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Europe.Is.Doomed!

by Starvid Tue Jul 14th, 2009 at 03:08:52 AM EST

[Ed note: first posted Wednesday, 1 July]

Having taken a look at Wolfgang Münchau's latest scribblings, it really seems Europe is doomed. Some excerpts below.

Eurozone banking needs a co-ordinated strategy

Published: April 26

The most shocking news from last week's excellent Global Financial Stability Report from the International Monetary Fund was not the headline estimate of total bad assets. That number stands at $4,100bn (£2,800bn, €3,000bn) and will almost certainly be revised upwards. Much more shocking was that the lion's share of these assets belong to European, not North American, banks. Of the total $4,100bn, the global banking system accounts for $2,800bn. Of that, a little over half - $1,426bn - is sitting in European banks, while US banks account for only $1,050bn.

Even worse, European banks have written down much less than American ones. According to Reuters, the US and European banking and insurance sector has so far written down $740bn. More than 70 per cent of the write-downs come from the US. The eurozone's share has been an appalling 14 per cent.

[...]

I suspect that this ugly drama will play out the full five acts, in classic European style. And we are not even halfway through. Not even close.


Message: European banks are even more screwed than US banks.

Diary rescue by afew


Europe must learn from Japan's experience

Published: May 3

[...]

Otto von Bismarck said only fools would learn from their own mistakes, while he preferred to learn from the mistakes of others. We are mostly fools.

[...]

Süddeutsche Zeitung, the German newspaper, recently revealed an internal memo from Bafin, the country's banking regulator, showing the estimated scale of write-offs would be more than €800bn ($1,061bn, £712bn), about a third of Germany's annual gross domestic product. By comparison, the entire capital and reserves of its monetary and financial institutions were only €441.5bn in February. If the leaked number is true, it would mean the German financial system is broke.

[...]

All this leaves Europe with a policy mix only slightly better than Japan's in the 1990s. Yet, Europe faces an additional problem. While Japan had its crisis when the rest of the world was booming, Europe has no such luck. I see nothing in our situation or our policy response to persuade me that it will take less than a decade to get out of this.


Message: Europe is doomed, and will have an even worse decade than the Japanese lost decade.

Like a fish, Europe is rotting from the head

Published: May 10

[...]

There is a saying that the fish rots from the head, and this is exactly what has been happening here. There is nothing in European politics that stinks more than the apparent inevitability of another five-year term for José Manuel Barroso, the Portuguese president of the Commission. He spent most of the last few years on his bid for re-election rather than doing his job. If the centre-right wins the elections to the European parliament, as everybody seems to expect, nothing can stop Mr Barroso's bandwagon.

So it is not quite game, set and match yet but it is as close as it could get at this stage. This is all very depressing. Mr Schmidt is right about the ECB. Indeed the central bank made a number of good decisions last week, when it delivered a robust policy response to the crisis.

But I never thought that we would ever celebrate a central bank as the only political institution that really works in Europe. How did we get there?


Message: Europe has a worthless leader, and he will do nothing or create disasters.

Germany needs more than an accounting trick

Published: May 17

After the US, the country with the biggest banking problem is probably Germany. Last week the German cabinet adopted a bank rescue plan worth looking at in detail. If you want to know how long the European crisis will last, this might give you the answer.

[...]

Will it work?

The answer is: not in the way that has been proposed. First of all, the plan is a giant accounting trick. Under fair-value accounting, it could not possibly work because the bank would have to make a provision for future losses of the SPV. This would, of course, defeat the very purpose of the plan. It is constructed in the same spirit as some of the more eccentric debt securities.

[...]

The more I think about it, the more I am reminded of Japan. But this might be unfair to the Japanese. They solved the problem eventually. If we freeze our toxic securities for 20 years, a Japanese-style lost decade will soon come to be regarded as the optimistic scenario.


Message: Europe is worse off than the US and it is worse than Japan, and Europeans are still in denial of the fact that there is even a problem.

Timing is everything

Published: June 2

[...]

Ms Merkel, who has persistently underestimated the extent of this crisis, has reached the inevitable point where complacency gives way to panic. She is presiding over one of the world's sickest banking sectors. German economic growth will shrink by some 5-6 per cent of gross domestic product this year. And even now, Germany's policy establishment is frightened about rising budget deficits and inflation.

On a recent visit to Berlin, I heard everyone talking about fiscal exit strategies as early as this autumn. Policymakers are visibly panicking over the relatively small increase in the budget deficit. Judging by her comments, Ms Merkel is a fully paid-up subscriber of those who blame the infidel, inflation-loving, Anglo-Saxon monetary economy establishment for everything that has gone wrong.

[...]

The woman who has championed the "chacun pour soi" approach to economic crisis management, tells the world that she is now open to global macroeconomic policy co-ordination, as long as it serves her narrow domestic interests. The approach lacks credibility. I guess the most likely scenario now is for a period of damaging transatlantic policy divergence.


Message: Europe, led by an irrational Germany, is panicking and flailing uselessly, damaging both itself and the world.

Down and out for the long term in Germany

Published: June 7

Let me attempt, perhaps foolhardily, to map out a scenario of how the global economic crisis could evolve in continental Europe.

Even if we assume a recovery elsewhere, Europe's economy may be stuck at low growth for some time. To understand why, it is perhaps best to look at sectoral balances for households, companies and the public sector.

[...]

If my predictions prove correct, Germany will be down and out for a long time with a huge and still unresolved banking crisis, an overshooting exchange rate and lower net exports, presided over by politicians who panic about domestic inflation. This will not end well.


Message: Germany (and Europe) is doooooomed!

Optimism is not enough for a global recovery

Published: June 14

[...]

As the recession continues, the number of personal and corporate insolvencies will rise, which in turn will aggravate the problems of the banking sector. I am not surprised that the Bundesbank's Mr Weber resists the publication of stress tests for the banking system. It would show that the German banking system was insolvent - and that bad and potentially bad assets were equivalent to about one-third of gross domestic product.

The only potentially good news in the past three months has been the receding threat of a currency crisis in central and eastern Europe. But I am not even sure that this is for real. The persistent refusal by eurozone policymakers to concede fast-track euro accession for central and eastern member states could yet prove destabilising.

Last week, the ECB had to provide €3bn in euro liquidity to Sweden's Riksbank, in the absence of which Sweden may have experienced its second banking meltdown in less than two decades. The inevitable collapse of Latvia will have ripple effects on the Baltic region and may cause panic among investors in other central and east European countries.

[...]


Message: The economy is really bad, there is no such thing as green shoots (we knew that already), all German banks are bust, Swedish banks are bust(! weird that no one noticed that thing back here), the EU is irrationally denying the euro to central and eastern Europe.

Berlin weaves a deficit hair-shirt for us all

Published: June 21

A decision was taken recently in Berlin to introduce a balanced-budget law in the German constitution. It was a hugely important decision. It may not have received due attention outside Germany given the flood of other economic and financial news. From 2016, it will be illegal for the federal government to run a deficit of more than 0.35 per cent of gross domestic product. From 2020, the federal states will not be allowed to run any deficit at all. Unlike Europe's stability and growth pact, which was first circumvented, later softened and then ignored, this unilateral constitutional law will stick. I would expect that for the next 20 or 30 years, deficit reduction will be the first, second and third priority of German economic policy.

[...]

I can foresee two outcomes. First, Germany might end up in a procyclical downward spiral of debt reduction and low growth. In that case, the constitutionally prescribed pursuit of a balanced budget would require ever greater budgetary cuts to compensate for a loss of tax revenues.

[...]

Either of those scenarios, even the positive one, is going to be hugely damaging to the eurozone. In the first case, the German economy would become a structural basket case, and would drag down the rest of Europe for a generation. In the second case, economic and political tensions inside the eurozone are going to become unbearable. Over the past 25 years, France has more or less followed Germany's lead at every turn, but I suspect this may be a turn too far. Deficit reduction has not been, nor will it be, a priority for Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president. On the contrary: he has listened to bad advice from French economists who told him that budget deficits are irrelevant, and that he should focus only on structural reforms. Budget deficits and debt levels matter in a monetary union. But a zero level of debt is neither necessary nor desirable.

[...]

While the balanced budget law is economically illiterate, it is also universally popular. Average Germans do not primarily regard debt in terms of its economic meaning, but as a moral issue. Der Spiegel, the German news magazine, had an intriguing report last week on the country's young generation. One of the protagonists in its story was a young woman who had borrowed a little money to set up her own company. The company turned out to be a success, and she had began to repay the loan. And yet she said she had not felt proud of having taken on debt.

This general level of debt-aversion is bizarre. Many ordinary Germans regard debt as morally objectionable, even if it is put to proper use. They see the financial crisis primarily as a moral crisis of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. The balanced budget constitutional law is therefore not about economics. It is a moral crusade, and it is the last thing, Germany, the eurozone and the world need right now.


Message: The Germans are really fucking irrational and still run on a toxic mix of protestantism and fear of shadows from the 30's. This will either fuck up Germany for a generation or break the Eurozone.

Germany and France need to sing in tune

Published: June 28

I never expected a message of austerity to emerge from the Palace of Versailles, where Nicolas Sarkozy, France's president, spoke last week to outline his economic strategy for the rest of his term. He left no doubt that he is not prepared to follow Angela Merkel, Germany's chancellor, in the direction of a balanced budget. Instead, he distinguished between "good" and "bad" government deficits, went on to explain that a good deficit is cyclical, a bad deficit structural, and then produced yet another category: a temporary deficit that would be brought down through higher economic growth in the future.

[...]

In fact, it could prove highly destabilising to the eurozone. Germany, as I argued last week, is heading in the direction of a zero level of government debt in the long run as a consequence of a new constitutional balanced-budget law. It is perhaps not intuitive that a balanced budget, pursued indefinitely, would eventually lead to a complete eradication of public debt. But this is what will happen.

[...]

They will not repeat the same mistake, but they will still be facing a problem. If Germany's national debt converges towards zero, Germany's surplus savers will have to invest huge amounts of their savings outside the country, since the supply of German government bonds will diminish over time as the outstanding stock of debt is depleted.

Now this is where Mr Sarkozy's bad deficits come in. Most German savers, especially pension funds, will want to invest in euro-denominated government debt, which, for practical purposes in this scenario, means French debt, because no other domestic European bond market is sufficiently large and mature. As a result France may enjoy a version of America's exorbitant privilege.

[...]

For the sustainability of the euro, you surely do not want to get into a position where a large member state has a rational economic reason to quit. So if Germany and France really do what they both promise, you may as well start the egg timer.


Message: The German protestant-idiots will send all their savings to France, become impoverished and bring down the Euro.

:: ::

I might add that I have not cherrypicked the articles. These are all his recent articles, bar one. Do we find a common theme? Are things really as bad as Münchau makes them out to be, and is Europe really in a uniquely bad situation? Or is Münchau for some reason somewhat slanted?

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Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 04:02:37 AM EST
I believe more or less the only thing rotten in Germany are the banks. This is not necessary a big problem. Their domestic markets are fine. It becomes problem only if government puts these debts on to tax payers. It is a political, not an economic problem.
by kjr63 on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 04:40:33 AM EST
and the only reason for that is that the EU forced the deregulation of the Landesbanks to cut off their source of cheap funding. With suddenly higher borrowing costs, they needed to invest in activities with higher remunerations, and they jumped massively into the markets for "structured products"

Dumb, dumb, dumb.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 05:51:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So let me get this straight...

  1. Despite not being the leaders of the "Anglo-Disease", European, and especially German banks managed to get themselves into even more trouble than the relatively more deregulated US banks.

  2. The response of European and especially the German Government has been even more opaque than the US - i.e. brush everything under the carpet.

  3. Despite this extraordinary political culpability the response of European electorates has been to move steadily the the Right to reward the economic and political elites which caused these problems

  4. Unlike the US which has moved to the left and re-discovered Keynesian solutions to the economic problems arising, the German response has been to adopt a Friedmanite aversion to public expenditure/debt.

  5.  In so doing, Germany risks creating a Japanese style decade of recession if not a US style Great Depression.

  6. Ergo, European political/economic culture is decades behind the US.

Did I miss something....?

4.  Unlike

notes from no w here

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 07:28:12 AM EST
  1. German banks were obstacles to the spread of the Anglo disease, so their destruction was part of the game plan;

  2. I still don't think the problem is bigger in Europe. European banks (especially German ones) have indeed bought bad assets and will suffer losses on these, but their core business (retail and local business) is still basically sound, as they do not have to deal with any local debt bubble (the jury is still out on Spanish banks there, but they seem to have been quite tightly regulated, and to have tried t odiversify away from the Spanish bubble early enough). So they should survive the second wave of the crisis better;

  3. The European right, like the Democrats (who have pretty close ideas to the Euroepan right on economics) has moved leftwards to some extent, even if in ways we don't really like;

  4. The fundamental problem has been too much debt. Focusing on reducing debt is the right solution in the medium and long term, even if it means short term pain. What matters in the meantime is how what is available is redistributed, but it is pretty much inevitable that the pie will shrink

  5. We need to have that discussion of the "Japanese lost decade", but it seems to have been lost for financial investors rather than for the population. Is that really a bad thing?

  6. Not sure what "behind" means anymore...


In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 08:32:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Jerome a Paris:
German banks were obstacles to the spread of the Anglo disease, so their destruction was part of the game plan;

Sounds a bit conspiracy theoryish.  Surely they adopted the anglo disease when  they started investing in dodgy US derivatives?

See also:
How the ECB's fig leaf has completely withered away | Anatole Kaletsky: Economic view - Times Online

However, if we look at the facts, the transatlantic difference is less clear. In fact, the ECB is printing money even faster than the Fed is.  It is also supporting fiscal policy more explicitly through debt monetisation and taking much bigger risks with its credibility and solvency. The first point is illustrated in the chart. Since mid-2007, central banks have expanded their total liabilities (the broadest definition of what it means to print money in the modern world) by $1.2 trillion in the US and by $1.5 trilllion in euroland. Given that GDP is 12 per cent bigger in the US than in the eurozone, this means that the ECB's printing presses have actually been running 50 per cent faster than the Fed's.



notes from no w here
by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 10:16:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Surely they adopted the anglo disease when  they started investing in dodgy US derivatives?

I agree to that; then again, they could do so after some loosening of rules. (Where the looseners of rules might have been dupes seduced by the Anglo finance propagandists themselves.)

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 10:30:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Adding for further clarity: let's not forget the global asymmetry. The system 'worked' due to a constant net flow of capital from the rest of the world to the USA (and the City of London). The stupid investments of the Landesbanken was beneficial for the imperial centre.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 10:33:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The Landesbanken had access to cheap funding thanks to their public status, and could lend to German companies at low rates.

Investment banks could not compete with such rates and could not sell bonds and other products to German companies. So they got the Landesbank public status to be labelled as unfair competition, and to be dismantled.

Thus the Landesbanken could no longer loan cheaply, as their own funding cost increased, and they then lost markets to investment banks. Forced to go look for other sources of income, they went to invest their (more expensive) money into riskier stuff.

Thus, to open German markets to investment banks (mostly US and mostly based in London), a cheap and reliable source of funding for the German economy was eliminated.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 12:37:56 PM EST
[ Parent ]
So the irony is - the Landesbanks lost their public status - where the state was the ultimate guarantor and risk bearer - and had to compete on an "open" market.  Whereupon they aped the investment banks and engaged in riskier behaviour - only with less skill - and got caught holding the junk when the music stopped.  Then the state had to step in anyway to bail them out because a functioning banking sector is essential to the economy.  So the state ended up taking on greater (US) liabilities than if it had simply continued to underwrite German market risk. It seems that Globalisation is something of a one way street where the imperial power is never the loser...

notes from no w here
by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 03:10:11 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It seems that Globalisation is something of a one way street where the imperial power is never the loser...

Bingo.  But what exactly is the imperial power?  I would submit that in the US it is not in DC.

As for Jerome's conspiracy, don't dismiss it too quickly.  Consider, the Landesbank deregulation came well after the first rounds of UK deregulation under Dame Maggie had failed to produce the advertised results and Garn-St. Germain had utterly destroyed the US thrift industry, and it was contemporaneous with the greatest cave-in to libertarian speculative finance theory ever, namely Gramm-Leach-Bliley (There were a few of us at the time who warned what would happen, but most of us were hicks from the US Midwest, so what did we know?).  Now that all of those theories have generated nothing but epic fail and the destruction of local sources of capital for the benefit of major banking houses, we know that the Austro-Chicago "brain trust" that sold this snake oil was in fact shilling for the Ueberklass.  I doubt there was a unified conspiracy of Dan Brownian proportions, but there were a lot of people who all belonged to the same country clubs and who were all working toward the same goal, namely controlling as much of the money supply as possible to the detriment of those of us who didn't belong to those country clubs.

As for the condition of the European banks, I honestly don't see how they can be worse off than the US banks, given the latter remain wholly addicted to the various forms of fraudulent financing they've ginned up over the last quarter-century.

by rifek on Sat Jul 4th, 2009 at 10:56:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But there is a world of difference between printing money to buy sovereign debt at face value and printing money to buy ShitpileTM at face value.

The former is supporting sovereign fiscal deficits, which may or may not be a good idea depending on circumstances. The latter is bailing out the people who used to hold the ShitpileTM at the expense of the full faith and credit of your currency. I am not sure I can see any possible scenario in which that is a good idea.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 12:44:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Quite. As the evidence says, the increase in central bank liabilities is a small fraction of one year's GDP, and is certainly in line with the credit-money that's been destroyed in the process of deleveraging ...

... the risk is on the asset side.

If the assets are sovereign debt, they can certainly be used to drain reserves out of the system again should the finance sector (unexpectedly) get back on its feet. It is a straightforward technical operation that central banks worked out long ago.

If the "assets" are notional valuations of chickenshit that could only be sold at a fraction of their book value, and which, indeed, the Central Bank dare not sale in order to avoid pressure to value them closer to market value ... then there is the possibility that normal monetary policy will run down their genuine income generating assets and facing a trade-off between pursuit of monetary policy and sacrifice of policy independence, if they have to go cap in hand to the fiscal authority for funding of the central banking system itself.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sun Jul 12th, 2009 at 01:58:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]
If the "assets" are notional valuations of chickenshit that could only be sold at a fraction of their book value, and which, indeed, the Central Bank dare not sale in order to avoid pressure to value them closer to market value ... then there is the possibility that normal monetary policy will run down their genuine income generating assets and facing a trade-off between pursuit of monetary policy and sacrifice of policy independence, if they have to go cap in hand to the fiscal authority for funding of the central banking system itself.

Interestingly, this is the exact situation Bernanke's Fed finds itself in.  This is why Ron Paul has 250 co-sponsors for a House bill to audit the Fed.  But the big US banks, whose creature the Fed is and for whom the Fed is the chief shill, probably have enough Senators on retainer to prevent legislation from reaching Obama, who would almost certainly veto it, (else he would long ago have fired Giethner.)

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Jul 13th, 2009 at 12:03:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
... is after the recession is over and it is time to drain reserves from the system.

Just as the damage to the financial sector done by the bubble is realized when the bubble pops, the damage presently being done to the Fed balance sheets during the recession will be realized when the recession passes.

Which could of course be one to four years from now.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Jul 13th, 2009 at 10:42:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... Continental finance sectors, banks carry a larger share of the finance sector.

However, (2) and (4) seem valid, nonetheless. The EU seems largely trying to ride out the recession on the back of stronger automatic stabilizers, which in the face of a downturn this severe is a recipe for a long period of economic stagnation.

(6) Does not necessarily follow ... if the US has moved more dramatically, it also had previously moved much more dramatically backwards towards a Gilded Age economy, and of course the actual policy action of $250b stimulus per year for three years is a fairly tepid thing as a GT Keynesian response to the current downturn, while the creation of a trillion or more in debt to keep money center banks living in the style to which they have become accustomed seems like it could be spent far more effectively.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 06:14:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
And even the Swedish social model is dead, so they say:

... it was Sweden's homemade financial meltdown of the 1990s that finally killed off the dream. Poverty was added to the pessimism. Savage cuts hit schools, unemployment rocketed, the krona sank - leaving the social system in a disarray from which it has not recovered. The conservative government at the time has lately been praised worldwide for its handling of the crisis. Actually the bankers were rewarded, not punished, while the rest of the country is still reeling from the cuts, selloffs and dashed dreams the crisis provoked.

Bring back the Czech presidency, quick!

by das monde on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 03:59:50 PM EST
Moody's Investors Service has issued its annual report on the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB or Bank). The eight members of the Aaa/ Prime 1-rated international financial institution are the five Nordic nations and the three Baltic countries. The Bank's capital and loan exposures are roughly proportional to the size of the member economies, with 96% of the capital contributed by the four Aaa-rated Nordics: Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway. "NIB's top ratings reflect its exceptionally strong creditworthiness, based on a track record of nearly unblemished asset quality, prudent financial management, healthy capital adequacy, and strong liquidity," said Kristin Lindow, Senior Vice President in Moody's.

That was then....

You can't be me, I'm taken

by Sven Triloqvist on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 04:15:10 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I call BS. So, they cut the milk from the school lunches and we had to make do with water for a while. Boo-fucking-hoo, certainly not the end of the welfare state.

And our banking crisis was managed in an exemplary way, except they didn't put draconian enough legislation in place to stop future excesses.

Calling our government "conservative" is, well, I guess it's just the British way of saying "right-wing". Our government is to the left of Brown, and certainly of Blair.

This guy puts me in mind of some crazy old marxist who has become disillusioned, turned to neoliberalism and started to hate the idealised old model which couldn't meet his sky-high fantasy expectations. He has probably never even been to Sweden.

For example, the following are just outrageously blatant lies:

Take healthcare. Swedes do not enjoy free public care: it costs to see a GP. That is, if you manage to see one. Queues are long and scandals rack the system. Psychiatric care, the source of many such scandals, has a near-medieval penchant for authoritarianism with few European equivalents. People are locked up for months for not taking medicine, given no therapy, and spat out of the system into despair and destitution. The mentally ill die in wards and in outpatient isolation. And they do not even have charities to turn to because state-run healthcare is supposed to work: this is Sweden, after all.


Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Thu Jul 2nd, 2009 at 02:54:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]
BS indeed, though the wait for free dental treatment in Finland is getting longer ;-)

You can't be me, I'm taken
by Sven Triloqvist on Thu Jul 2nd, 2009 at 04:02:19 AM EST
[ Parent ]


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