private individual who might sue under S.B. 8 hinged on the fact that the "connection between judges, clerks, and [the private individual are] impossible to miss." Jackson, 2021 WL 4128951, at *7. So much so that the Fifth Circuit determined that the private individual's "jurisdictional issues [under S.B. 8] are `inextricably intertwined' with the same issues in the State Defendants' appeal . . . ." Id. (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995)). S.B. 8 vests private individuals with the authority to enforce the statute, "a traditionally exclusive state power." (Mot. Prelim. Inj., Dkt. 8, at 40). The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has himself described the statutory scheme as "unprecedented" and noted that it "delegated enforcement* . . . to the populace at large. . . . to insulate the State from responsibility for implementing and enforcing the regulatory regime." Jackson, 2021 WL 3910722, at *1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  

As such, private individuals enforcing S.B. 8 are properly regarded as state actors. "Individuals suing under S.B. 8 are not suing `for violation of distinct legal duties owed' to them as individuals, but instead are suing `for violation of legal duties owed the public.'" (Mot. Prelim. Inj., Dkt. 8, at 40) (quoting Texas v. Dep't of Labor, 929 F.3d 205, 213 (5th Cir. 2019)).

Courts have characterized private parties as state actors where a state allows or is involved with conduct that would be unconstitutional should the state itself engage in that conduct.42 See also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991) ("Our precedents establish that, in determining whether a particular action or course of conduct is governmental in character, it is relevant to examine the following: the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits; whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function; and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.") (internal citations omitted). Apt is Shelley, a 1948 case brought by the Kraemers, a white couple, against the Shelleys, a Black couple, to stop the Shelleys from moving into the house they had just purchased in a St. Louis neighborhood.43 334 U.S. at 4-6. The Kraemers sought to enforce the terms of a restrictive covenant that specifically excluded Blacks from occupying the property.

House Bill 454, as the law is officially known, would bar a dilation and evacuation procedure -- the country's most common method for abortion of a fetus in the second trimester [TRUE] -- unless that fetus is already dead.[FALSE]

After the Sixth Circuit affirmed an injunction for the clinic, the [KY] health secretary appointed by U.S. District Judge Joseph [eh?] opted to drop further appeal. Rather than late the case die, however, [AG Daniel] Cameron in turn moved to intervene.

What is the question?

1. Whether a state attorney general vested with the power to defend state law should be permitted to intervene after a federal court of appeals invalidates a state statute when no other state actor will defend the law.
   
2. And if so, whether the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for further consideration in light of June Medical.

"EMW ignores that the Attorney General moved to intervene in his capacity as the Commonwealth of Kentucky's chosen agent to represent its sovereign interests in court," Cameron argues in a reply brief.

The justices granted [KY] certiorari in March [2021], amid several other abortion-related case[s] that have been moving through the appellate courts simultaneously. Back in [] June [2020], the Supreme Court voted 5-4 to strike down another strict Louisiana abortion law in the case June Medical Services LLC v. Russo.

Breyer, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Scalito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, in which Thomas, J., joined except as to Parts III-C and IV-F, and in which Kavanaugh, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III. Gorsuch, J., and Kavanaugh, J., filed dissenting opinions.

Now: Texas's 6-week abortion ban law, SB 8, is in effect again for now -- the 5th Circuit has granted a temporary, administrative stay of this week's preliminary injunction (which halted enforcement of SB 8) to consider the state's request for a longer stay pending appeal pic.twitter.com/wdTIH5emjm

— Zoe Tillman (@ZoeTillman) October 9, 2021

Republican Texas Governor Greg Abbott, responding to what he called "bullying" by the Biden Administration, on Monday barred all COVID-19 vaccine mandates in the state by any entity, including private employers.

"In another instance of federal overreach, the Biden Administration is now bullying many private entities into imposing COVID-19 vaccine mandates, causing workforce disruptions that threaten Texas' continued recovery from the COVID-19 disaster," Abbott said in an executive order.

The White House had no immediate comment.

Abbott's order states that "no entity in Texas" could compel proof of vaccination by any individual, including employees or customers. He called on state lawmakers to take up the issue in an upcoming special session.