Green wave: a new political power?

I have mentioned the string of cities won by the Greens (EELV), including some of the largest ones like Lyon or Bordeaux. Even though, these successes are often limited to some big cities and not necessarily to the larger metropolitan areas which have their own councils, it sill show a dramatic shift in political power. For decades, the paradigm was that the Greens had to ally with the mainstream PS as a junior partner in a municipal coalition. But then, when "serious" decisions had to be taken, say for new industrial or commercial development, the PS majority would have its way, overruling environmental objections. Only in a handful of cases would the PS support a Green candidate rather than running one themselves, mainly to counter a possible right wing win.

It all started changing during the 2014 elections, when the Greens led by Eric Piolle ran against the PS for the second round in Grenoble and won a majority at the city hall; Piolle was re-elected this year. In many cities won by EELV, the PS was actually present as a junior partner in the coalition. There are still many cities won by the PS with support from EELV, like Lille or Paris, but the signs are unmistakable: the Greens are becoming a political force to reckon with.

Will it translate into national level at the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in 2022? This is still a long shot, but with the COVID pandemic and the unprecedented heat wave and drought hitting the country this summer, people are not going to forget so easily.

The same trend has been observed in other European countries like Ireland and of course Germany, where Die Grünen have been a powerful presence for a long time at the local level - there is even speculation that when Merkel eventually leaves next year, the future GroKo might very well be CDU-Grünen rather than the usual CDU-SPD.

PS and LR: Diluted but stable overall

The mainstream right party Les Républicains (LR) and the Parti Socialiste (PS) have long been parties with a strong presence at the local governments level; this year was no exception, but it can noted that most candidates were not displaying any party affiliation at all and were referred to by the media as "Miscellaneous Right" or "Miscellaneous Left". They manage to retain a large part of their footprint and hold back any significant implantation of the Macronistas (LREM). However, both parties still lack any obvious candidate to oppose Macron's re-election bid in 2022, which explains some of the Macron's strategy for the next two years, as we'll see later.

Extreme right: On the backfoot

The extreme right RN was expecting some big gains, in the wake of growing unpopularity of Macron policies - highlighted by protests like the Gilets Jaunes. Overall, they total number of seats and number of cities where they are present have been halved with respect to 2014, despite the win of Perpignan, the main city of French Catalonia. In addition, Robert Ménard, who is not part of the RN party but still extreme right, has been re-elected in Beziers. The RN itself has seen a lot of infighting recently: Marine Le Pen removed several members of the national bureau last month. Not to mention the various financial scandals involving Le Pen and the RN structures.

Still, even if the RN footprint has shrunk somehow over the past years, it has also solidified: many RN mayors in medium size towns have been re-elected easily, starting with Hénin-Beaumont in the north, which Le Pen wants to showcase as a "window front" for the RN municipal administrations.

Internal warfare within extreme right parties is not exclusive to France: in Italy, the famous Salvini has lost a lot of credibility and political capital by first denying the magnitude of the COVID crisis and then changing his tune on face masks. His Lega party is running the Lombardy region, the worst hit by the virus, and the governor is being investigated for fraud over medical supplies. Similarly in Germany, the AfD is also engaging into internal infighting between the national leadership and the AfD leader in the state of Brandenburg.

Macron: right turn for 2022

How did Macron and his LREM party react to these elections? Macron was already focusing on one thing and one thing only: running for re-election in 2022. Back in 2017, Macron won the election on being a "centrist", somewhere between the main parties of left and right. Since then, of course, he has appointed a right wing PM and has started policies to dismantle workers protections, weaken retirement plans, defund the public hospitals and of course, tax breaks for the rich. His authoritarian traits were visible before: police has been sent out to break up the major rallies organized by the unions or the grassroots Gilets Jaunes, often violently: dozens of people have lost an eye or were severely injured.

Since the elections, Macron has been doubling down on his rightward turn: his new PM is also coming from the right, but Jean Castex is a rather low key politician; there is no doubt as to is running the show. And what a show: three years ago, Macron announced that equality between men and women would be the 'grand national cause' of his term in office. His first cabinet was 50% female, although most women were in junior positions. A law against 'street harassment' was passed, a first in Europe.

Fast forward to July 2020:

Gérald Darmanin is appointed Minister of the Interior, in charge of the police, even though he is himself under criminal investigation for rape .

Éric Dupond-Moretti, a famous criminal defense lawyer is appointed Minister of Justice, even though he has been an outspoken opponent of the street harassment law and the #MeToo movement.

On top of that, a group of women working in the Macron staff at the Élysée Palace has been complaining publicly of sexist behavior and jibes from their male colleagues (and often boss), a group of thirty and forty-something nicknamed 'the Mormons', for their uniform white shirts and dark ties. The main offender, Marc Guillaume, who was chief of staff at the Élysée, has just been promoted prefect of the Île-de-France region.

Despite a swarm of protests from women rights activists, the government (and 'Jupiter') has dismissed the issues, invoking the 'presumed innocent' principle for Darmanin.

A river in Egypt

In other areas too, the right turn of Macron policies is palpable, starting with denial: denial of any 'propriety issue' of appointing a man under rape investigation by the police to lead said police. In the wake of the BLM movement, there have been calls to remove statues of the main actors of slave trade and colonization, like Colbert, Galliéni, Faidherbe or Lyautey. Macron, who in 2017 famously called the French colonization 'a crime against humanity', was adamant: "France will not erase any traces or any figures from our history".

Same denial about police brutality: the government has pushed back against this very notion: Darmanin said there's no such thing as 'police brutality' ("violences policières"), because the use of violence by the police is 'legitimate'. Macron and the government don't want to antagonize the police unions who steadfastly refuse to acknowledge any issue with excessive force.

This strategy from Macron is of course deliberate: Macron reportedly believes that the left is too fragmented to unite and provide a meaningful opposition for the 2022 presidential election, so he's moving to occupy the LR right wing "law and order" territory, betting that the next election will pit him again with Marine Le Pen in the second round. Will it go as planned? This is less than certain.