CNN | IAEA calls for 'safety zone' [Recommendation 1, p 13] ...

Once there, the [ISAMZ] team saw first-hand the damage shelling has caused to the facility and "noted with concern that the shelling could have impacted safety related structures, systems and components, and could have caused safety significant impacts, loss of lives and personnel injuries [p 11]," the report said.

The plant and the area around it, including the town of Enerhodar, have endured persistent shelling that has raised fears of a nuclear accident through the interruption of the power supply to the plant. Each sides accuses the other of acts of nuclear terrorism.
Ukrainian officials on Monday said Russian shelling led to its last operating reactor to disconnect from Ukraine's grid, and President Volodymyr Zelensky later accused Russia of intentionally deteriorating the situation around Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant.

The Ukrainian president said last week that demilitarization of the plant was "the goal of Ukrainian and international efforts."...

Recommendation 2: The IAEA recommends that the physical protection system should be operated as designed and licensed, and that the continued functioning of safety and security systems and operability of the systems and equipment at ZNPP be ensured. This requires the removal of vehicles from areas that could interfere with the operation of safety and security systems and equipment. [p 14]

S Ukraine NPP (SUNPP), Rivne NPP (RNPP), Khmelnytskyy NPP (KhNPP) incident report, 24 Feb - 26 June 2022, p 31 - 32; IAEA-SNRIU assistance, p32 - 39

152. The remaining power reactor site -- Zaporizhzhya --which was occupied by Russian forces, remained inaccessible to the IAEA until September. The Zaporizh* site consists of six reactors, a common fresh fuel store, and a large dry spent fuel storage facility. To provide credible assurances about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the peaceful nature of nuclear activities at this site, the IAEA needs to conduct regular in-field verification activities including a yearly physical inventory verification (PIV) of the nuclear material and design information verification of the facilities on the site. [p 41]