That said, it isn't necessary for the purposes here to have read any of that work by Boudon.  Instead, I'm paraphrasing as much of it as I've been able to make myself think I've understood.

 Yes, you're correct that the view I'm expounding  assumes that people behave or, rather, reason-- for purposes of this discussion about conceptual framing of political issues (which qualify as ideological)--in what are essentially rational ways even if they are not correct in their premises or the conclusions drawn from them, the relationship between these is still rational; it's perhaps faulty on the details of the reasoning but, if, for example, you asked why they believed such-and-such about a controversy, their reply would not be irrational nonsense but something which, in their view, is a reasonably drawn conclusion.

 e.g.  

Q: "Why did you vote for George W. Bush in his second campaign?"

A: "Because he's defending us from enemies determined to attack us."

 We can dispute this line of reasoning; we can disagree with its soundness; but we can't show that it is irrational.  That's an important part of my point--or, of Boudon's.  ;^)

"In such an environment it is not surprising that the ills of technology should seem curable only through the application of more technology..." John W Aldridge

So, while I agree that the Dems do not possess the propaganda machine necessary to combat the Republicans' version fully, a large part of me believes that the party would be too politically incompetent to, if they did possess it, use it well enough, anyway.

Where do they stand on gay marriage?  Opposition?  Support?  States' rights?  Kerry said he supported states' rights, which rang a tad hollow with me, as I'm sure it did with every other voter, regardless of allegiance.  I'm reminded of the Dixiecrats when I hear that, or of Reagan's speech in Philadelphia, Mississippi.  Nobody believed Kerry on that.  He's a liberal Yankee, and he shouldn't run away from that fact.  That's really the problem.  The Dems are not willing to stand up and speak of their true beliefs.  They not willing to call bigotry out as bigotry.  They're not willing to stand up and say that creationism is bullshit.

The media love "shock and awe" stories.  Whenever Howard Dean says something "controversial" about the Republicans' policies, the press runs with it, and often the polls show that Americans agree, at which point the Republicans are forced to play defense.  It's not a matter of the Dems being unable to gain access to the press.  It's a matter of the Dems watering down everything they say until it means absolutely nothing and bores the hell out of the audience.

Be nice to America. Or we'll bring democracy to your country.

 I can see I'm going to have to read his work.

 One correction where you have me wrong, though:

 "In Lakoff's theory of mathematical thought we have the apparent contradiction you highlight between logical and metaphorical thought. There is no contradiction.

 My point was also, indeed, that I saw not only no contradiction, but, even more, no fundamental distinction either, between what are termed "logical" and "metaphorical" thought.  In stating this, I recognize that I'm being terribly presumptuous to put what is my sheer speculative hunches--which lack even the most meagre grounding in the literature on this topic--up against your explanation of Lakoff, of whom I've not read a word.  But, while the ideas you've presented are fascinating, I don't yet see them as convincing-- though, of course, that's to be expected since you have only had time to present the barest of outlines, and you've done that very clearly.

It seems to me that Lakoff may be largely correct in his analysis as you've explained it of human reasoning processes as metaphorical and based on corporal experiences.  

I'd even say that in the following,

   "In other words, it's not that our thought is irrational, but reason (or logic) is applied on a metaphorical substrate. ..."

    I don't see anything to quarrel with.  Much of what you've presented so far can be readily adopted without any apparent inconsistencies with what I think I understand about Boudon's (and his predecessors who he supports)--or even with the points I'm trying to defend.

I think that people do practice "conceptual framing".  But I do not see it as a very useful practical tool of political debate and discourse or a means which lends itself to manipulating mass publics' opinion in any fashion which departs from "traditional standard views" of political discourse.  Or, in other words, so far I see nothing revolutionary in this or inconsistent with the views I've presented in the diary part above.  I think that while "conceptual framing" occurs, it neither facilitates nor relieves any otherwise necessary components of rational political discourse nor lends any particular advantage to some factions as opposed to others who try to make what might be called "conscious use" of its unconscious effects on others.  Another way to state this is to argue that I believe there is no substitute for practicing careful, critical reasoning in the effort to both understand others and to attempt to persuade them.

My major objection to the way in which Lakoff's ideas are being used is that they are presented as a sort of "short-cut" to the more laborious and less certain process of deliberative, argued persuasion.  That is not Lakoff's fault, of course.  But my point here is not about his lack of responsibility for others' misuse of his work, it's about _others' arguable misuse of his work.

This brings me to the other point that I think is worth making.  Previously, you expressed doubts about the validity of the "war" versus "occupation" controvesy as an example of the workings of Lakoff's theories.

 However, this misses the point.  I presented that for an example not because of any particular validity it might have as far as Lakoff's views are concerned but, rather, because it is a current example of people's efforts to apply their understanding of Lakoff's "framing" principles.

  Therefore, it's part of my point in saying that this example, whether faithful to Lakoff or not, is how the "framing" principle is in fact being urged, argued over and "_applied" in a sense; and that, if this application is faulty, then my point that it's applied use is questionable at best is a valid one.

 It isn't enough to simply object that, "People ought not to misstate, misunderstand and misapply Lakoff's theories"--of course they oughtn't.  But if they do, and if they do so consistently, then these principles are difficult for non-experts to understand and to apply to practical political affairs of the day.

I'm very interested in what your coming post(s) will present.

 thanks!

"In such an environment it is not surprising that the ills of technology should seem curable only through the application of more technology..." John W Aldridge

Regarding my partial reading of his writings, Where Mathematics Comes From being from 2000 and directed to a non-specialist audience, I think it can be assumed to give a good (if brief) overview of the general theory as it is now. It definitely gave that impression to me. So while someone with a primary background in linguistics, anthropology or philosophy might get more out of the earlier works, I think I'm ok... I do want to read Philosophy in the Flesh for whatever his take is on epistemology, but I don't feel motivated to read Moral Politics, for instance.

There are various reasons why Lakoff's ideas appeal to me. I've described myself as a Kantian, and I have given above my view of how Lakoff reinforces Kantian epistemology (though, like I say in the previous paragraph, he might well disagree with me, I don't know!). Also, cognitive science is quickly developing into a fairly empirical field, and I just like seeign what Lakoff does with it. Finally, I take a materialistic approach to consciousness, and Lakoff not only embodies the mind, but also gives his theory of conceptual metaphors an evolutionary slant which I find very appealing.

It's possible that nothing he says is new in the sense that some philosopher sometime, somewhere may have said it before, but to make an analogy, the difference between the Atomism of Democritus and that of Dalton (and even more that of today) is that Democritus had no reason outside his own mind to think the way he did, while Dalton had indirect evidence from stoichiometry, and we have electron microscopes. So I do believe that there is some progress in these more intangible issues such as consciousness, and that what 300 years ago would have been a serendipitous correct statement can be today substantiated more solidly.

But I digress.

P.S. I think I would need two write at least a book review diary, like I said above, rather than continuing "this here discussion". But I have all kinds of other esoteric diary ideas, so it will have to wait for a while.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman