What the Ukrainian Armed Forces Need to Do to Win | War on the Rocks |

During training exercises, we have repeatedly observed that the Ukrainian military's planning process requires separate orders for each phase of the operation. For example, a battalion in the defense cannot conduct a counterattack even if they are attacked. They do not have potential stand-by missions such as "be prepared to counterattack" that are planned in advance to exploit unexpected opportunities. They must await orders. Of course, the Ukrainian military's planning process is based on local doctrine, and in actual combat, it depends upon the commander. However, what we have observed is that there are serious changes happening throughout the Ukrainian military's officer corps. The younger officers realize that they must get rid of the old mentality but continue to face resistance from older officers wedded to Soviet doctrine and centralized planning. Michael Kofman and Rob Lee made similar observations after their most recent research trip to the country.

Having trained every component of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, we have continually seen a lack of an experienced noncommissioned officer corps. It is common to see field grade officers running around during training counting personnel and coordinating for meals. In the United States, it takes years to develop just a junior noncommissioned officer. Senior noncommissioned officers at the platoon level have at least ten years of experience. In the U.S. military, lieutenants lead platoons, but it is the job of the platoon sergeant to train them, as discussed in Defense News. In Ukraine, it is the job of a platoon commander straight out of their service academy to lead and train their platoon. Without effective noncommissioned officers, mission command at the company level and below is almost impossible to do, and they are directly responsible for the care, mentoring, and training of soldiers.

Lack of Effective Training

The Ukrainian Armed Forces' current training philosophy is based on the old Soviet model. Large-scale battalion-level training is orchestrated and choreographed. During several exercises, we witnessed company commanders overseeing the exercise from afar and only occasionally interjecting. They were acting more as observers than direct participants. This philosophy is changing and, as noted in the  Russia Contingency, appears to be generational. Younger officers are more open to Western military-style leadership, while older officers have clung to Soviet doctrine. Despite these tendencies, we have yet to see any true combined arms training involving infantry, artillery, and armor working together. Synchronizing all these different elements to achieve maximum military effect, avoid fratricide, and confuse the enemy's takes repeated training at all levels of command, which allows leaders to make mistakes and work through processes.

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As noted in these virtual pages, there are several volunteer organizations training the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Most of this training's focus is on basic soldier skills at the company or platoon level. The training is disjointed and haphazard, and the quality of instruction varies. NATO is training select units and soldiers outside of Ukraine. While this training can be effective and necessary for certain specialty skills, such as tank crews and HIMARS teams, it takes units and soldiers away from the front line for weeks, if not months, at a time. Commanders cannot afford to lose units and soldiers for extended periods.