"The pipeline software that was to run the pumps, turbines and valves was programmed to go haywire, to reset pump speeds and valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to the pipeline joints and welds. The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space," Reed recalled [WaPoo 27.02.04].
[...]
Portions of the operation were disclosed earlier, in a 1996 paper in CIA journal Studies in Intelligence by [Spec. Assist. Sec DOD, NSA Dir. Int'l. Economics Gus] Weiss. In it, the former official recalled how, at an economic summit in Ottawa in 1981, French President Francois Mitterrand had informed Ronald Reagan that a KGB double agent named Vladimir Vetrov had come forward to provide French intelligence with 4,000 documents and photographs related to alleged Soviet efforts to get their hands on Western technologies which the US and allies refused to sell due to sanctions and embargoes. The collection of documents was dubbed the 'Farewell Dossier'. [Weiss, "The Farewell Dossier"] .

In a private meeting associated with the July 1981 Ottawa economic summit, he [Mitterand] told Reagan of the source and offered the intelligence to the United States. It was passed through Vice President Bush and then to CIA. The door had opened into Line X [USSR industrial espionage unit].
[..]
Since 1970, Line X had obtained thousands of documents and sample products, in such quantity that it appeared that the Soviet military and civil sectors were in large measure running their research on that of the West, particularly the United States. Our science was supporting their national defense. Losses were in radar, machine computers, tools, and semiconductors. Line X had fulfilled two-thirds to three fourths of its collection requirements—an impressive performance.
[...]
I met with Director of Central Intelligence William Casey on an afternoon in January 1982. I proposed using the Farewell material to feed or play back the products sought by Line X, but these would come from our own sources and would have been improved, that is, designed so that on arrival in the Soviet Union they would appear genuine but would later fail. US intelligence would match Line X requirements supplied through Vetrov with our version of those items, ones that would hardly meet the expectations of that vast Soviet apparatus deployed to collect them.
[...]
American industry helped in the preparation of items to be marketed to Line X. Contrived computer chips found their into way Soviet military equipment, flawed turbines were installed on a gas pipe line, and defective plans disrupted the output of chemical plants and output a tractor factory. The Pentagon introduced misleading information pertinent to stealth aircraft, space defense, and tactical aircraft. The Soviet Space Shuttle was a rejected NASA design. When Casey told President Reagan of the undertaking, the latter was enthusiastic. In time, the project proved to be a model of interagency cooperation, with the FBI handling domestic requirements and CIA responsible for overseas operations. The had program great success, and it was never detected.
[...]
in a further use of the Farewell product, Casey sent the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to Europe to tell NATO and governments' intelligence services of the Line X threat. These meetings led to the expulsion or compromise of about 200 Soviet intelligence officers and their sources, causing the collapse of Line X operations in Europe. Although some military intelligence officers avoided compromise, the heart of Soviet technology collection crumbled and would not recover. This mortal blow came just at the beginning of Reagan's defense buildup, his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and the introduction of stealth air craft [BWAH!] into US forces.
[...]
In 1985, the case took a bizarre turn, when information on the Farewell Dossier surfaced in France. Mitterrand came to suspect that [Soviet Col. Vladimir I.] Vetrov had all along been a CIA plant set up to test him to see if the material would be handed over to the Americans or kept by the French. Acting on this mistaken belief, Mitterrand fired the chief of the French service, Yves Bonnet.

To this day, Russian officials have never conceded that the 1982 explosion was the result of CIA interference. In the 1990s and 2000s, when relations between [Yeltsin] and the US still looked rosy, engineers and ex-KGB agents came forward to tell media that industrial negligence or even shoddy [SOVIET] workmanship, and not sabotage, was to blame.

The CIA never directly confirmed its involvement in the Urengoy-Surgut-Chelyabinsk pipeline explosion. However, in a page on the CIA's official website, the agency did boast that "flawed turbines were installed on a gas pipeline" [ibid.] as part of a broader US technological sabotage campaign against the USSR.