• The SPD had Big Mo up into this week. That seems to have stalled now, judging by the Forsa and Allensbach polls. I can't find the MoE of these polls anywhere, but it's hard to dismiss the fact that both show the same trend.

• The pundits have been predicting for weeks that the SPD would close the gap up to the lower or mid-30s percent range, as disgruntled but ultimately loyal SPD voters grudgingly return into the fold. Schroeder, on the other hand, predicted that the SPD would surge right back to 38%, which is were they ended up in the 2002 election and which would give them about parity with the CDU. But I'm afraid that the polls this week are more consistent with the pundits' story than with Schroeder's.

• To make matters worse, the last three days have seen a major onslaught of bad publicity for Schroeder's government. The excreable Bild, Germany's largest worthless rag, err, tabloid, always happy to shill for the CDU, alleged that Schroeder's finance minister, Hans Eichel, has prepared a list of painful budget cuts to be implemented immediately after the election. Eichel denies this and is threatening to sue Bild, but Merkel & Co. have absolutely run with this. The real problem is that this business reminds a lot of voters of what happened three years ago, when Schroeder's government hid damaging data on the economy and the government's budget until after the election. This credibility gap has contributed a great deal to the SPD's recent losses in state elections, and this is the worst possible time for the SPD to have voters see their suspicions of them reinforced.

• On the upside, though: this week's polls also show that 35% of the electorate are still undecided, and that a majority of voters no longer desire a change in the government. And the combined impact of these two data points is not to be underestimated. German voters are extremely "conservative", in the sense that it takes a lot for them to vote a government out of office. The fact of the matter is, they've done this only once so far - in 1998, when Schroeder came to power. Every other change of government was caused, not in the voting booths, but by the parties forging new governing coalitions. Schroeder's predecessor, Kohl, was able to stay in office for so long because even though he was never popular (except after the reunification in 1990), voters always in the end decided to stick with him, until 1998. That may work for Schroeder as well. Like you said, we'll see.  

The feeling of belonging to a majority +
a good propagandist +
ordered happiness +
the TV camera effect +
3 glasses of champagne

=

a raving crowd for any politician.

1. Ever considered that these people want to keep more of their hard earned money?

2.  How about the government legally stealing less of your money?
   

3. Maybe they want more economic freedom?

4. Maybe they want a stronger defense policy agaisnt the Islamofascism?

5.  Why did people enthusiastically cheer Ronald Reagan?
   

A question for those of you across the pond: is NPR feeding U.S. citizens a load of garbage? Or is feminism behind Merkel's popularity?

I will try to put up a diary with some links until tomorrow afternoon.

On the other hand, while I found Schroeder's justification for early elections dubious - i.e. that due to dissatisfaction on the left of the coalition he didn't have a working majority, that would absolutely be the case with a minority govt.  In practice I far prefer a right wing govt or a grand coalition than a left wing one that is largely powerless, and that's what a minority govt would be.  The existing right wing veto power in the Bundesrat would be joined by a formalized far left wing veto power in the lower house.  

I also think it could turn around and hurt the SPD (and Greens) politically as centrist and center left voters decide that they prefer a mainstream right wing coalition to a one combining the mainstream and extreme left.