Sat Apr 14th, 2018 at 07:33:20 PM EST
6 November 2017, I did write.
The headline topic "Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online" is pretext to secure far more ranging cooperation from these publishers to police "user content", eg. number of cell text message responses to a posted solicitation, and legal identity of "users", eg. "beneficial owner of a (shell) corporation". In general, Democratic Party members were preoccupied with instances of suspected Russian "meddling and interference" such as false voter instructions; Republican Party members were skeptical of witnesses' claims in terms of operating capacities and technical expertise to avoid first amendment violations.
Approximately five months later comes news of US gov, Department of Homeland Security, request for proposals from private-sector firms to undertake surveillance of "social media communications," or "Media Monitoring Services," on behalf of US gov [1
to monitor traditional news sources as well as social media, identify any and all media coverage related to the Department of Homeland Security or a particular event. Services shall provide media comparison tools, design and rebranding tools, communication tools, and the ability to identify top media influencers.
The US federal government is preparing a secret list of individual domestic and foreign suspects (persons of interest) committing "influence" with a telecommunications device. One could characterized this project as "democratizing" a state's police apparatus.
The agency's requirements list for an applicant's consideration is formidable and precisely directed to configuring database reporting capabilities to the preferences of "users" employed in the obscure National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) of DHS and its subdivisions. These are the Office of the Under Secretary (OUS), the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C), the Office of infrastructure Protection (IP), the Federal Protective Service (FPS), the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) and the Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA).
One may note analogous, historical attempts by nation-state ray-geems to secure the obedience of constituents to legitimate public enterprise. None of that portends successful condition of freedom from arbitrary prosecution by the state, which is paradoxically us.