Welcome to European Tribune. It's gone a bit quiet around here these days, but it's still going.
Yeah, though I must add that if it was actually possible to blow up the pipelines using only software solutions that would also remove my biggest objection to considering possible Russian involvement.
by generic on Wed Nov 2nd, 2022 at 10:24:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
not external force—the MSM explantion—because the Zero Days study of the Natanz exploit was "a revolution" back in 2010.

This brief, "MONITORING AND CONTROL PARAMETERS OF GAS PIPELINE BY USING PLC AND SCADA SYSTEM" is schematic. It lists common types of PLCs in the field a/o 2020 that monitor or actuate flow from either terminal point and along the loop. Anyone of these could be compromised by malware.

I'm idly looking for PNG pressure containment parameters, comparable to Nord Stream 1 casing which I will assume is not reinforced up to RU-TR Turkstream II 2022 spec. So far, most the public lit covers leaks typically attributed to low-pressure deformation or unidentified corrosion of moving parts and joint seals, the most frequent maintenance issues.

OG was a successful software attack for a few reasons. It ran with instructions to save data, hijack firmware, and mask data reporting by PLCs in the network.

LANGNER: So a centrifuge, it's driven by an electrical motor, and the speed of this electrical motor is controlled by another PLC, by another programmable logic controller.  
CHIEN (VO): Stuxnet would wait for 13 days [ARCHIVE VIDEO: Natanz engineers inspecting physical equipment] before doing anything, because 13 days is about the time it takes to actually fill an entire cascade of centrifuges with uranium. They didn't want to attack when the centrifuges essentially empty or at the beginning of the enrichment process.  
[ARCHIVE VIDEO: Natanz operators room stations, panel displays of PID controller blocks] What stuxnet did was it actually would sit there during the 13 days and basically record all of the normal activities that were happening and save it. And once ithey saw them spinning for 13 days, then the attack occurred. Centrifuges spin at incredible speeds, about 1,000 hertz. [VISUAL: 3-D spline simulation]
LANGNER (VO): They have a safe operating speed, 63,000 rpm.
CHIEN (VO): Stuxnet caused the uranium enrichment centrifuges to spin up to 1,400 hertz. [VISUAL: OG document detail, sub-routine parameter]
LANGNER (VO): Up to 80,000 rpm.
CHIEN: What would happen was those centrifuges would go through what's called a resonance frequency. It would go through a frequency at which the metal would basically vibrate uncontrollably and essentially shatter. THere'd be uranium gas everywhere. And then the second attack they attempted was they actualy tried to lower it to 2 hertz.
LANGNER: They were slowed down to almost a standstill.
CHIEN: And at 2 hertz, sort of an opposite effect occurs. You can imagine a toy top that you spin [VISUAL    : 3-D spline simulation] and as the top begins to slow down, it begins to to wobble. That's what would happen to these centrifuges. They'd begin to wobble and essentially shatter and fall apart. And instead of sending back to the computer what was realy happening, it would send back that old data that it had recorded. So the computer's sitting there "thinking" [ARCHIVED STILL FRAMES: Natanz operators room, monitor disply of PID block diagram, control switch stations] "Yep, running at 1,000 hertz. Everything is fine. But those centrifuges are potential spinning up wildly, a huge noise would occure. It'd be like, you know, a jet enginve. SO the operators then would know, 'Whoa, something is going wrong here.' They might look at their monitors and say, ' hmmmm, it says it's 1,000 hertz,' but they would hear that in the room something gravely bad was happening.
LANGNER: Not only are the operators fooled into thinking everything's normal, but also any kind of automated protective logic is fooled.
There's no way Cyber Command put that genii back in a bottle.
by Cat on Thu Nov 3rd, 2022 at 01:27:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Really depends on those containment parameters, but I still wouldn't bet on it. Centrifuges supposedly are built to spin at one working point and would easily break if turned up a notch. A pipeline needs to withstand large differences in internal pressure anyway, and I really see no reason why you would use turbines strong enough that they could rupture the pipes. And if they could I'd expect something else to fail first. Surely there are more delicate parts than the steel mantle? Also we're looking at ruptures in one line of NS2 and NS1. If I'm not completely off only NS1 uses the Siemens turbines.

Though there certainly might be another trick you could do to make them explode. Not a pipe expert.

by generic on Thu Nov 3rd, 2022 at 11:20:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I was thinking the same thing. It would blow out the joints, not shatter steel pipes.

It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
by eurogreen on Thu Nov 3rd, 2022 at 01:36:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
supra Nord Stream PR describes the system design in "three sections".

Elsewhere, SOP is 40 m pipe sections (max) fabricated off-site and finished on-board "pipelay vessels," obviously, because there is no known sea-borne vessel of 1,224+ km length. (wikiwtf Nord Stream I article puports to list project contractors, but not suppliers, named by PR placemnt.)

ICYMI The Longest Gas Pipeline till date (2022)

Now. Who honestly believes that there are no "moving parts" or digital sensors between Nord Stream I 1,224 km pipeline terminals? That "turbine stations" at each end are sufficient to maintain constant pressure and flow end-to-end?

I don't, but, yanno, I'm no "expert." My skepticism about MSM torpedo theory (see euractiv's elegant, 1-dimensional, arial "submarine explosion" feature photo, above) relies on sundry maps of x-country PNG lines in the public domain —some which actually feature compressor station intersection locations—and my low-brow intuition that atmospheric pressure above and below sea level differ substantially, such that the possibility of a manned vehicle precisely placing detonation devices without a map at -80 m is, frankly, comical. So I question vintage WW II sabotage scenarios and search for  trade and canonical knowledge of "best practices" in PNG structural design as well as relevant "stress testing" in research lit. (For example, months ago, in the Azovstal ERA, when MSM drop a thinly sourced story about "bunker busters" to one (untitled) CHINESE!! research "tied to" the PLA, I donated an inordinate amount of time searching relevant papers in the Journal of Rock Mechanics and Geotechnical Engineering.) So far I've found only one "Underwater explosion effects of 60 mm H.E. mortar bomb on a cylindrical concrete structure - PIT", which is irrelevant not only because "the tube" is capped and concrete reinforced with rebar, but full-text discussion of underwater "effects" requires payment. So. What have I learned? Not much; I already knew that trade secrets are predictable barriers to the flow of information and common understanding of HOW people, processes, and things work, whether or not pertaining to "defense" technology.

by Cat on Fri Nov 4th, 2022 at 03:32:04 PM EST
[ Parent ]
by Cat on Fri Nov 4th, 2022 at 03:49:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I don't see how internal pressure can explain the second explosion North Stream 2 Pipe A.

Ukraine Latest: US Will Give Another $1 Billion in Security Aid

The monitoring network said the first explosion occurred on Monday at 2:03 a.m. Swedish time with a magnitude of 1.9 on the Richter scale, followed by a second at 7:04 p.m. on the same day with a magnitude of 2.3.

Far as I understand the first explosion took out North Stream 2 Pipe A southeast of Bornholm at 02:03 AM.

The second explosion took out North Stream 1 pipe A & pipe B, and North Stream 2 Pipe A again. The second explosion happened north-east of Bornholm on the border between the Swedish and Danish economic zones. It is not close to the first explosion site.

I don't see how North Stream 2 Pipe A could have exploded from internal pressure twice, given that the first explosion punctured the pipe and the gas had 17 hours to leak out. I also find it unlikely that North Stream 1 pipe A & pipe B, and North Stream 2 Pipe A would explode from internal pressure at exactly the same time.

On the other hand I think hitting the same pipe twice with some form of external explosives is a rather likely thing to happen if you try to explode four seperate pipes at two locaitons.

by fjallstrom on Fri Nov 4th, 2022 at 01:11:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
impact of "debris" the size of the first section
by Cat on Sat Nov 5th, 2022 at 12:49:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Could you spell this out?

How did "debris" from the first explosion in North Stream 2 pipe A, 17 hours later cause a second, larger, explosion some 50-100 km away (looking at not great maps), that also took out North Stream 1 pipe A & pipe B?

To me, that doesn't sound possible.

by fjallstrom on Mon Nov 7th, 2022 at 08:37:04 AM EST
[ Parent ]
that's the timeline given after explosions
by Cat on Sat Nov 5th, 2022 at 12:50:57 AM EST
[ Parent ]
freelance journalist from Denmark, Niels Eriksen reports:
"U.S. Torpedo Appeared at Explosion Site of the Nord Stream".
40-year-old motive, one destroyer, "200 hrs" of stealth seabed surveys over 9 months, master "underwater fast attack" commander, one Harpoon "tested on the battlefield in Ukraine", Guardian rendered "approximate location" of four (4) leaks, AND

the remains of the American torpedo near the Nord Stream pipeline explosion site,
computer image taken from hidden camera
by Cat on Sun Nov 6th, 2022 at 10:31:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Wired | 'Dark Ships' Emerge From the Shadows of the Nord Stream Mystery, 11 Nov
According to the analysis by satellite data monitoring firm SpaceKnow, the two "dark ships," each measuring around 95 to 130 meters long, passed within several miles of the Nord Stream 2 leak sites. "We have detected some dark ships, meaning vessels that were of a significant size, that were passing through that area of interest," says Jerry Javornicky, the CEO and cofounder of SpaceKnow.
"They had their beacons off, meaning there was no information about their movement, and they were trying to keep their location information and general information hidden from the world," Javornicky adds.

The discovery, which was made by analyzing images from multiple satellites, is likely to further increase speculation about the cause of the blasts....Once SpaceKnow identified the ships, it reported its findings to officials at NATO, who are investigating the Nord Stream incidents. Javornicky says NATO officials asked the company to provide more information.

NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu says it does not comment on the "details of our support or the sources used" but confirmed that NATO believes the incident was a "deliberate and irresponsible act of sabotage" and it has increased its presence in the Baltic and North Seas. However, a NATO official, who did not have permission to speak publicly, confirmed to WIRED that NATO had received SpaceKnow's data and said satellite imagery can prove useful for its investigations.
To detect the ships, Javornicky says, the company scoured 90 days of archived satellite images for the area....Once it gathered archive images of the area, SpaceKnow created a series of polygons around the gas leak sites. The smallest of these, around 400 square meters, covered the immediate blast area, and larger areas of interest covered several kilometers. In the weeks leading up to the explosions, SpaceKnow detected 25 ships passing through the region, from "cargo ships to multipurpose larger ships," Javornicky says.  In total, 23 of these vessels had their automatic identification system (AIS) transponders turned on. Two did not have AIS data turned on, and these ships passed the area during the days immediately ahead of the leaks being detected.

27.09.22 Berlingske video "area of interest" d: 1km, 2 jet NS1 leak  (src: Norwegian Defense Command)
by Cat on Sun Nov 13th, 2022 at 08:27:06 PM EST
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