alias Stuxnet
is not contained even today, according to anonymous sources familiar with its internat'l, inter-agencies coordinated dev as well as Richard Clark and Michael Hayden background commentary. It's a feature, not a bug, to be proud of.

Symantech Research Labs among other ISVs received binary samples from multiple sources within their client networks—worldwide. Interviews with "cybersecurity" vendors recall decoding line by line: Immediate consensus attribute-free, self-executing routines confirmed state-sponsored dev. A month in, aside from counterfeit MSFT digital certificate traced to Taiwan, finding Siemens OS fragments and PLC hardware IDs in the code. Uncertain how to relate the significance of these keys, they resorted to "geopolitical news" reconnaisance to trace checksum operators to anamalous control system events anywhere that preceded the Iran reactor crash. Guess what? Multiple explosions of gas pipelines transiting Iran.

Now, I ask you. Is it any wonder Gazprom did not accept "refurbished" Nord Stream 1 turbines from Canada? Is it any wonder US Treasury, last Friday, licensed Starlink "internet" satellite service for "social media" users in Iran? Is gov.in now pushes for home-grown navigation system any wonder?

Malware infection of industrial control systems kills people.

STUXNET US-Israel Cooperation Cyber Warfare on Iran | @BooMan by Oui on May 31, 2011 |

F-secure Q&A analysis of stuxnet computer worm effects Siemens Process Controllers

Apparently the stuxnet worm did most harm in the ultra-centrifuges plant at Natanz in Iran.

(New York Times) - In early 2008 the German company Siemens cooperated with one of the United States' premier national laboratories, in Idaho, to identify the vulnerabilities of computer controllers that the company sells to operate industrial machinery around the world -- and that American intelligence agencies have identified as key equipment in Iran's enrichment facilities.

Siemens says that program was part of routine efforts to secure its products against cyberattacks. Nonetheless, it gave the Idaho National Laboratory -- which is part of the Energy Department, responsible for America's nuclear arms -- the chance to identify well-hidden holes in the Siemens systems that were exploited the next year by Stuxnet.

SIEMENS Automation Conference 2008
Control System Security Assessments (pdf)

Presenters: Marty Edwards! Idaho National Laboratory
Todd Stauffer, Siemens

'Sapere aude'