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Peak Coal: the Olduvai perspective

by Luis de Sousa Wed Jan 12th, 2011 at 07:17:27 AM EST

Peak Coal. Some folks have begun eagerly researching this topic and writing about its timing, now that talk of Peak Oil is all around. The different outlooks on how and when the peak will occur are disparate, ranging from next year to a time many decades in the future. This post tries to view this debate in a different, wider perspective, and deals with the following issues:


  • Applying the Hubbert Method to Coal;

  • Looking at Ultimate Reserves for Coal;

  • Coal and its place in the Olduvai picture;

  • Implications for stakeholders;

This post is largely a follow up to Dave Summers' Future  Coal Supplies: More, Not Less!

from the diaries - Nomad


Pre scriptum: This is a cross post from TheOilDrum. Within days of preparing this post, Dave Rutledge updated his report on ultimate coal extraction using Logit and Probit transforms rather than Hubbert Linearization. I have yet to become familiar with this method, and, although Rutledge reaches essentially the same results as previously, the remarks made here shouldn't be directly applied to his update.

Introduction

Lately there has been a mild, but growing, level of hype about the coming epoch of peak world coal extraction. As with any other non-renewable resource, the amount of coal consumed every year by mankind can't grow forever. A day will come when growth will stop and a terminal decline sets in; the only question is when. Authors such as Patzek and Croft have been hasty to predict the timing of peak coal as almost immediate. As with many other things, imminent events draw wider attention than more distant ones.

Dave Rutledge might have been the first to produce such a forecast, with the conclusion that coal extraction will come to a peak in 15 years. Kjell Aleklett's research group reached the conclusion that an all-time maximum would occur in about 10 years. But by bringing the peak forward to 2011, Tad Patzek drew the attention of, and gained the honour of coverage by a magazine the caliber of National Geographic. What is common to all these forecasts is that they all derive an ultimate reserve figure which is well below the numbers quoted in official statistics (about 900 Gtoe), and that's where the controversy starts.

Applying the Hubbert Method to Coal

One thing which is generally common to these short term predictions for peak coal is that they incorrectly use the Hubbert Method. The process popularized at The Oil Drum as Hubbert Linearisation, whereby a logistic curve is adjusted to past production in the P/Q vs. Q plane, is but one step of this method and is not intended to determine reserves by itself (P is annual production, Q is cumulative production). As explained by Kenneth Deffeyes in his book Beyond Oil, the linearisation process must be applied to exploratory drilling and discovery volumes before being applied to production. Prior to the production phase, a clearer idea about the ultimate reserve size must be developed, for there's no guarantee that a logistic curve applies, even in the case of oil.

What the discovery linearisation process does is something a bit more refined than simply providing a more accurate figure for ultimate reserves. It actually provides a picture of the production build-up signal that precedes the logistic capital signal that Ugo Bardi explained in bridging oil production to the Lotka-Volterra population model. With crude oil, the production signal matches the accumulation of resources prior to extraction, mainly the reserve itself, but also includes the investment of human expertise and the development and use of equipment. The capital signal can be seen as the usefulness obtained by society from the oil extracted. Reconstructing the discovery signal provides at least a proxy for this productive capacity accumulation that must precede the capital build up.






The Mind sized Hubbert model of resource depletion. Click for Ugo's article.

In the case of coal the production signal cannot be easily reproduced. The identification of reserves has been very widespread both in time and in space, since it occurred as the Industrial Revolution progressed. Secondly the emergence of oil as a considerably more convenient fuel, because of its energy density and liquid properties, produced a non-negligible substitution process, especially in the transport sector. In more recent years, coal, which had been displaced by oil in boilers and furnaces, has in its turn started replacing oil in electricity generation. Assuming that the Lotka-Volterra production signal for coal followed a regular logistic curve seems, at the least, debatable. Those eager to apply the Hubbert Linearisation process to coal extraction must first justify, with evidence, that the logistic production development model justifies this approach.

Looking at Ultimate Reserves for Coal

An alternative way to apply the logistic curve is the one performed by Jean Laherrère. Instead of directly adjusting a logistic curve to conform to past production, Jean tries first to get a picture of the ultimate reserve by consulting available databases. After reaching a solid figure (today 700 Gtoe), he then produces a logistic curve obeying that reserve value and finds the best fit to past production. The magical step in this approach is assuming that coal production will henceforth  follow an orderly, unconstrained logistically predicted path. Though this method is still open to criticism, since the geological knowledge may be incomplete, this is a much more sensible approach. Given the impact of the impending oil decline, a flat out bell shaped extraction forecast may not be that far from reality.

The famous coal report produced by the Energy Watch Group (EWG) was to a large extent based on the use of a similar technique, although applied at a regional level. But it also produced an ultimate reserve estimate that was somewhat below official figures.

And this is the base of Dave Summers' critique: the direct application of curve fitting methods to past production will likely neglect reserves that are not present in accounting books, simply because productive resources haven't yet been gathered to bring them online (e.g. Botswana). In other cases it's the change in productive reserves to impractical resources that may have been caused by a non-geological decrease in reserves (because of politics or cost), as in his home country of Scotland. The best of these examples may well be Mozambique, a country that is expected to become the second-largest world coal exporter within the decade [Google translation here]. Consulting a publicly available resource data base such as BP's annual statistical review, will reveal that the word Mozambique doesn't even appear, nor its resources; thus the reserve volumes may be something that the non-Portuguese speaking media is largely unaware of (for the uninformed Mozambique was a Portuguese colony, gaining independence in 1975).

But there's also the other side of the coin: extraction of coal has frequently been impacted by state subsidies. In some regions of the world, not only has coal extraction not been abandoned, but it has been provided with additional resources to continue production. Perhaps the most striking of these is the case of Germany, a state that is presently spending 2 000 million euros per year on its coal industry. That translates into 42 €/ton, and these are direct money deliveries, not feed-in tariffs such as those made available for renewable energy industries.

In essence, there's a big question mark on ultimate coal reserves.

Coal and its place in the Olduvai picture

This debate can, however, be put under a completely different perspective if considered at the light of the Olduvai Gorge Theory. World fossil fuels consumption per capita crossed over 9 boe/capita/annum in 1970 and since then has remained on a bumpy plateau; with marginal exceptions, this variable has since bounded between 9 and 10 boe/cap/a, reaching almost exactly 10 boe/cap/a in 2009. Richard Duncan postulated in 1989 that this plateau would end in the not too distant future; and in the referenced 2008 assessment fossil fuel levels per capita were forecast not to rise above 10.5 boe/cap/a, beginning a decline after 2020 that would slash that figure by 50% by 2050.

The 2008 assessment was performed using the EWG coal forecast, but even if coal is indeed not as scarce as Dave Rutledge, Kjell Aleklett et al.  claim, for how long can the Olduvai Plateau last? Turning this question around, how much coal is needed to maintain this plateau until 2050? Or to 2100?






The Olduvai fossil fuel outlook with coal filling the gap up to 2100 for a constant consumption of 10.5 boe/cap/a.

This graph provides the first step towards answering the question. To give a sense of proportion, this scenario can be compared with that used in the 2008 Olduvai assessment.






Energy Watch Group's Coal forecast used in the 2008 Olduvai assessment compared to the constant 10.5 boe/cap/a scenario.

For a constant fossil fuel/capita scenario to be sustained over those time intervals, world coal extraction would need to double in the next 25 years and reach triple the levels of today by 2050. By the century's end extraction would need to be over 10.5 Gtoe/a. To put this in perspective, it would have to provide almost 3 times the primary energy levels provided today by oil.

After having made these considerations, the role of reserves can finally be assessed. The next graph shows cumulative extraction volumes required, based on the above constant fossil fuel per capita scenario.






Cumulative world coal extraction to match the constant 10.5 boe/cap/a scenario.

The size of the needed Ultimate Reserve can be inferred from this graph; assuming a roughly symmetrical extraction profile, it can be computed by multiplying by 2 the commutative figures at the time when the Olduvai Plateau ends. Extending the plateau to 2050 will require an Ultimate Reserve that would have to be over 800 Gtoe; to reach 2070 it would have to be nearly 1300 Gtoe; a reserve value of 2000 Gtoe is reached before 2100.

Implications for Stakeholders

What stakeholders should take home from this discussion is that coal will not  be able to replace the other fossil fuels. Whether extraction peaks in 2011 or in 2050, the probabilities of coal on its own being able to help the world avoid the Olduvai cliff are slim at best. Certainly, this fossil fuel can still become more relevant as a fuel in some regions of the world. This can occur in the US for instance, if reported reserves are anywhere near a geological reality. In such places, coal can provide time for a smoother transition to a fully renewable energy paradigm, but on a global scale, the panorama is entirely different.

Especially for states or nations that are net importers today but do not possess realistic reserve perspectives, the use of coal is more a thing of the past than of the future. Coal will continue to be an indigenous energy source par excellence, not only for its lower energy density when compared to oil (which makes transport difficult) but also because of its narrow international market, which is less than 10% of all coal consumed globally. Voracious demand from China (the consumer of 50% of the world's annual extraction, at about 3 times the levels used in the US) and India (a consumer of 8% of world use, which is about the same as the EU) promises to quench this frail market. But that's another story.

Acknowledgment

I'd like to thank Dave Summers, Arthur Berman and Kristin for helping out with the english.

Related posts at TheOilDrum:

Future Coal Supplies - More, Not Less!

The Coal Question: Revisited

The Chinese Coal Monster

Display:
The link provided for The Olduvai Gorge Theory did not work for me. Here is a link to Wiki that describes what I presume you intend.

Your graphs show what the required coal production would be, which requirement is of questionable feasibility. Has anyone tried applying the Jean Laherrère method of estimation to the known data for world coal reserves, or is that too explosive a subject for a mere mortal to attempt?  

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Jan 11th, 2011 at 12:43:41 AM EST
Dave Rutledge of Cal Tech estimated 680Gt of available reserve, if I read him correctly. Is that the total he used when estimating a peak in 15 years?

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Jan 11th, 2011 at 01:00:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Dave Rutledge's latest figure is around 720 Gt, or 510 Gtoe, and it is that number that's associated with the coal peak forecast for 2025.

luis_de_sousa@mastodon.social
by Luis de Sousa (luis[dot]de[dot]sousa[at]protonmail[dot]ch) on Tue Jan 11th, 2011 at 04:57:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]
[ET Moderation Technology™]

I've corrected the Olduvai link in Luis's diary.

This is the right one.

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Tue Jan 11th, 2011 at 01:41:43 AM EST
[ Parent ]
by Luis de Sousa (luis[dot]de[dot]sousa[at]protonmail[dot]ch) on Tue Jan 11th, 2011 at 04:49:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Jean's method is quite simple, on mathematical terms it is a simple curve fitting process. The magic is getting the correct ultimate reserves figure to do it.

luis_de_sousa@mastodon.social
by Luis de Sousa (luis[dot]de[dot]sousa[at]protonmail[dot]ch) on Tue Jan 11th, 2011 at 04:58:47 AM EST
[ Parent ]
... cost of using coal to "ease the transition", the premise in:
This can occur in the US for instance, if reported reserves are anywhere near a geological reality.
... seems highly unlikely. The tendency to include as reserves amounts within reserves that are not recoverable under current technology ~ which of course facilitates financing operations ~ means that as exploitation continues, the share of unexploitable reserves in the total inexorably increases.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Jan 11th, 2011 at 10:57:43 AM EST
I don't understand why these curves have a nice symmetrical shape. For a commodity that is hard to replace, why wouldn't the price rise as necessary to support increased production, skewing the curve to the right? I would expect a much sharper drop-off as the ultimate supplies are exhausted...
by asdf on Wed Jan 12th, 2011 at 10:47:41 PM EST
For oil there are physical limits to how hard you can pump without damaging the reservoir (and even if you're willing to pay for faster recovery with lower ultimately recoverable reserves there's still limits). I'd suspect that the same is true for natural gas, but that's an infrastructure business more than an extraction business, so the economics might be different. And for coal, you have to dig your way to it before you can get it out - and if the other coal is in the way, then you can't extract in parallel. Add up a large number of independent extraction points that all behave like this and you'll almost certainly get something that looks like a bell curve.

So while the post-peak drop might be expected to be steeper than the ramp-up, using a roughly symmetric profile as a low-order approximation is not completely silly.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Jan 12th, 2011 at 11:03:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm not so sure about that. The initial ramp-up of production depends on a completely different set of economic and technical considerations than the failure of the system. I can see why either one of them might have a normal distribution, but I can't see why the steepness of the curves would be the same.

For the case of coal, until you can't get more shovels onto the working face, increasing production should be pretty straightforward. Is coal production really limited by access to the face?

by asdf on Thu Jan 13th, 2011 at 07:52:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Is coal production really limited by access to the face?

Not necessarily - the focus on extraction in this discussion overlooks UCG - underground coal gasification. Check it out here, here, or here.

by yacker on Fri Jan 21st, 2011 at 08:57:24 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Are you taking into account the User Cost of lost capital gains in the face of steadily rising prices?

Given an expectation of steadily rising prices, the expected future value of the resource puts a limit on how much capital it makes sense to invest per ton extracted per unit time.

We ignore that particular User Cost if we assume stable prices, or if the expectation of price increases are beyond the blue event horizon ~ that is, driven to negligible values by discounting ~ but we can't ignore it if we assume steadily increasing prices over the medium term.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sat Jan 15th, 2011 at 03:19:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
No, I was thinking of it from the consumer side, where the demand is pretty inflexible. That could push the future value way up...
by asdf on Sun Jan 16th, 2011 at 12:22:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Increasing the intensity of exploitation requires investing more money per ton to get it out, and the rate of return on investing more money per turn has to include the hit against the capital gains that would have occurred if the coal was exploited more slowly, at the most capital efficient rate.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sun Jan 16th, 2011 at 01:17:10 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Also, coal has more ready substitutes than oil, and therefore has a harder price ceiling where demand destruction starts to kick in.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Jan 16th, 2011 at 08:48:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]
There are several aspects to this question:

  1. Exhaustion - it is set be declining EROEI, money has nothing to do it. Remember that paper currencies are purely abstract without any physical link to the economy; any sort of resources/reserves assessment based on such concept is bound to failure.

  2. Curves - for a 3 parameter curve, the Hubbert curve is the one that best fits data from regions that already reached peak production, either Oil or Coal. You can throw more parameters at it but you can rapidly fall into over-fitting; the Hubbert curve is a sort of one-size-fits-all when it comes to resource depletion. Dave Rutledge and Adam Brandt are two authors that have extensive work on the matter.

  3. Skewness - in fact historical data points to some skewness in oil depletion profiles, but exactly in the opposite sense that you (and most economists) suggest, with a sharp rise and slow decline. As with the Hubbert curve, this is another growth process we find in Nature, modelled with the Gompertz curve.


luis_de_sousa@mastodon.social
by Luis de Sousa (luis[dot]de[dot]sousa[at]protonmail[dot]ch) on Tue Jan 18th, 2011 at 09:55:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]
This is silly. Mostly because "constant fossile fuels per capita" is not going to happen. Energy demand per capita will, globally, go up by a factor of at least 4 over this time horizon, which would tend to drive things upwards very badly, but on the other side of the equation, coal is going to be the first fossile fuel to be phased out entirely, because it is trivially and directly replaceable by non-fossile energy sources.

Primarily, nuclear, and over the timehorizon that graph covers, the only realistic projections are either a total transition to fission based electricity production or an electricity source as clean and significantly cheaper.
- because economics of are very, very compelling -

 In the first world, reactors are quite costly, but the first world tends to care about externalities and the (health) cost savings of shutting down coal more than cover the extra costs of building EPR's or similarily goldplated designs in place of coal fired capacity.

In the rising asian economies, nuclear is, quite simply, cheaper than coal which means that they will all switch to it as fast as they can build the industrial base to do so. - All of these places are now net importers of coal, and no matter how I look at the numbers I cannot see world-market price coal compete with electricity produced in nuke plants as cheap as those Korea, India and China are building.

by Thomas on Fri Jan 14th, 2011 at 07:46:01 PM EST
I think the point of the "constant fossile fuels per capita" graph was exactly to make the point that even maintaining the energy use we have today from fossil fuels is highly problematic. You make an interesting point about the reasonableness of including fission energy in this modeling process. India and China both are moving towards deployment of fission reactors. But that just brings in another mineral extraction logistics curve -- which most certainly should be done. It will be interesting to see how long before uranium ores will be substantially exhausted under various curves of utilization.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sat Jan 15th, 2011 at 10:51:52 PM EST
[ Parent ]
A factor that will complicate the calculation of uranium ore depletion is that fossil deposits are relatively concentrated, while uranium is all over the place.
by asdf on Sun Jan 16th, 2011 at 12:25:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The upper limit on the use of nuclear fission for power is not resource scarcity - fast breeders could feed any reasonably imaginable level of global energy consumption without any mining at all for well upwards of a century (burning depleted uranium and nuclear waste stockpiles) rather, the actual limit on fission expansion is the size of the supply chain as the core of a reactor needs engineering to OCD levels not easily sourced from general industry.
by Thomas on Wed Jan 19th, 2011 at 02:29:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
At the moment, fast breeders are experimental. Are they going to arrive on the commercial scene before or after hot fusion?

Besides, the real operational constraint today is proliferation risk (real, perceived and pretended).

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Jan 19th, 2011 at 04:50:38 AM EST
[ Parent ]
eh, the russians are already selling the AP800 design on a commercial basis, and as the predecessor was the most reliable reactor in Russia and the AP800 is a very modest modification to that it is certainly going to work.  Scepticism on this point is thus somewhat unconvincing.

Now, lots of people would, at the present time, very strongly object to buying, fresh-of-the-design-table russian fast breeder tech, but what this diary is predicting is the exaustion of coal reserves in a few decades. In that context - with lots of politicians looking down the buisness end of a pitchfork if they do not keep the electricity flowing somehow said political opposition would last about 3 minutes. Same goes for any and all proliferation concerns.  The important thing to realise is that human beings without access to electricity have a lifeexpectancy multiple decades shorter than human beings with an operational grid.
And people know this in their bones, even if they do not think about it much. What this means is that no obstacle not written into the very laws of nature will be permitted to keep the juice from flowing. If the lights are going out, the planning process for reactors will take minutes instead of years, and greenpeace picketers will be summarily shot.

by Thomas on Wed Jan 19th, 2011 at 11:03:41 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm not talking about proliferation risks as perceived by the locals. I'm talking about proliferation risks as perceived by the countries that possess the engineering and institutional expertise to build the things.

It's all well and good that the locals in Sierra Leone want nuclear reactors, but if the Americans tell them "no can do" then they don't get nuclear reactors. Because the Americans can put a naval blockade between the them and their reactors, and there's fuck all anybody is gonna do about that.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Jan 19th, 2011 at 02:44:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... "Iran".
Also, not particularily relevant in a global perspective - the great powers might refuse to supply particularily obnoxtious states, but a general embargo on nuclear tech? They would instantly be accused of engaging in economic warfare (by denying the industries of other nations a viable primary energy supply) and told to fuck off. In fact, trying this on a scale remotely large enough to impact global energy perspectives would  guarantee completely runaway nuclear weapons proliferation as it would amount to tearing up the NPT and piss off every single non-weapons state badly enough that they would suddenly want a nuclear deterrent.  In other words, not going to happen, because it would require the entire security council to suffer complete brain failure at the same time.
by Thomas on Wed Jan 19th, 2011 at 05:54:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, Iran. Iran can take all the shit the Americans are throwing at them because they are already a serious regional power with a firm grasp some real estate that the Americans really can't afford shooting up. Also, they could quite possibly kill a naval blockade dead if they wanted to.

But all the shit the Americans are giving Iran is a powerful disincentive for any other emerging power to seek nuclear technology (nevermind third-world backwaters).

the great powers might refuse to supply particularily obnoxtious states, but a general embargo on nuclear tech?

No, of course not. Just as there is today no general embargo on nuclear tech. Just on breeder tech, and on genuine tech transfer.

As in "you can have the power plant, and we'll provide some engineers to run it and sell you the fuel - but we won't train any of your engineers, and we won't let you make the fuel itself." Essentially the deal Iran was offered. Of course, if you're enough of a toady, then you can get a better deal. And if you've got domestic educational, industrial and resource capacity to develop the technology yourself, you'll get a better deal too. But it's still political constraints that matter, not what engineers can do if direct the full force of modern industrial society towards solving the problem.

They would instantly be accused of engaging in economic warfare

And this would be news because? This has been a (voiced and valid) criticism of the great powers' conduct since (before) India won independence from the British Empire. There is nothing magical that trade wars over electricity will accomplish that could not be accomplished by trade wars over food and potable water. And we've already had those.

In fact, trying this on a scale remotely large enough to impact global energy perspectives would  guarantee completely runaway nuclear weapons proliferation as it would amount to tearing up the NPT and piss off every single non-weapons state badly enough that they would suddenly want a nuclear deterrent.

And best of luck to them trying to get one.

Seriously. Give everybody an ICBM and twenty kiloton and the world would probably be a better place.

But they won't get a nuclear deterrent - to simply maintain an independent nuclear deterrent, you have to be at least a third-tier regional power like Iran or France. To develop it, you have to be a first- or second-tier global power.

Obviously, China, India, the EU, the US and Russia already covers about half the world's population and around three quarters of the world economy. And all them are already nuclear powers, so proliferation will not be a political concern (it will be a real problem, of course, but that's not what we're talking about here). Add Turkey, Pakistan, Brazil and Iran, who either have nukes or can make them if they put their minds to it, and you get another half billion people or so, and significant chunk of the economic activity not in the big five.

Gonna suck hard to live in sub-Saharan Africa or Central Asia, though.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Jan 19th, 2011 at 07:33:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]
JakeS:

And best of luck to them trying to get one.

Seriously. Give everybody an ICBM and twenty kiloton and the world would probably be a better place.

But they won't get a nuclear deterrent - to simply maintain an independent nuclear deterrent, you have to be at least a third-tier regional power like Iran or France. To develop it, you have to be a first- or second-tier global power.

When Sweden

  • was on top three GDP/capita in the world
  • already had nuclear tech
  • had a big, untrusted neighbour with nuclear bombs
  • had a military that wanted nuclear bombs
  • prioritised military spending and development of weapons

It was still to expensive to get and upheld a nuclear deterrent. So yeah.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
by A swedish kind of death on Thu Jan 20th, 2011 at 07:21:57 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The lights will not go out for important people. Did you miss California's rolling blackouts?

The market will provide, and those not provided by the market are not deserving of electricity anyway. Just like today people will be shut off for not paying their bills, and just like today it will be blamed on their individual misfortune.

I do not see why hitting peak coal would snap our politicians form freemarket-mode back to industrial planning. Hitting peak oil appears to have had little effect in that regard, it is rationing at the pump that is the dominating feature.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Thu Jan 20th, 2011 at 07:31:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
well, that logic might hold if the bulk of electricity and energy use was residential. Which it is not. Industry is the main customer, and when industry screams politicians listen. Or are replaced by people who will listen.
by Thomas on Sat Jan 22nd, 2011 at 02:57:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But the bulk of the political power is held by finance and industry is so 20th Century. Besides, most of it has been transferred to China.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sat Jan 22nd, 2011 at 04:31:37 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Yet none of the commentary about the problems of nuclear power plants obviates the necessity of computing the available nuclear power into the mix of available power sources over the next 90 years. But I would be interested in a discussion of how long fission power plants could be run without relying on breeder reactor generated fuel and how long breeder reactors could be run on available feed stocks.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Thu Jan 20th, 2011 at 11:06:58 PM EST
Hmm.. this rather depends on your assumptions for energy use per capita and global population, but conventional lwrs taken to this scale run into.. issues. let me demonstrate:

I am going to assume the successful industrialization of most of the world leading to a global average energy consumption of 10000 watt (this is somewhat conservative over a 90 year time frame, tough very high for the early part. oh well.) per capita, and that global population will peak and stabilize at 9 billion. This means we need  90 terawatts worth of reactors, or 54000 EPR's. ... ookaaay then. An economy the size this consumption implies can certainly afford them.

The EPR lists maximum burnup as 65 GWd/tU, at 90 terawatts globally, this works out to half a million tonnes of enriched uranium burned /year, or about 4 million tonnes of natural uranium/year.  This would burn through all conventional uranium reserves in a couple of years and would burn through the oceanic uranium reserves in less than 500 years, and would be massively disruptive to marine ecosystems in the process.. This is patently not the most reasonable plan.

Same base assumptions but with fast breeders: Ultimately a one gigawatt fast breeder converts one tonne of uranium to fission products per year, so the consumption is very easy to calculate: 90000 tonnes of U per year. Global stockpiles of depleted uranium are currently over 1.5 million tonnes which would suffice for this (immensely energy hungry!) world for a period of 16 years. Conventional uranium reserves would last a few centuries and oceanic uranium several hundred thousand years, at which point we might have to start mining really bad deposits (breeders make the energy return on investment of mining an average chunk of the earths crust strongly positive.. )

by Thomas on Sat Jan 22nd, 2011 at 03:28:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
If you're going to do that, you might as well use Thorium as fuel. And given the size of the industry and the economic pressures, the necessary research and development would be done in a couple of decades.

Keynesianism is intellectually hard, as evidenced by the inability of many trained economists to get it - Paul Krugman
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Jan 22nd, 2011 at 04:02:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Thorium deployment on this scale would almost certainly need fast breeders to supply the plutonium for initial fuel loading in any case, as while thorium breeders do have a positive breeding ratio, said ratio tends to be rather low, so if you are building reactors by the thousands the only way to do it is to kick them off with a thorium/pu loadout.
There is, in other words, a really good reason the indians are so heavily invested in fast breeder tech, despite a long term commitment to a thorium cycle.

- high breeding ratio fast breeders can also be used to keep the existing fleet of LWRS operating by supplying them with mixed oxides fuel and taking their waste as fuel, which given the likely lifespan of current lwr build is going to be fairly important.

by Thomas on Sat Jan 22nd, 2011 at 05:26:26 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Thanks for the scenario-estimate.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sat Jan 22nd, 2011 at 04:36:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]
do note that this calculation is based on a world of total electrification. those 10kw continious per head cover all energy use, transport, heating, industry,  very extensive recycling of all raw materials ect, which is why it works out so high. I make these assumption because it is the only way I see to make the future a both a worthwhile place to live in and ecologically responsible.- and it is why I am so often skeptical of the classically "green" solutions people pose to climate change. I wiev their potential as several orders of magnitude to small to adress the problem that needs solving - Clean and cheap electricity is the bedrock upon which all other solutions to enviormental problems rest, which means we need vast amounts of it. to the tune of those 90 terawatts.
by Thomas on Sun Jan 23rd, 2011 at 09:33:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
This will have to be demonstrated to be safe and cost effective in emerging economies, which is no foregone conclusion.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sun Jan 23rd, 2011 at 10:42:26 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Designs proof against the "operator who was hired because he is the cousin of the interior minister" problem are a major focus of the export oriented nuclear industries - the indians have the passively safe advanced heavy water reactor design they are working on, the russians have the whole deal where they park a barge off your coast line and operate the damm thing themselves, and heck, France appears to be working that angle too, only they plan to sink it to the bottom of the sea (which is a neat solution to weather and most security issues.. hard to picket or otherwise mess with a reactor which is 7 km offshore and 90 meters down..) the Japanese and the US are both working on small and wholly automated/passive designs intended for a return-to-seller-for-refueling model.
by Thomas on Sun Jan 23rd, 2011 at 01:22:52 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I have seen articles, one I believe in Scientific American, about such "modular reactors". But I don't know to what point actual practice has arrived and how much design life experience exists on these designs.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sun Jan 23rd, 2011 at 01:38:11 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The russian barge programme is live- construction of first one currently ongoing, and they are taking orders for more. That design is tested- basically, all they did was take the reactors they use on their icebreakers and hook them up to generators. The french plan is based on the reactors  developed for their nuclear fleet, again well tested in operation, but currently appears to be at the stage of somebody in the french military industrial complex going "Say, I looked at the production cost of these nuclear reactor units we are selling to the navy, and if we could break into the civilian market we might make a few billion", so I am hesitant to put a date on it.
 The logic of both programmes is that shipyard work is far more like a factory process than construction is, so you can gain the economic advantages of mass production - consistent quality and lower costs - by building your powerplants as ships rather than as buildings.

The small modular reactors are an attempt to scale power reactors down to the point where they can fit in a shipping container and construct them in actual factories. - None of these designs have significant operating experience at all, as they are all new. - the japanese, however, appear to be actively looking for customers.

by Thomas on Sun Jan 23rd, 2011 at 03:32:31 PM EST
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