Almost as an aside, Ignatius makes two pertinent comments concerning Allawi.  He says: 1) that the Sunni (in Iraq, presumably) support Allawi, and 2) that the Saudis are bank-rolling his push for an appointment as essentially a martial-law Prime Minister.  Now Allawi is nominally a Shi'a, but his real religion is money and power.  Of course, this is the true nature of the regime in Saudi Arabia, however much the House of Saud may tolerate the fundamentalist Wahhabists, so they understand one another quite well.  Some western and Baghdadi Sunni do have a modicum of fondness for Allawi, because he is a sometime Ba'athist, which represents to them the period of their ascendancy.  And being on Saddam Hussein's bad side is not necessarily a demerit in this region, either.  Saddam seems little mourned, other than in Tikrit.

The CW on Allawi has been that either he and his buddies stole a lot of the money when they were heading up the pre-election show in Iraq, or that some of his bandit buddies are fronting his "reappointment" campaign - or that our administration is still supporting him via the CIA.  If the Saudis turn out to be the Sugardaddies, we can guess that they have a dog in this fight.

Beyond the Allawi campaign, there are significant realignments happening here in the second half of August.  Besides the ever-connected Clinton and Levin pronouncements (plus those of their new connectivity-wannabe, Representative Brian Baird), we have the NIE, the "ambassador" Ryan Crocker, the "liberal media", and "administration officials" - all swelling the al-Maliki-must-go chorus to a mightly crescendo.  Why?

First and foremost, the U.S. military must pacify Baghdad, as a key component of the row of permanent bases (read "forts") from the western Kurdish region to the soon-to-be-former British base in Basrah province.  The Shi'a in Baghdad must either accept subservience there, or - at  the least - move across the river to the eastern suburbs where their brethren are already concentrated. Under the rubric of neutralizing the militias, our forces in Baghdad are primarily targetting the Shi'a districts.  Until lately, al-Maliki has resisted the focus on his fellow Shi'a.  

All other reasons for his downfall are secondary, but follow from the same relationship.  Abandonment of the national project is the ulterior motive.

Another indicator of the new strategy is the $20 billion in weapons to Saudi Arabia and the related Persian Gulf regimes.  Basically, they will be responsible for their northern border (plus Kuwait) where it faces the soon-to-become Shi'a region.  In my opinion this deal will also support additional internal security forces, because al-Qaeda is becoming persona non grata in the new arrangement. Knowing al-Qaeda, they will try to wreak a little havoc in the old hometown.

The U.S. military itself will be reorganized on one side of a distinguishable line with a simple mission: Protect yourself and the people behind this line.  This defensive alignment will enhance security and will mean that troop levels can be reduced.  This will improve morale immediately, will make their mission acceptable to them again, will make rhetoric about eventual withdrawal more credible, and will allow a return to an R&R schedule that meets the nominal program of the U.S. armed services.

Such a situation also changes the debate with respect to attacks on Iran in that, once in defensive mode, any attacks are seen as Shi'a (read Iranian) provocation.  The normal - and I use the term advisedly - military reaction will be to throw missiles and bombs in the general direction from which the attack originated.  (Forget invasion - that has been nothing but a bluff for some time now.)

That's how I see the latest developments.  What do you think?