Sweden and Denmark
filed in useful idiots by Stoltenberg, each according to their own dubious aspirations in bloc pyramids and, shall we say, prosecutorial expertise in criminal and civil equity law. To be charitable, I'd suppose, their IC were the last to know the mission, declared ex post by NO "seismologists", was accomplished.

Germans are not about to incriminate their "knowledge and belief".

I'm sure a lot are privately, but all I've seen in the media is astonishing message discipline.

eurativ | EU countries lay bare Europe's limits in securing critical infrastructure, 2 mo 1 wk later

The vulnerability of the EU's critical infrastructure came under the spotlight at the end of September following the detected leakage of two Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea, an act of deliberate sabotage that Western security agencies attributed to Russia.
[...]
On 5 October, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented a five-point plan to secure critical European infrastructure, which included carrying out stress tests and early implementation of the Critical Entities Resilience directive (CER).
[...]
Underwater infrastructure

A notable criticism from France is that the CER directive does not cover maritime infrastructure, only terrestrial, where internet cables and gas pipelines are submarine and outside national territories. Finland emphasised relying on trusted vendors for subsea cable systems. Since many of these cables are at the end of their lifecycle, substantial investments should be considered to ensure global connections.
[...]
Added Value Profit
The Commission's response to significant infrastructure should be coordinated within the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR). For Germany, it is unclear whether the IPCR should provide a platform for constant coordination or just in case of significant disruptions. Moreover, the Commission proposed the development of a new blueprint for critical infrastructure incidents and crises to define how the IPCR would coordinate its response....Berlin deemed it unacceptable that the Commission could unilaterally determine the cooperation between member states, considering it a decision for the Council. France, the Netherlands, Finland, Slovakia, Austria, and Poland all requested further clarity on the blueprint, notably its added value compared to existing initiatives such as the EU Hybrid Playbook....

Under subsection (p) of Section 2209 of the Homeland Security Act, as amended (6 U.S.C. § 659(p)), CISA has the authority to issue administrative subpoenas for the production of information necessary to identify and notify an entity at risk. This authority applies when CISA identifies a system connected to the internet with a specific security vulnerability and has reason to believe the security vulnerability relates to critical infrastructure and affects a covered device or system, but is unable to identify the entity at risk.

The Intercept | Truth Cops, 31 Oct
ppl are US American critical infrastructure, too!

reference
CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Committee, meeting minutes 12.05.22
Protecting Critical Infrastructure from "the MDM space" (merits duplication in Crisis as Discipline, NPI Systems Design 2022 > public service media operators)