"The pipeline software that was to run the pumps, turbines and valves was programmed to go haywire, to reset pump speeds and valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to the pipeline joints and welds. The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space," Reed recalled [WaPoo 27.02.04].
[...]
Portions of the operation were disclosed earlier, in a 1996 paper in CIA journal Studies in Intelligence by [Spec. Assist. Sec DOD, NSA Dir. Int'l. Economics Gus] Weiss. In it, the former official recalled how, at an economic summit in Ottawa in 1981, French President Francois Mitterrand had informed Ronald Reagan that a KGB double agent named Vladimir Vetrov had come forward to provide French intelligence with 4,000 documents and photographs related to alleged Soviet efforts to get their hands on Western technologies which the US and allies refused to sell due to sanctions and embargoes. The collection of documents was dubbed the 'Farewell Dossier'. [Weiss, "The Farewell Dossier"] .

In a private meeting associated with the July 1981 Ottawa economic summit, he [Mitterand] told Reagan of the source and offered the intelligence to the United States. It was passed through Vice President Bush and then to CIA. The door had opened into Line X [USSR industrial espionage unit].
[..]
Since 1970, Line X had obtained thousands of documents and sample products, in such quantity that it appeared that the Soviet military and civil sectors were in large measure running their research on that of the West, particularly the United States. Our science was supporting their national defense. Losses were in radar, machine computers, tools, and semiconductors. Line X had fulfilled two-thirds to three fourths of its collection requirements—an impressive performance.
[...]
I met with Director of Central Intelligence William Casey on an afternoon in January 1982. I proposed using the Farewell material to feed or play back the products sought by Line X, but these would come from our own sources and would have been improved, that is, designed so that on arrival in the Soviet Union they would appear genuine but would later fail. US intelligence would match Line X requirements supplied through Vetrov with our version of those items, ones that would hardly meet the expectations of that vast Soviet apparatus deployed to collect them.
[...]
American industry helped in the preparation of items to be marketed to Line X. Contrived computer chips found their into way Soviet military equipment, flawed turbines were installed on a gas pipe line, and defective plans disrupted the output of chemical plants and output a tractor factory. The Pentagon introduced misleading information pertinent to stealth aircraft, space defense, and tactical aircraft. The Soviet Space Shuttle was a rejected NASA design. When Casey told President Reagan of the undertaking, the latter was enthusiastic. In time, the project proved to be a model of interagency cooperation, with the FBI handling domestic requirements and CIA responsible for overseas operations. The had program great success, and it was never detected.
[...]
in a further use of the Farewell product, Casey sent the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to Europe to tell NATO and governments' intelligence services of the Line X threat. These meetings led to the expulsion or compromise of about 200 Soviet intelligence officers and their sources, causing the collapse of Line X operations in Europe. Although some military intelligence officers avoided compromise, the heart of Soviet technology collection crumbled and would not recover. This mortal blow came just at the beginning of Reagan's defense buildup, his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and the introduction of stealth air craft [BWAH!] into US forces.
[...]
In 1985, the case took a bizarre turn, when information on the Farewell Dossier surfaced in France. Mitterrand came to suspect that [Soviet Col. Vladimir I.] Vetrov had all along been a CIA plant set up to test him to see if the material would be handed over to the Americans or kept by the French. Acting on this mistaken belief, Mitterrand fired the chief of the French service, Yves Bonnet.

To this day, Russian officials have never conceded that the 1982 explosion was the result of CIA interference. In the 1990s and 2000s, when relations between [Yeltsin] and the US still looked rosy, engineers and ex-KGB agents came forward to tell media that industrial negligence or even shoddy [SOVIET] workmanship, and not sabotage, was to blame.

The CIA never directly confirmed its involvement in the Urengoy-Surgut-Chelyabinsk pipeline explosion. However, in a page on the CIA's official website, the agency did boast that "flawed turbines were installed on a gas pipeline" [ibid.] as part of a broader US technological sabotage campaign against the USSR.

This brief, "MONITORING AND CONTROL PARAMETERS OF GAS PIPELINE BY USING PLC AND SCADA SYSTEM" is schematic. It lists common types of PLCs in the field a/o 2020 that monitor or actuate flow from either terminal point and along the loop. Anyone of these could be compromised by malware.

I'm idly looking for PNG pressure containment parameters, comparable to Nord Stream 1 casing which I will assume is not reinforced up to RU-TR Turkstream II 2022 spec. So far, most the public lit covers leaks typically attributed to low-pressure deformation or unidentified corrosion of moving parts and joint seals, the most frequent maintenance issues.

OG was a successful software attack for a few reasons. It ran with instructions to save data, hijack firmware, and mask data reporting by PLCs in the network.

LANGNER: So a centrifuge, it's driven by an electrical motor, and the speed of this electrical motor is controlled by another PLC, by another programmable logic controller.  
CHIEN (VO): Stuxnet would wait for 13 days [ARCHIVE VIDEO: Natanz engineers inspecting physical equipment] before doing anything, because 13 days is about the time it takes to actually fill an entire cascade of centrifuges with uranium. They didn't want to attack when the centrifuges essentially empty or at the beginning of the enrichment process.  
[ARCHIVE VIDEO: Natanz operators room stations, panel displays of PID controller blocks] What stuxnet did was it actually would sit there during the 13 days and basically record all of the normal activities that were happening and save it. And once ithey saw them spinning for 13 days, then the attack occurred. Centrifuges spin at incredible speeds, about 1,000 hertz. [VISUAL: 3-D spline simulation]
LANGNER (VO): They have a safe operating speed, 63,000 rpm.
CHIEN (VO): Stuxnet caused the uranium enrichment centrifuges to spin up to 1,400 hertz. [VISUAL: OG document detail, sub-routine parameter]
LANGNER (VO): Up to 80,000 rpm.
CHIEN: What would happen was those centrifuges would go through what's called a resonance frequency. It would go through a frequency at which the metal would basically vibrate uncontrollably and essentially shatter. THere'd be uranium gas everywhere. And then the second attack they attempted was they actualy tried to lower it to 2 hertz.
LANGNER: They were slowed down to almost a standstill.
CHIEN: And at 2 hertz, sort of an opposite effect occurs. You can imagine a toy top that you spin [VISUAL    : 3-D spline simulation] and as the top begins to slow down, it begins to to wobble. That's what would happen to these centrifuges. They'd begin to wobble and essentially shatter and fall apart. And instead of sending back to the computer what was realy happening, it would send back that old data that it had recorded. So the computer's sitting there "thinking" [ARCHIVED STILL FRAMES: Natanz operators room, monitor disply of PID block diagram, control switch stations] "Yep, running at 1,000 hertz. Everything is fine. But those centrifuges are potential spinning up wildly, a huge noise would occure. It'd be like, you know, a jet enginve. SO the operators then would know, 'Whoa, something is going wrong here.' They might look at their monitors and say, ' hmmmm, it says it's 1,000 hertz,' but they would hear that in the room something gravely bad was happening.
LANGNER: Not only are the operators fooled into thinking everything's normal, but also any kind of automated protective logic is fooled.

The Four Generations of SCADA Architectures, mid-20th century into present; note PLC integration

How did Soviets keep pace with PNG "digital" tech?
Stern, "Gas pipeline co-operation between political adversaries: examples from Europe", 13 pp

At the Ottawa Summit in July 1981, President Reagan attempted to persuade European leaders
to reject imports of additional gas from the USSR. When this failed, the American Administration first tried to offer financial incentives and then applied extra-territorial sanctions to those components of gas compressor stations [!], being supplied by European companies, which were of American origin. This created a political crisis in relations between the US and its European allies. Eventually, after several months of dispute, the US lifted the sanctions and the Urengoy pipeline(s) went ahead with rather more Soviet, and rather less American, equipment than had been intended.14

CIA continuous residence in Germany since WWII is indisputable.

Why would CIA sabotage Soviet PNG?

CRS, "SOVIET PIPELINE IP0219S (1982), Ronald Reagan administrative actions to "block Soviet pipeline" plus press clippings documenting US frustration with allies' opposition, 29 pp

There you have it: means, motive, opportunity to cripple Soviet critical infrastructure ...official denial deposited in the Reagan Library notwithstanding.

Eric Li: "I make the joke..."