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Last scenario is a bit tongue in cheek, because it reaches a complexity where things usually goes into chaotic theory. Different weather one day and it shifts who does what to whom and then you end up with a totally different dictator. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
If the last couple of years have learnttaught us anything
I don't think the major powers wants to send in visible ground troops to support one side unless that side is not already clearly winning
if they attempt to leave the EU proscribedprescribed policies
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
First, they are very few in numbers (a few hundred), and they are even more marginalized than fringe left partist.
Second, things are going pretty well in the Nordics. As long as Germany holds up, things will be well in Sweden and Finland, and Sweden has its own currency which gives huge freedom of action. Norway has oil and its own currency and will be well no matter what. In Denmark the established parties can co-opt any increase in right-wing radicalism through triangulation. Denmark can also easily drop its fixed exchange rate with the euro. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
Catalonia has declared sovereignty; the Spanish government finds this sufficiently serious that they will challenge it in court. And now some interesting comments have come to light from a general : Invasion of Catalonia an option, says general - The Irish Times - Fri, Mar 01, 2013
A Spanish general has suggested that the armed forces should consider invading Catalonia if the region attempts to break away from the rest of the country.Juan Antonio Chicharro, a general in the marine reserve, warned that patriotic sentiment would take precedence over democratic rules in the face of a "separatist-secessionist offensive" by the northeastern region.`The fatherland' "The fatherland is above and more important than democracy," he said. "Patriotism is a feeling and the constitution is just a law."
A Spanish general has suggested that the armed forces should consider invading Catalonia if the region attempts to break away from the rest of the country.
Juan Antonio Chicharro, a general in the marine reserve, warned that patriotic sentiment would take precedence over democratic rules in the face of a "separatist-secessionist offensive" by the northeastern region.
`The fatherland'
"The fatherland is above and more important than democracy," he said. "Patriotism is a feeling and the constitution is just a law."
Back in December, something strange happened with the Center-Right Catalan independence party CiU. They started to target austerity as the creation of Madrid, thereby linking the idea of Catalan independence with that of opposition to austerity. This happened at the same time as the CiU discovered it needed the support of the ERC, Left Catalan nationalists, to form a government. The ERC demanded a firm timeline for an independence referendum as a condition of making a coalition.
In the event of some sort of standoff between Barcelona and Madrid, or pronunciamiento, I don't think that Catalans in the Army are going to be a major factor. The Mossos, the Catalan regional police, probably are. And their director has stated that "in the case of conflict, the Mossos serve the Generalitat," that is the Catalan government.
When you start to gameplay the idea of a pronunciamiento it's not clear that the Spanish military have the manpower to simply lock the country down. First, since 1981, the civil guards were moved from the department of defense to Interior. This denies the adventurous general the articulation needed to put feet on the street in many places at once. Let's talk now about forces on the ground.
The Spanish military numbers about 127,000. Another 16,000 or so are in the reserves. There are no Spanish military facilities in Catalonia proper, although there is a major military presence (army/air force) in Zaragoza, and to a lesser extent Valencia and the Balearic Islands. In all reality, only the Army would be able to do the kind of work needed to occupy an urban area. In the event of a pronunciamiento you are probably looking at anywhere from 20,000-30,000 soldiers max that could be called up. Compare this to the roughly 17,000 Mossos de Esquadra, and it's not clear that a head on military action is a winner. Then again, one thing that is clear is that by the point at which the shooting has started, we aren't talking about a regular conflict. We are talking about irregular, urban warfare. In other words, Bosnia...... And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg
the Spanish government is challenging the declaration of Catalonian independence in the Constitutional Court; a Spanish general said the army would intervene to keep Spanish unity
The intersection of nationalism and austerity in Spain We have a number of stories this weekend illustrating the dangerous mix of austerity and nationalism in Spain. After the Spanish Parliament rejected the Catalan Parliament's sovereignty declaration in a vote, the Spanish government decided on Friday to challenge the Declaration before the Constitutional Court, writes El Pais (English edition). The government's decision is backed by the consultative State Council, as well as the Attorney General's office. Last Autumn, the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) had agreed to lend outside support to a minority CiU government in exchange for a timetable for independence which included the above sovereignty declaration as a first step, subordinating its opposition to austerity policies to the 'national construction'. However, on Saturday, ERC's leader Oriol Junqueras laid down an additional condition for its party to support CiU's budget: that the budget cut be blamed officially by Artur Mas on Spain's PM Mariano Rajoy, ABC reports. Meanwhile, [according to] Europa Press the leader of CiU in the Spanish Parliament, Cristian Democrat Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida, worries that ERC is "capitalizing" on the sovereignty drive, and that the budget cuts make CiU "look right-wing". We recall that the Catalan socialists PSC broke ranks with the national PSOE in the parliamentary vote on the Catalan sovereignty resolution (with the PSOE voting against, the PSC for, and some PSC deputies abstaining), and the resulting controversy included internal calls for the PSOE to sever ties with the PSC. ABC writes that [p]rominent PP member Esteban Gonzalez Pons attempted to drive a further wedge between the PSOE and PSC, by declaring that "for the good of Spain, the PSOE in Catalonia should be different from the PSC". So far, the PSC has been affiliated with the PSOE at the national level, while the PSOE does not contest Catalan elections. In this context, in the middle of last week a Spanish reserve General made public statements at a forum on "Armed forces and constitutional arrangement" which were widely interpreted as suggesting the armed forces should intervene in Catalonia. Among other things, the General said "the fatherland is more important than democracy". Catalan political parties as well as the PSOE demanded that the government discipline the General, and La Vanguardia reported on Thursday that the Ministtry of Defence has started the procedures to determine whether the General's remarks broke the law.
We have a number of stories this weekend illustrating the dangerous mix of austerity and nationalism in Spain.
After the Spanish Parliament rejected the Catalan Parliament's sovereignty declaration in a vote, the Spanish government decided on Friday to challenge the Declaration before the Constitutional Court, writes El Pais (English edition). The government's decision is backed by the consultative State Council, as well as the Attorney General's office.
Last Autumn, the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) had agreed to lend outside support to a minority CiU government in exchange for a timetable for independence which included the above sovereignty declaration as a first step, subordinating its opposition to austerity policies to the 'national construction'. However, on Saturday, ERC's leader Oriol Junqueras laid down an additional condition for its party to support CiU's budget: that the budget cut be blamed officially by Artur Mas on Spain's PM Mariano Rajoy, ABC reports. Meanwhile, [according to] Europa Press the leader of CiU in the Spanish Parliament, Cristian Democrat Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida, worries that ERC is "capitalizing" on the sovereignty drive, and that the budget cuts make CiU "look right-wing".
We recall that the Catalan socialists PSC broke ranks with the national PSOE in the parliamentary vote on the Catalan sovereignty resolution (with the PSOE voting against, the PSC for, and some PSC deputies abstaining), and the resulting controversy included internal calls for the PSOE to sever ties with the PSC. ABC writes that [p]rominent PP member Esteban Gonzalez Pons attempted to drive a further wedge between the PSOE and PSC, by declaring that "for the good of Spain, the PSOE in Catalonia should be different from the PSC". So far, the PSC has been affiliated with the PSOE at the national level, while the PSOE does not contest Catalan elections.
In this context, in the middle of last week a Spanish reserve General made public statements at a forum on "Armed forces and constitutional arrangement" which were widely interpreted as suggesting the armed forces should intervene in Catalonia. Among other things, the General said "the fatherland is more important than democracy". Catalan political parties as well as the PSOE demanded that the government discipline the General, and La Vanguardia reported on Thursday that the Ministtry of Defence has started the procedures to determine whether the General's remarks broke the law.
Spain's chief prosecutor is seeking to remove the chief prosecutor of Catalonia
After the military, now it's prosecutors called out of order on Catalan independence The chief prosecutor of Catalonia is facing disciplinary action over statements he made to the press over the weekend regarding the legality of an independence referendum, reports El Mundo. The Catalan prosecutor, in an interview with Europa Press, had said that a referendum was illegal, but that it was possible that "other forms of consultation with different questions" could be found, as well as referring to a draft law on consultations currently being considered by the Catalan regional parliament. Finally, while "rejecting secessionist projects" he wondered whether the Constitution of 1978 could be reformed. All of these remarks are considered inappropriate by Spain's Chief Prosecutor, who has initiated the procedure to remove the Catalan Prosecutor.
The chief prosecutor of Catalonia is facing disciplinary action over statements he made to the press over the weekend regarding the legality of an independence referendum, reports El Mundo. The Catalan prosecutor, in an interview with Europa Press, had said that a referendum was illegal, but that it was possible that "other forms of consultation with different questions" could be found, as well as referring to a draft law on consultations currently being considered by the Catalan regional parliament. Finally, while "rejecting secessionist projects" he wondered whether the Constitution of 1978 could be reformed. All of these remarks are considered inappropriate by Spain's Chief Prosecutor, who has initiated the procedure to remove the Catalan Prosecutor.
Without the context of austerity and the social backlash it causes, this is basically just machismo. But when we being to talk about mass movements instead of inter-elite fights, that's when things get worrisome. And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg
Yes, both for secessionists and for unionists conflict can be beneficial as long as they are not the ones ending up shot. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
Unfortunately and for purposes of popular mobilization, feeling is far more important than rational consideration, or at lest that is what Chicharro thinks, hopes or believes - likely believes. He probably considers the current Spanish constitution to be illegitimate and that Franco lives on in spirit. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
When thinking about the dynamics of EU and the crisis, I think that if there are wars the major powers will be tempted to get involved. Which means they (and thus the EU) are supporting one side against the other and then allowing the supported side to remain in the EU/represent the state in the EU. Which also means that EU continues, but not necessarily as a club of democracies. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
There are some factors that makes wars less likely in Europe. Demography is one, we don't have the massive surplus of young people that Europe had a century ago. Though we are of course working hard to make the youngsters we have desperate and disposable.
Then we have cross-border connections. People don't want war, but then again what people want is far down on the list. Wars are also bad for a lot of businesses, but so is austerity.
I am failing at easing my worries. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
I think the burning memory of Yugoslavia is sufficiently potent that the EU (or a coalition of the military powers therein) would intervene militarily in anything which started degenerating into serious armed conflict.
If it isn't, then I'm afraid it will be up to us (EU civil society) to bring it back into the collective memory. Yes, us : antimilitarists, bordering on pacifism, we will campaign for war if necessary. I think, in the absence of any European body competent in military matters, that one or more EU nations would formulate a proposition of intervention, and others would be shamed into joining it. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
The point is not to push policies that lead to countries degenerating into armed conflict, and then claim that the pushers can fix the mess by occupying the country.
This sounds too close to a Neocon regime change strategy - economic strangulation, followed by humanitarian intervention. Is that the way the EU will carry out its internal politics in the first third of the 21st century? I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
Undoubtedly, western Europe could, and should, have used political and economic influence to lessen the risks of war in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, when war broke out, it was morally wrong to fail to intervene. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
But I have yet to see a historical example of such a great power.
As Junker said, the Euro will bury us all (well, not exactly). I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
How would the EU react at the moment of decision?
In the event of another 23-F event how would Brussels respond?
Particularly in light of the common commitment to the Petersburg tasks of the Western European Union which were subsumed into the EU's CSDP via the Lisbon Treaty. It is entirely unclear what constitutes humanitarian intervention, nonetheless the framework for common action exists. But will Brussels act when, or if, the time comes?
Or will the stand down, staring on from the sidelines?
And if instead of the sledgehammer approach of Tejero, a more astute class of military man proposes something on the lines of the 1982 coup attempt? Predicate the crackdown on a false flag operation to implicate the "enemy." If an Atocha scale event happens in Madrid and the blame is placed on the ERC (Left Wing Catalan nationalists, remember that elements of Terra Lliure integrated into the party in the 1990s) will Brussels act if the military impose martial law in Catalonia, or throughout the country?
Moreover, if they were smart they would eliminate the PP leadership in an operation of this sort to make independent military action more plausible. And would the Generalitat stand aside, the Mossos do nothing as the national army moves into the region to occupy?
As much as this is, now, a dark, if distant, possibility, it seems that the sheer possibility that this might come to pass in Spain, or elsewhere, should be grounds for the EU to specify what happens if a member state government falls to military action, or otherwise ceases to be a democracy. You would think this to be a no brainer, but all you have to do is look to the silence on Hungary with Fidesz to be worried that no action is an acceptable action for Brussels. And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg
Not politically realistic at the time, of course. But fewer deaths, and an obligation to find a political solution. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
Not that it was really feasible to just put down a couple of armored divisions between the belligerents, unless you wanted to wait until after they were done with the first round of ethnic cleansing.
The American and Israeli experience in Lebanon is that if you intervene in that sort of messy civil war, you end up with no perceptible strategic gain, no perceptible humanitarian improvement, and all the locals hating your guts.
The point of a joint French-German intervention, to spell it out, would have been that jointly they would neutralise any accusation of bias in favour of one side or the other, insofar as they were seen, in the fevered imaginations of the belligerents, as natural allies of one or the other.
No guarantee of success, obviously. But a moral obligation to try. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
I submit Germany and France give a flying fuck about saving lives in the "problem countries". I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
On the other hand an escalating intervention in support of an unpopular right wing government doesn't look unlikely.
It seems obvious to me (perhaps because I live in fantasyland?) that European governments would not deny military assistance to a democratically-elected European government that was under attack. It also seems obvious to me that any military coup against a democratically-elected European government would result in blocade and heavy economic and diplomatic pressure etc. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
Also, if someone had asked you what the reaction of European democracies would be to a fascist coup in Spain, maybe you would have given the Eurogreen reply that it wouldn't have been allowed to stand. Instead, even in France,
When Stalin told French Communists to collaborate with others on the Left in 1934, the Popular Front was possible with an emphasis on unity against fascism. In 1936, the Socialists and the Radicals formed a coalition, with Communist support, called the Popular Front. Its victory in the elections of the spring of 1936 brought to power a left-wing government headed by Blum. ... Politically the Popular Front fell apart over Blum's refusal to intervene vigorously in the Spanish Civil War as demanded by the Communists.
...
Politically the Popular Front fell apart over Blum's refusal to intervene vigorously in the Spanish Civil War as demanded by the Communists.
Can one expect better from Hollande than from Blum? I don't think so. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
My starting point is that war must be forbidden within the EU : both war between nation states within the EU, and civil war within an EU country. There is a question of threshold, but we know war when we see it.
My hypothesis is that the operational aim is to separate the belligerents and/or put an end to atrocities against civilians, by the rapid application of overwhelming force.
Because it can present itself in all sorts of ambiguous ways, and because the question of sovereignty and legitimacy may be open to interpretation, the application of any such doctrine must be done in an ultimately arbitrary but rapid and decisive manner, leaving legal technicalities and political considerations for later.
This means that it can only be done by an existing nation state, not by any EU mechanism.
As far as I can see, only two nation states have the military capacity to intervene anywhere in Europe with overwhelming force. If it were a matter of two EU states fighting each other, I can imagine that the two would intervene in a concerted manner. If it were a civil war, I can't imagine the UK putting boots on the ground. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
Whether their political authorities have any clues about what they might do in such contingencies is debatable. In my view, they have a moral responsibility to formulate doctrine ahead of time, so they don't get overtaken by events. Because inaction is always tempting. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
Insofar as these two nations are, de facto, the arbiters of last resort within Europe, they have a responsibility to have (secret or not) rules of engagement which will govern any military intervention in Europe.
This is no more unthinkable, in itself, than contemplating the use of nuclear weapons.
If the politicians have never thought about this, then it's time they did. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
Anyway, are you searching for secret EU military doctrine about military intervention within the EU? Where, in the public domain?
Or by searching do you mean speculating? I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
I am postulating that political doctrine should exist. I am not confident
I am searching metaphysically. I want to clarify my own ideas about what is required.
My mental framework on these matters is largely determined by the Yugoslav wars. At the time, I considered myself European, a citizen of Europe (I did not yet consider myself French). The existence of war on the European continent was unconscionable for me, and a source of lasting shame as a European. My starting point is "never again"; the point of this conversation from my point of view is to examine how to achieve that. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
Well...
In 1992, the Western European Union adopted the Petersberg tasks, designed to cope with the possible destabilising of Eastern Europe.
The existence of war on the European continent was unconscionable for me, and a source of lasting shame as a European. My starting point is "never again"; the point of this conversation from my point of view is to examine how to achieve that.
So what you're searching for is self-contradictory. You don't achieve never again by contingency military planning, but by conducting sane policies at the EU and member state levels. Which is rather the problem right now: the EU economic policy establishment has gone insane. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
In the event that a war should happen, it will undoubtedly be the fault of all those people and entities who should have acted to prevent it. That does not entitle us to just throw up our hands in horror and declare "game over". The idea that we should refuse to even contemplate the possibility is reminiscent of the attitude of much of the European left in the 1930s (all those who applauded the Munich agreements).
If there is an outbreak of war, that's a clear sign of failure. But things can always get worse. The aim is to smother armed conflict before the deaths number in the thousands. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
You will need at least one more digit to count the fatalities of even an unsuccessful attempt to start a civil war.
And I am quite sure that much more people died because of austerity in the 2007-2013 cycle, then in the cases above.
In the coups/revolutions there were barely no direct deaths, probably little indirect deaths. The indirect death tool of austerity is surely greater already.
Sure, not civil war above. But serious events.
The name "war" might be ugly, but at the end of day what should count is human suffering. This "peace" has had many casualties already.
What about Yugoslavia, 1991? Note, 1991. i.e. when militias are terrorizing villages, the Yugoslav army is coming apart/turning into a Serbian army, and the Croatian army hardly even exists. As I have suggested, a joint Franco-German intervention would not have been easy, and there probably would have been months of mayhem before they got things locked down, but... tens of thousands of lives saved. It doesn't solve the problems that precipitated the war, but those problems were never serious enough to justify war. Instead of a decade of wars, a decade of establishing a political process for partition of territory.
Perhaps my scenarios are not realistic, but they are a lot more objective than conjectures about future civil wars. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
In the event that a war should happen, it will undoubtedly be the fault of all those people and entities who should have acted to prevent it. That does not entitle us to just throw up our hands in horror and declare "game over".
The idea that we should refuse to even contemplate the possibility is reminiscent of the attitude of much of the European left in the 1930s (all those who applauded the Munich agreements).
They had the excuse of the Great War. What's ours? It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
What was the better survival strategy in 1934? To emigrate to South America or to stay in Europe? I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
I am speculating that such military doctrine exists (Colman thinks this unlikely).
The UK and France have secret military doctrine for war on each other?
No. I can't see how you can parse that out of what I have written, but no. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
these two nations ... have a responsibility to have ... rules of engagement which will govern any military intervention in Europe
A military conflict between France and the UK being certainly among the least plausible cases; notably because of the relative symmetry of their forces (not to mention their nuclear arms [because I forbid you to mention them]). It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
Now, I'm still puzzled because you seem to think that this blind spot is a good thing; i.e. that you don't seem willing to envisage any circumstances in which it would be better for an EU nation to intervene militarily rather than see a war worsen. Perhaps the subtlety of your irony escapes me. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
Tell me why that is a bad plan while intervention by the central EU powers in a civil war they mostly caused is a good plan.
Well, that depends on who the police are, obviously. The majority opinion here appears to be convinced that, if there is war within the EU, it will be because the elite in the central EU powers want it, and could gain some sort of advantage from provoking, then intervening in it. That proposition merits a bit of explaining, to put it mildly. Who's up for it? It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
Which they are, so there will be.
when you see someone being raped, don't call the police
If you see the government starving people to death, do you call the cops?
When the starving people start raping each other, it's scant consolation that the right hand of the government will mete out punishment in the communities destroyed by the left hand. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
Well, that depends on who the police are, obviously.
The right analogy is if you see someone being raped, call in drone strikes. Which seems to be sbout the direction that law enforcement is going, with rumours that US police departments are looking into using drones. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
No. What I see is the European welfare states being burned down in a conflagration of misanthropy and stupidity. That leads me to the assumption that any war run by them will be equally stupid and misanthropic if not more so. In fact stopping them from destroying Europe's economy seems the easier task compared to keeping an humanitarian intervention humanitarian. And up till now we are failing quite hard at it.
As a recovering liberal interventionist (and there are a number of us on the blog), I simply don't see the obvious benefits of intervention. My point is, by the time intervention becomes your best policy option, the European project is a failure. So you're no longer debating from the point of view of the European interest. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
If we have war, then the European project is a failure. But the continent and its people continue to exist, regardless of institutional structure, so the question of the European interest is still pertinent. The EU, or its constituents, had no institutional obligation to intervene in Yugoslavia in 1991. Is that a valid excuse for not doing so? Do you think any such intervention would have made things worse? It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
There's one thing worse that either military intervention or no intervention: incompetent military intervention. I am confident the EU won't disappoint. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
If we have war, then the European project is a failure. But the continent and its people continue to exist, regardless of institutional structure, so the question of the European interest is still pertinent.
In the event of a war in Europe, the entities which are able to put boots on the ground will be, at best, acting in their own national interest (and more probably in the narrow special interests of a certain slice of their oligarchy). In terms of pertinence, the European interest is located somewhere slightly below the interests of the people being intervened in. The latter can, at least, shoot back.
The EU, or its constituents, had no institutional obligation to intervene in Yugoslavia in 1991. Is that a valid excuse for not doing so? Do you think any such intervention would have made things worse?
In practice, given that the same countries who were going to be intervening had been the loudest cheerleaders for starting the civil war they were intervening into in the first place, yes.
Perhaps the subtlety of your irony escapes me
Defence Scheme No. 1 was created on April 12, 1921 and details a surprise invasion of the northern United States as soon as possible after evidence was received of an American invasion of Canada
And of course its US equivalent War Plan Red:
The war plan outlined those actions that would be necessary to initiate war between Great Britain and the United States. The plan suggested that the British would initially have the upper hand by virtue of the strength of its navy. The plan further assumed that Britain would probably use its dominion in Canada as a springboard from which to initiate a retaliatory invasion of the United States. The assumption was taken that at first Britain would fight a defensive battle against invading American forces, but that the US would eventually defeat the British by blockading the United Kingdom and economically isolating it.[3]
That's completely different to the political doctrine which currently has the largely fictional Al Qaeda as Enemy of Democracy Number 1, with a present and active threat in Afghanistan.
Political doctrine is never debated. It's stated and propagandised, and it's purely for internal consumption. The real ends - which remain mysterious in Afghanistan, although personally I suspect opium and other drugs - are never stated publicly.
Which means that civil war won't happen in Europe unless it's useful and profitable to someone.
Just as the Nazis happened in Germany precisely because they appeared useful and profitable.
I'm finding it hard to imagine Catalonian independence - or its absence - being useful or profitable to anyone.
Likewise in Greece, which is an economic sideshow.
I can imagine the current crop of mad rulers breaking Greece just to prove they can, and for fun, with the possibility of useful profit, somewhat tangentially.
But actual civil war would surely spook the markets almost as much as a default would.
Since I would not trust the current crop of rulers to run a piss-up in a brewery, I would not make any expensive bets on that proposition.
Except maybe Catalonians.
As far as I can see, only two nation states have the military capacity to intervene anywhere in Europe with overwhelming force.
Who knew? I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
The best case is after an urgent "coalition of the willing" intervention (yes, I have deliberately chosen a stinky term), Eurocorps is used to validate it retrospectively, replacing the combat troops when the shooting has stopped. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
democracy in Europe was a bad joke in 1931.
So I think both sides in a conflict will claim to be the democratically-elected European government under attack. Which means that the major powers can choose which one to support. And if that support follows the same politics as todays support, it will be pro-austerity governments that will be supported. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
Georgia might be a more apropos example.
If only because if we make it clear we won't, some other power will be delighted to do it for us. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
France gets to pick the winner. Germany and the UK get veto rights over who France picks.
"France, subject to German and British veto" is not the same as "EU."
Given how obviously dysfunctional the German-led EU has become, France acting unilaterally or with tacit support from Britain and Germany may well make better decisions than the EU. But don't kid yourself that unilateral French decisions will be made to cater to the European interest.
Isn't a armed conflict about separatism much more probable?
Even the conflict in Ukraine has a considerable regional slant.
In Spain, probably. But there is likely to be an ideological difference between the separatists and the central government as well, which is what will likely decide which side the great powers support.
In Greece, I don't see the separatist fault line. But I very much do see the Pro-Nazi/Austerity vs. Anti-Nazi/Austerity fault line.
Other than that, I at least am not assuming a conflict "along ideological lines" (except possibly in Greece with Golden Dawn vs. Syriza).
Though if Spain gets violent over nationalism, it will quickly devolve into an "ideological" war too, what with all those Franco fans and anarchists. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
Ok, other ideological lines not related with competing nationalisms.
Absent great power interest, both sides could reject austerity, but with present great power line-up embracing austerity could grant foreign support. So defeating the secessionists, paying our debts and getting help from our friends could also be part of the same program.
In general I think smaller conflicts adopt to what greater powers will support. Absent the cold war a lot of conflicts would have been fought between similar groups but with different flags. Some time ago I read an article by a pakistani communist that travelled to North Korea during the heydays of international communism and left with the question of why the North Korean government was considered communist in the first place. My answer would be because they had been accepted in the communist group and therefore were communist by definition. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
Do we need a separate macro for liberal interventionist? I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
The pro-Russian gangster happened to probably be better for Georgia than the pro-US gangster. But what's good for Georgia was likely to have been some way down the list of criteria for picking him.
it's unlikely that any wars will be fought by "pro-austerity" vs "anti-austerity" forces.
The subthread initiated by the parent comment to this is too deep and is eating into the right margin of the page.
A new diary is strongly recommended. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
Maybe eurogreen could sum up some conclusions on proposed EU policy in case of war in Europe and we can continue from there? Or if someone else wants to sum another proposal for the EU? Or perhaps for the individual, beginners course in spanish for emigrants? Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
Worthy of a Nobel Peace Prize, surely. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
THE troika aren't our friends. They are not here to help Ireland. They are here to protect the interests of the creditor countries to whom Ireland is in debt. Ireland's banks must be saved to prevent any contagion to other core countries' banking systems. ... Sometimes, caricatures of this austerity-at-all-costs argument come to the fore. David Begg, General Secretary of the Irish Confederation of Trade Unions, recently said that "the troika has done more damage to Ireland than England ever did in 800 years". ... But it's not at all credible to say that Ireland's experience from 2010 to today is comparable to 800 years of British rule. You just can't compare the two. ... But without the troika, Ireland would have had to drop its government spending by more than 20pc in one year, not over five years. That's the big difference. The correction would still have had to be made, but much, much more quickly, and without giving people time to adjust. I'm no fan of the austerity approach, but the troika aren't the ones imposing it on us. Simple accounting has dictated it. We'd have had to do it ourselves, in some shape or form.
Sometimes, caricatures of this austerity-at-all-costs argument come to the fore. David Begg, General Secretary of the Irish Confederation of Trade Unions, recently said that "the troika has done more damage to Ireland than England ever did in 800 years".
But it's not at all credible to say that Ireland's experience from 2010 to today is comparable to 800 years of British rule. You just can't compare the two.
But without the troika, Ireland would have had to drop its government spending by more than 20pc in one year, not over five years. That's the big difference. The correction would still have had to be made, but much, much more quickly, and without giving people time to adjust. I'm no fan of the austerity approach, but the troika aren't the ones imposing it on us. Simple accounting has dictated it. We'd have had to do it ourselves, in some shape or form.
but the troika aren't the ones imposing it on us. Simple accounting has dictated it.
There is no alternative (to propaganda), of course.
So economically, independence could only lead to things getting much worse, no? It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
Then again, if the UK breaks up, couldn't Scotland be the successor state to EU membership and the rest of the UK exit? After all, on paper the Act of Union between Scotland and England was between equals... I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
If the Scots suddenly started running the tax haven scam for themselves, they could make London very nervous.
The Catalan government would probably argue that it has been a net fiscal contributor to Spain and so is owed. However, the Catalan government borrowed 10bn from the Spanish government last year to avoid insolvency, and it will borrow as much this year. In addition, Catalunya Caixa has received 10bn of Spanish government aid (some of it from the EU bailout last year) and now cannot be auctioned because nobody wants to buy it. I joke that the Spanish government should sell Catalunya Caixa to the Catalan government for 1.
So Catalan independence looks to me to set up something not unlike the Ljubljanska Banka controversy: when Yugoslavia fell apart many banks failed, including Ljubljanska Banka. The newly independent slovenia argued that onle Slevenes were eligible for protection from the Slovenian state, and that others had recourse to the Yugoslav deposit guarantee. 20 years later, Slovenia is delaying retification of Croatia's EU accession because there are still lawsuits by private Croatian citizens on their lost savings in Ljubljanska Banka, and Slovenia and Croatia are negotiating some sort of settlement. 20 years later. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
Exiting the Euro would be a good thing... if the debt were under local law.
The debt is under whatever law the debtor is under. What it says on the lien doesn't really matter to that.
Some of which may be incompatible.
I wouldn't that rich region separatism as some sort of rebellion against austerity or whatever.
Then in 2012 the Catalan government finds itself bankrupt and impopular due to austerity, and what do they do? Blame the bankruptcy on Rajoy's austerity, call early elections, lose a bunch of seats in the regional parliament to the Republican Left of Catalonia.
And then what does the Republican Left do? They agree to support the reappointment of the incumbent government on condition that they lay down a calendar for independence. And they are willing to support an austerity budget, on condition that the austerity budget is publicly, officially blamed on Rajoy.
Meanwhile, the Spanish nationalist crazies are making noises about military intervention in Catalonia. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
After 121 comments, there's still no mention of Syria or Turkey anywhere in this diary. Turkey is part of Europe, right? And Syria's longest border is with Turkey. And they are not quite at war yet. But if you want to start calculating probabilities, I will put my bets on this as the starting point...
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=148325
And even our most outspoken won't blame the syrian civil war on the ECB.*
* I hope so.
Syria is a member of Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean. Does that count? Or did that come to an end with Sarkozy himself?
i.e. it was an interesting idea, but was nobbled by northern european hegemony. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
Several comment threads, actually.
Don't recall where and when, though.
4 has been going on since 2009, and has so far failed to break the EU.
There's no realistic economic or ethnic fault line along which France can split. Certainly not while Spain maintains territorial integrity.
The China does not have, and cannot in the time frame available for resolution of the present depression develop, the requisite capabilities for pt. 11.
3 does not follow from 2. Indeed failure to break the Z is much more likely to cause step 3.
But you can put a deeper recession as a result of EU break-up and trade-war. So add the er and move it down.
JakeS:
But so far it has been one-sided. If you include step 2 you could get a two-sided conflict. Say that Italy and Greece gets governments that fire CB bosses and investigates them and by extension ECB for subverting treaties and conspiring to cause economic harm to the nation (which is high treason in Sweden at least). They also default on debt and blame Germany. Pressure mounts on all countries except Germany to leave the euro and they promptly do.
On the other side you have a German government trying to bloc the effect of the investigations by having the original sinners thrown out of the EU for breaking the EMU treaties. Plus a number of anti-austerity governments that support Italy and Greece while at least Netherlands and Finland backs Germany. The Council grinds to a halt and with it the EU. Member states start withholding their fees and eventually the cities reposses the EU buildings for not paying the water bill. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
If you include step 2 you could get a two-sided conflict.
Possession is 9/10ths of the law.
There's no realistic economic or ethnic fault line along which France can split.
The direct losses of 4 countries (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal) leaving the EZone are estimated at 17 trillion.
This would be the worst economic crisis in modern times and take more than a decade to overcome.
So far the losses haven't been materialized, they are potential.
That is true. However, France is a split country in the sense that socialist supporters including intellectuals, civil servants and the like see themselves as the leader of the South, whereas the business and industry community is much closer to Germany and the North. That is why a split of the EU is going to very much polarize opinion in France.
The direct losses of 4 countries (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal) leaving the EZone are estimated at 17 trillion. This would be the worst economic crisis in modern times and take more than a decade to overcome.
The problem with such an event is that those owning the debt that is being defaulted won't just accept that their claims have to be written down and they have to lose money. OH NO! They will be demanding to be made whole until every poor person in the EZ has been thrown into a meat grinder and sold as hamburger, regardless of whether that will or will not make them whole.
The situation in the Euro-zone is similar to the real estate melt down in the USA. Much of the debt has been created by fraud, but it has all been mixed together or comingled, so now all is tainted. But the most powerful people, many of whom were responsible for the fraud, are demanding to be made whole and those they are blaming are not capable of making them whole. So what we have is an ugly drama of vindictive spite inflicted mostly on those who had nothing to do with the origin of the problem other than, perhaps, having voted for politicians who colluded with fraud. I guess the assumption is that the citizens are not like investors in a corporation who are only liable to the extent of the value of their stock. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
It is not the 'losses of 4 countries' that matters so much as the 'losses occasioned by the default and debt repudiation of 4 countries' and what really matters is who would suffer those losses.
Just imagine 2 to 3 trillion Euros leaving the Italian economy in a very short period of time
because Italian savers aren't likely to cherish the idea of loosing 30 to 50% of their savings due to the devaluation
Such a vast drain of money will result in total economic collapse.
And the Italian central bank should permit this for what reason?
Savers have no macroeconomic function.
Money can be printed.
Thus we are so sensible, have schooled ourselves to so close a semblance of prudent financiers, taking careful thought before we add to the "financial" burdens of posterity by building them houses to live in, that we have no such easy escape from the sufferings of unemployment. We have to accept them as an inevitable result of applying to the conduct of the State the maxims which are best calculated to "enrich" an individual by enabling him to pile up claims to enjoyment which he does not intend to exercise at any definite time.
Savings = Investment, eh? I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
The alternative is to stop all cross-border transactions which would also result in a total collapse of the economy.
But the savvy investors will park their ill gotten gains in safe havens long before that will happen.
As always, it is the average Joe that's going to foot the bill.
Savings are necessary to fund industrial production.
Wealth cannot be printed. Printing money destroys wealth.
Most adult Italians have a good idea of how to survive with a currency that is fairly rapidly depreciating.
The 'two to three trillion Euros' is highly unlikely to be even mostly cash.
the ECB isn't going to put a single cent into Italy if the problem is perceived to be due to political instability in Italy
Now on to substance. You are a bit more optimistic then I am, essentialy following the break-up of the Eastern bloc (at least until 8). My mental model is more of 1848 mixed with 1930ies.
If we see alliances, I don't think they will be north-south as then you largely ally with your neighbours, and it is with the neighbours the old border issues exist. Sweden could (extremely unlikely though) conjure up border issues with Finland (Åland islands) but not with Greece. A rise of Greater Hungary could quickly trigger a search for anti-Hungary alliances around Hungary, but Portugal would be uninterested. So if there is alliance building I rather think it will be a complex weave of enemy-of-my-enemy alliances. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
German policy has been driving basically all of the Eurozone's dysfunctions, which means that the successor bloc containing Germany is virtually guaranteed to be just as dysfunctional.
The main problem with a northern trade bloc, nevermind a northern alliance, is that Germany has amply demonstrated that it is totally untrustworthy as a trade partner.
The countries most likely to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime against you, and tolerate that you abuse it in this manner, are the ones most likely to be your closest economic or geopolitical allies or clients. In other words, Germany has been pursuing - consistently - a strategy designed to retard the industrial development and stunt the economic strength of the trade bloc in which they are the hegemon.
Think of it as a version of mercantilism. But dumber.
If an NEU bloc does not maintain a common currency or fixed exchange rate regime, then Germany's economic strategy will implode, and the raison d'etre for an NEU bloc will be gone. If an NEU bloc attempts to maintain a common currency or fixed FX regime, then that bloc will inherit all the dysfunctions of the , and fall apart in turn in short order.
The German economic strategy of the last several decades has been to gain export market share through wage dumping.
How can that be? Prior to the Euro, the value of the DM has increased about fourfold in relation to the Pound. In other words, British labor has become cheaper and German labor has become more expensive.
The European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the precursor to the Euro, would periodically experience crises in which appreciation pressure on the DM featured prominently. The German response was always to absolutely refuse to defend the DM exchange rate, insisting that it was a problem with the other currency of the day. When the DM is almost always involved on the same side of a currency crisis between pegged European currencies, you should start wondering whether perhaps this is because Germany is deliberately running a harmful, disinflationary policy.1
Which is evidence of the mercantilist strategy, not evidence against it. The depreciation of the £ is the British defense against German wage dumping. (Well, that and the fact that the UK has been systematically dismantling its industrial plant for thirty years solid, which must eventually show up in your ability to afford imported goods, which in turn shows up in your exchange rate.)
If you devalue it means that you are not competitive.
"Uncompetitive," in this context, is simply another word for "overvalued currency." Nothing more, nothing less. There is nothing inherently wrong with fixing that through devaluation. Nor is there anything inherently wrong with running a higher rate of inflation than your trading partners and compensating with regular depreciation or periodic devaluations of the currency.
That policy regime sucks for rentier interests. But that's a feature, not a bug.
To compete on price these days (wage dumping) you would have to lower wages to Third World levels. The only way to maintain a high standard of living is by innovation.
With or without the EZone, the issue for Germany is not competition with Greece, the issue is competition with Japan, Korea and China.
Without a fixed exchange rate regime to prop up German exports, Germany's problem will be that German economic strategy requires that Germany is a net exporter. In the absence of a fixed FX regime it is only possibly to be a net exporter by discounting your currency. And Germany lacks the political will to get into a balls-to-the-wall competitive devaluation with countries who discount their currency to protect themselves from importing the unemployment caused by Germany's irresponsible policy mix.
- Jake
1The relationships between exchange rates and other macroeconomic variables are... non-trivial, and most contemporary attempts to model them quantitatively are, quite frankly, embarrassingly bad. So normally inferences of policy implications from exchange rate behavior should be treated with extreme caution. But in this case the effect is sufficiently large and persistent that a compelling case can be made. Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
Only if the hourly wage in £ has not grown faster relative to the hourly wage in DM.
"Uncompetitive," in this context, is simply another word for "overvalued currency."
With the Eurozone, China and the US have been playing middle-man for what was effectively Germany competing with Greece and Spain.
Big wage increases are no use if most of it is eaten up by inflation.
Germany has pursued a policy of a hard currency with low inflation and low currency fluctuation in order to increase predictability necessary for industrial investment.
In that context, even low wage increases will improve living standards more than high wage increase in soft currency high inflation economies.
With soft currencies, devaluation is an ongoing process. I.e., one devaluation hides the next devaluation.
There is nothing inherently wrong with running 5-8 % annual inflation and 3-6 % annual depreciation of the currency w.r.t. the D-Mark. It has a different distributional impact between rentiers, entrepreneurs, labor and mature industrial firms than rigidly running 2 % inflation and no depreciation versus the D-Mark. But it is not inherently worse. Just different.
Domestic industry can sell by price and does not have to increase productivity and innovation. Therefore, industry loses competitiveness.
First, wages, being kept high relative to the cost of capital by full employment, will push firms to substitute capital for labor. This will not cause unemployment, since the saved labor is kept employed via demand-side intervention. But it will increase the sophistication and extent of the capital plant.
Second, domestic industry is not homogeneous: Firms and sectors can gain at the expense of other firms and sectors in the domestic economy. If you do not innovate and improve, and your neighbor does, then your firm will lose market share. A balanced trade currency policy only ensures that the domestic sector will not lose market share in the aggregate, it does not protect any individual firm from competitive pressure.
German industry has had to face regular increases in the value its currency. It has become competitive by a) shifting from low-cost to high added value industries b) increasing productivity c) improving technological innovation. Therefore it has become competitive.
With the Eurozone, China and the US have been playing middle-man for what was effectively Germany competing with Greece and Spain. As a percentage of total German exports, exports to the EZone have fallen from 47 to 37% in the last decade. That trend is likely to continue in the future. European markets will continue to loose importance.
(The argument is identical to the one about firms in an open, floating-rate healthy-inflation economy.)
But I agree that the Euro is too cheap for German industry. This will compromise German competitiveness in the future
Anyways, the Germans don't need the exorbitant trade surplus they have now.
But there is no way of decreasing your competitiveness in relation to Spain while at the same time increasing your competitiveness to compete against China or Japan.
There is nothing wrong with activist currency policy, and there is nothing wrong with a healthy 5-8 % annual inflation rate. Foreclosing on activist currency policy and attempting to push the rate of inflation substantially below where it should be to ensure financial stability in an economy facing 0-1 % annual real growth serves no purpose except to enrich rentiers.
Jake, I think we basically disagree on the virtues of inflation and devaluation.
What I'm trying to figure out is why.
But structural debt, which is recurrent as is the case in the EZone periphery, cannot be dealt with in that way.
Investors (savers or whoever) will invariably factor in a country's propensity to erase debts by inflation/devaluation and make you pay through the nose.
High inflation invariably has a negative impact on society.
And to think that you can control inflation at 8 to 10% is absurd. High inflation invariably tends to spiral out of control
High inflation also encourages high-risk investments, i.e. speculation,
Preventing unwanted speculation requires heavy-handed and intrusive regulation of the financial sector. Attempting to prevent it by manipulating macroeconomic variables is like hunting bears by setting the forest on fire.
and discourages stable long term low interest investments need by the manufacturing industries.
Anyways, leaving aside the thin air of economic theory, the reality of the economic situation is that pumping more money into the periphery would reproduce the causes that led to the crisis in the first place and produce another consumer bubble without building domestic manufacturing industry.
If you wish to maintain the fixed exchange rate regime, then of course no action which exclusively targets the deficit countries can resolve the structural cause of the crisis, because the structural cause of the crisis is that surplus countries are running unsustainable current accounts surpluses.
However, a policy of forcing the surplus countries to underwrite the current account deficits of deficit countries would stabilize the system, end the humanitarian catastrophe, and encourage the surplus countries to stop pursuing harmful surplus-generating policies.
And to think that you can control inflation at 8 to 10% is absurd. High inflation invariably tends to spiral out of control and it can only be brought down again by very painful measures.
Not really. It is as far as I can tell a common idea that inflation is driven mainly by expectations so inflation triggers more inflation until you get to hyperinflation. But I don't think it matches reality. Hyperinflation tends instead to be a phenomena of its own and high stable inflation is possible.
Here is for example Inflation in Sweden 1831-2012
You can easily see a number of external events there - WWI&II, the 70ies oil crisis - but even those do not lead to out of control inflation.
Do you have any examples of high inflation spiraling out of control from mainly internal factors like inflation expectations? Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
It also tends to result in weak productivity growth, which IS a problem. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
I've not seen any good statistical evidence that the policy leads the drop in productivity growth, rather than vice versa.
Floating exchange rate, independent central bank, central bank mandate including both inflation targeting and financial stability, and fiscal stimulus when you hit the zero lower bound, seems like a completely sufficient policy outfit. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
Which is hardly the case.
As Kjell Olof Feldt, social democratic minister of finance during the 80's in Sweden said: devaluation is like peeing your pants; first it feels good - then it doesn't. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
Of course, the entire society could, in principle, decide that they want to not work so hard and just import less instead. But why is that not an acceptable policy decision? Sucks to be a rentier under that policy, but fuck the rentiers.
Notable events here are the reunification of Germany and the introduction of the euro.
If there is balanced trade you get a bit up some years and a bit down some years. Consistent surpluses as Germany has had since the introduction of the euro indicates a mercantilistic strategy. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
This ignores the key flaws in the Maastricht regime of the EMU and the true causes of the crisis. One original sin was to put no one in charge of minding the store of the giant integrated euro economy. No demand management was foreseen in good times, no lender of last resort in bad. Predictably, the Euroland economy has proved prone to protracted domestic demand stagnation and conspicuous reliance on exports for its meager growth, while crisis management has been by trial and error; and errors with no end it would seem. The second original sin was to forget what fifty years of European monetary cooperation were all about, namely to forestall the risk of beggar-thy-neighbor currency devaluation. The euro provided the coronation of that very endeavor in the sense that exchange rates disappeared with national currencies. But this only meant that under the EMU trends in national unit labor costs have taken on the role of determining intra-union competitiveness positions alone. The golden rule of monetary union therefore requires that national unit labor cost trends stay aligned with the common inflation rate that union members have committed to - when they didn't. It is a well-known fact that Germany's unit labor cost trend departed from the 2 percent stability norm, settling for zero under the euro regime. As Germany turned űber-competitive, its euro partners lost competitiveness just the way they would have in case of 20 percent deutschmark devaluation in pre-EMU times. Alas, the EMU has actually complicated matters as diverging unit labor cost trends essentially dealt the currency union an asymmetric shock that undermined the "one-size-fits-all" monetary policy. With wage repression and mindless austerity suffocating German domestic demand, the ECB's stance became far too tight for the former "sick man of the euro." By contrast, set to suit the average of the euro aggregate, the ECB's stance became far too easy for other euro members, nourishing property market bubbles and growing current account imbalances as a result. Prior to the crisis, Germany's soaring current account surplus was concentrated in Europe, about two thirds with its euro partners. Lending flows from Germany were instrumental in allowing intra-area divergences to persist and imbalances to build up. Herein rests the source of Germany's exposure to solvency problems in the euro periphery. While these basic facts should be well-known by now, their official reading pins the blame solely on debtor countries. Somehow everyone but Germany lost competitiveness. And somehow fiscal profligacy was the main villain in all this. A sober reading of these facts suggests requirements for crisis resolution that squarely defy the strategy currently pursued by the euro authorities.
It is a well-known fact that Germany's unit labor cost trend departed from the 2 percent stability norm, settling for zero under the euro regime. As Germany turned űber-competitive, its euro partners lost competitiveness just the way they would have in case of 20 percent deutschmark devaluation in pre-EMU times. Alas, the EMU has actually complicated matters as diverging unit labor cost trends essentially dealt the currency union an asymmetric shock that undermined the "one-size-fits-all" monetary policy. With wage repression and mindless austerity suffocating German domestic demand, the ECB's stance became far too tight for the former "sick man of the euro." By contrast, set to suit the average of the euro aggregate, the ECB's stance became far too easy for other euro members, nourishing property market bubbles and growing current account imbalances as a result. Prior to the crisis, Germany's soaring current account surplus was concentrated in Europe, about two thirds with its euro partners. Lending flows from Germany were instrumental in allowing intra-area divergences to persist and imbalances to build up. Herein rests the source of Germany's exposure to solvency problems in the euro periphery.
While these basic facts should be well-known by now, their official reading pins the blame solely on debtor countries. Somehow everyone but Germany lost competitiveness. And somehow fiscal profligacy was the main villain in all this. A sober reading of these facts suggests requirements for crisis resolution that squarely defy the strategy currently pursued by the euro authorities.
I think, on purely economic grounds, a Northern alliance will most likely follow an EU breakup. Most countries bordering Germany depend on the German market. This will create a bloc other countries will join by and by. Any Southern alliance is likely to be dysfunctional.
(Yes, the name "Neuro" is an intentional pun) I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland
I don't think so. This includes only four euro members and that counts latvia.
Austria, the Benelux countries, Slovakia, Slovenia and the non euro using Czech republic are even more intertwined with the german economy then the members of Baltic sea region.
And that said, even with my "realistic" additions only one of the four largest trade partners of Germany - the Netherlands- is included.
Plus Poland doesn't exactly have warm fuzzies for either Germany or Russia.
So it's complicated. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
The relationship between Poland and Germany hasn't been this good since the siege of Vienna. That is not the problem.
The relationship between Poland and Germany hasn't been this good since the siege of Vienna.
The Baltic countries will probably cling to Germany for safety whatever austerity may come. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
If it is about staying in a rump-EU, Sweden would stay. If it is a new alliance that comes close to EU in importance,
I'm no Techno-Utopian but it seems clear, to me, the global linkages allowed by the Internet will have profound consequences, some of which we can't even begin to imagine. As an example, what happens to Big-Box Brick-and-Mortar Stores when customers routinely purchase commodity consumer consumables over the internet? What happens to continual consumption (purchase) of consumer durables after somebody figures out they can make a bloody fortune by junking planned obsolesce and receive long-term income from parts and service?
A major change in Communications must lead to other major changes, across the board. See what happened after the invention of the moveable type, as an obvious 'bit of proof.'
Granted TPTB, who became TPTB under the previous circumstances, are going to do everything they can to prevent a phase transition. However under foreseeable meta-changes, e.g., Global Warming, I think, in the end, there is bugger-all they can do about it. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
So if EU fails I predict member states going their own ways with overlapping, weaker intergovernmental collaborations. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
I'm saying it's not an Either/Or situation. I submit Russia can manage to do two things at the same time.
:-) She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
any supra-national Baltic Sea organization that includes Germany and excludes Russia would have the latter freaking out
a) Under what geopolitical model is a Sino-German trade bloc possible independent of the American empire?
b) What does Germany offer as third wheel of a Sino-Russian trade bloc?
c) In which political universe is Germany going to accept being the (very) junior partner in a Russo-German trade bloc?
d) In what universe is the US going to tolerate a Russo-German trade bloc (remembering that the US has a number of current and potential clients in the ECE buffer states who will be more than eager to play spoiler on their behalf)?
If you want Germany and the Netherlands in the same economc bloc, we're looking rather at the North Sea basin: Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, France, UK, Norway, Denmark. But that replicates the situation with the old European Community (minus Italy) and the EFTA (UK, Denmark, Norway, etc). It didn't work out then (the EFTA countries remain outside the EU or are eurosceptic or uncommited members of it) so why should it work out now? I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
That said, I just looked at current trade. And there Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia are more dependent on trade with Germany then any country in the Baltic, with the exception of Denmark. Austria e. g. 38.2% of imports came from Germany and 31.2% of imports did go there.
And of course the largest trade partner of Germany is still France.
German exports in 2012:
Now, if a North Euro without France or even Italy would make sense is another question, but the economic facts as of now don't hint to a Baltic Empire. The Hanseatic League won't rise again. :-)
Wo einst St. Lucien Frieden nach Rhätien Hineingebracht. Dort an dem Grenzenstein Und längs dem jungen Rhein Steht furchtlos Liechtenstein Auf Deutschlands Wacht.
Frieden nach Rhätien
Hineingebracht.
Dort an dem Grenzenstein
Und längs dem jungen Rhein
Steht furchtlos Liechtenstein
Auf Deutschlands Wacht.
Danube Federations were very popular in the interwar years. And while the biggest trade partners of Germany and Austria mostly are the same, there is one exception: Hungary.
And of course the largest trade partner of Germany is still France. German exports in 2012: 1.France
1.France
Imagine a core Eurozone with Germany and France alone, and Germany retaining its 6% current account surplus. If their common currency continued to float freely and the core Eurozone had a neutral current account balance, France would have an 8% current account deficit.
So either Germany gives up its current account surplus or the rest of the world allows the core Eurozone to devalue its currency so that it can run a 3% current account surplus. Or Germany accepts fiscal transfers to France comparable to the size of the current account balances.
As none of the three possibilities are politically plausible, there cannot be a core Eurozone consisting of Germany and France. In fact, there cannot be a Eurozone consisting of Germany and anyone else (as the successive failures of Europe's attempts to fix exchange rates without fiscal transfers over 40 years demonstrate). I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
"In fact, there cannot be a Eurozone consisting of Germany and anyone else"
Is simply magical thinking. So Germany couldn't share a currency with the Netherlands because of their unbalanced trade?
German trade surplus with eastern europe = Hamburg
The German trade surplus basically happens in the southern half of the country. And that cargo goes to Bremen, Rotterdam and Trias (in roughly that order).
Two of these euro countries, three of those countries with a free floating currency.
So either Germany gives up its current account surplus or ...
Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
the problems of trade surplus and defiicits are internal to the eurozone
Some countries like Portugal have had a trade deficit for the last 60 years. That predates EZone and EU membership.
Trying to keep your currency overvalued will produce the trade deficit, and then the devaluation crisis. An overvalued currency, however, is great for the local elite to take their rentier income out of the country. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
First there was the Bretton Woods gold standard, ...
It must be solved by fiscal policy, and it can only be solved by fiscal policy if monetary policy doesn't work against it.
The EU allows no industrial policy, no independent fiscal policy, and has a monetary policy conducive to deflation, depression and unemployment. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
That is a structural problem that won't be solved by exiting EZone/EU
how can it be solved, in your opinion?
keynesian job creation? government investment of citizens' taxes to provide employment and teach skills to make them productive?
whose fault is it they don't get smart like the germans and invent more saleable stuff for the world economy, or price their labour cheaper than asia's?
if we are in a painful transition period between old and new capitalism, what is the goal the suffering is for? 'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
The Andrew Mellon way:
liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate farmers, liquidate real estate... it will purge the rottenness out of the system. High costs of living and high living will come down. People will work harder, live a more moral life. Values will be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up from less competent people.
whose fault is it they don't get smart like the germansBavarians and invent more saleable stuff for the world economy, or price their labour cheaper than asia's?
Edmund Stoiber once caused something of an uproar when he said "unfortunately, not everyone in Germany is as intelligent as in Bavaria".
Anyways, jobs in the South are lost to China and the emerging economies not to the North.
The simple fact of the matter is that countries in the South have priced themselves out of low-cost manufacturing without managing the transition to high value added production. That is a structural problem that won't be solved by exiting EZone/EU. That problem cannot be solved by monetary policy.
Therefore, the Eurozone must run a trade surplus with the rest of the world.
And the rest of the world is going to accommodate that without allowing their freely floating currencies to devalue, exactly why? I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
So either Germany gives up its current account surplus or ...No, its the other way around: we have to give up trade deficits.
If the surplus country won't play ball, the fixed exchange rate system breaks down. The story of the past, I don't know, 150 years? I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
No, its the other way around: we have to give up trade deficits.
That is the purpose of structural reforms,
This is not what is being done, therefore the purpose of structural reform is not to do away with trade imbalances (unless you wish to postulate that those who peddle structural reform are all idiots who do not understand elementary import substitution strategies).
which are necessary irrespective of whether we have the Euro or not.
It has nothing to do with the Euro. The problem is one of adapting traditional societies to the competitive environment of the modern world.
Competition is, after all, a policy, not an objective. If we can protect the interests of the bottom three quarters of the income distribution at the "cost" of wiping out the accumulated wealth of the top quarter, then that's a feature, not a bug.
The sum of all foreign trade must be zero.
Never going to happen. Latvia, say, is never going to have a viable domestic automotive industry and Germany, say, is never going to have autarky in food production. The relative production costs, thus purchase price, for manufactured goods versus agricultural commodities means a steady trade imbalance between the two regions. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
Human society, including economics, isn't natural.
No other species (unless our powers of observation are too limited for us to notice) has anything like the volume, complexity, and duration of human culture.
But the determining factor for the formation of a German-centered trade block following an EZone/EU collapse would be the question where Northern and Eastern countries export to. I'm pretty sure that to most Germany will be the most important export market.
And 2012 is of course the present, not the past, except in a hyper literal sense.
Even so, this guess includes six members of the EU and Switzerland.
I would like a source for that claim
It's a GS projection:
http://www.goldmansachs.com/s/GMeT_othermailings_attachments/63488662514238375059101.pdf
And no, trade figures for 2012 do represent the past of business that has been completed and payed for. File closed. Current order books and business plans have to take into consideration a horizon of 2020 at the very least.
And Goldman Sachs - in 2007 they probably made projections how Ireland would grow into the largest european economy or something.
Come back with a halfway credible source and then we can talk.
Proving a negative is hard, after all.
China will become the most important trade partner. Russia will overtake the US. France will loose it's top position and the South will be insignificant.
But the fact is, the rest of the world cannot be relied on to keep the Euro undervalued so it can avoid running a neutral current account balance. Because there's no way to coerce the BRICs, politically, to overvalue their currencies. I distribute. You re-distribute. He gives your hard-earned money to lazy scroungers. -- JakeS
Incidentally, my mental model is more 1914, which is suiting since we are soon to celebrate its 100th anniversary.
So his value as an authority is, perhaps, somewhat questionable.
Now he is talking, shortly before leaving office. And this time, no one accuses him of lying. Jean-Claude Juncker delivered a furious valedictory speech at the economic and monetary affairs committee of the European Parliament. This was picked up by the Spanish press in particular. Cinco Dias calls Juncker's intervention "a furibund attack on Berlin". The BBC has footage of the full 90-minute session. He said: that he disagreed with the rhythm of adjustments "imposed on certain countries", and that the Eurogroup has not made political valuations of the adjustments which too often were just rubber-stamping recommendations by the Commission, ECB and IMF "whose democratic legitimacy is not clear". that "the choice was made to make the adjustment fall on the weakest"; that certain countries who benefitted from capital flight out of Greece were not doing anything about it; that the mistake has been made to "underestimate the drama of unemployment" and to "give the impression that Europe is only there to punish" and by not rewarding the "program countries" for following through with their adjustment plans; that his successor would be well advised to "listen to all Eurozone members on an equal footing" even if it takes a long time to go through a meeting, or else "we'll see the results in 6 months if my successor doesn't"; that the ESM should have "some degree of retroactivity" and be able to "recapitalise banks" and not just address "new problems that may apply in the future"; that the results of the latest European Council were "disappointing", because "the original idea was to present a road map for the following decades"; in respect of economic policy coordination, that "we can't carry on with a system where the Frankfurt monetary arm is strong and the economic policy arm is feeble" and "those who refused [in 1997] are now the largest voices calling for this idea". And "we have to make sure that every time a government recommends a structural reform it is explained to the Eurogroup and that the ministers in charge explain the consequences and others say what the consequences of such reforms will be on policy in their countries"; "there's a need for all member states to agree on a 'minimum social wage'", a need for "a basis of minimum social rights for workers", as "otherwise we're going to lose the support of the working classes". There's a need to "agree on the elements of solidarity", "principle and ways and means of bank resolution", and "a deposit guarantee scheme"; that the Green party in Luxembourg will vote against the Fiscal Treaty because "they are fed up with what they see as a German diktat";
Get rid of all monarchies, popes, and super-rich.
Stop this "freedom to breed" attitude that you seem to embrace.
You do know that births in the EU as a rule are quite a bit below replacement rate? That the states with the highest births almost - but not quite - reach replacement rate and that without immigration all EU states would have declining population? Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
That doesn't follow. All it takes is a landlord who doesn't maintain the drainage where you park your car, a heavy rainstorm with water reaching the engine, and (possibly - I only thought of this possibility much later) collaboration between a garage owner and insurance adjuster, and you end up collecting more from auto insurance companies than you've paid in (in my case, than I've paid all my life).
Of course, this was in NY. Maybe such things don't happen in CA.
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