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NWO of Greed and War, Avoid Peace

by Oui Sat Jun 22nd, 2024 at 06:59:45 PM EST

The West's success to spread the lies of war and ridicule any peace effort. Destroy the socialists, destroy the "Left"... destroy offenders who breach the war narrative.

Key word @EuroTrib | Indoctrination |

The forever false comparison to the "Chamberlain Effect"...

"The Chamberlain Effect": When did World War Two really begin? | Radio Prague International - 2009 |

The 70th anniversary of the outbreak of World War Two this week will pass almost unnoticed in the Czech Republic. The reason is simple. For Czechs and Slovaks the tragedy did not begin with the invasion of Poland, but a full year earlier. With the Munich Agreement of September 1938, Britain, France and Italy gave Hitler the green light to annex huge tracts of Czechoslovakia and less than six months later, Nazi troops marched into what was left of the Czech lands unopposed. So how did Hitler get away with bringing a determined and well-defended democratic country under the sway of the swastika, while Czechoslovakia's allies stood by?

The British historian and politician, David Faber, has tried to answer this question in his book, Munich: The 1938 Appeasement Crisis, which focuses above all on the role of the British political establishment, in particular Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.

Many of the key protagonists kept diaries, wrote their own memoirs subsequently, and it was really a bit like a jigsaw, piecing together all the individual quotes and the individual moments and times when things were happening. Very often I found that having looked at an event that had happened in London and an event that had happened in Prague or in Berlin, or even in Rome, and that these two things had happened at roughly the same time. So I was able to put people's speech side by side, as to what they'd been thinking in the different capitals of Europe at the time."

The view of the Munich Crisis from the perspective of the Czech Republic is very much that Britain let down Czechoslovakia, almost as if it were a foregone conclusion. From your book I think you get a rather more nuanced picture of what was going on politically, that it maybe even needn't have happened that way.

"The ultimate result was that Czechoslovakia was let down. And I think in the end, both in the immediate aftermath of Munich and of course in March the following year in 1939, there was no doubt that Czechoslovakia had been let down by Britain - and also by France of course, in many ways a closer ally of hers at the time. But I agree with you that none of the politicians really set out to do that. This wasn't a deliberate policy. I think Chamberlain's weaknesses were that he was a very arrogant and a very vain man, and I think that once he had set himself on a particular course, he decided that he was right and he really wouldn't brook any confrontation with anyone close to him. And his vanity led him to believe, especially after his meetings with Hitler, that he was in some way getting the better of Hitler, whereas, in fact, the exact opposite was the case."

And it seems amazing, when you read contemporary sources, that many people in Europe, including in Germany itself, really did think that Chamberlain had got the better of Hitler, didn't they?

"They did, and of course in the immediate aftermath of the Munich Crisis, albeit only for a few days or weeks, Chamberlain was perceived as a great hero in London, as indeed Daladier the French prime minister was in Paris. They were perceived as having pulled of a great coup, albeit at the expense of the hapless Czechs. But that didn't last very long.

"I think that there was a twofold sense that things had not gone right. First was that I think the British people woke up to the fact that this was, from a purely selfish point of view, unlikely to postpone war for ever. Of course, one of the most important things to recognize is that, however much he may have been lauded later for postponing war and enabling the Allies to be better prepared for the Second World War, that was not the intention of Chamberlain and the people immediately around him. His intention, as he proudly boasted when he came back from Munich, was to achieve peace for all time, and he firmly believed that he had achieved peace.

"The second thing was that the British people in particular, and I think the French also, did recognize and I think felt a strong sense of guilt on behalf of the Czechs, and there was a great outpouring of support for Czechoslovakia in the months after the Munich crisis.


One of the very interesting issues in connection with the Munich debate is that there is no consensus internationally and there is certainly no consensus in Britain about Neville Chamberlain's decision to appease Hitler. To this day there is quite a strong body of thought, and there have been books written about it, arguing that Chamberlain was doing the right thing, that he was gaining time, that appeasing Hitler in 1938 made Britain stronger in the run up to the Second World War. In a sense, in writing about Neville Chamberlain's role in a very negative way, you could be accused by people in your own party of fouling your own nest. He was a Conservative politician and there are still many Conservatives who would sympathise with his decision then.

"Funnily enough, I'm not sure that the issue of support for Chamberlain necessarily divides along party lines. I think that the Conservatives as a party are not particularly enamoured of Neville Chamberlain when they look back. He gets a very bad press by and large from conservative (with a small "c") writers and observers. But you're quite right that his reputation has suffered ups and downs over the past 60 or 70 years. In immediate aftermath of the Second World War he was really vilified in Britain. Then in the 1970s a lot of the government papers relating to this period were released and a number of historians at the time took the opportunity to write pro-Chamberlain works along the lines that he was actually quite perspicacious in looking ahead and in appeasing Hitler, and that he did buy us time. For instance, the first Spitfires that fought in the Battle of Britain only rolled out of the factories just in time for the Battle of Britain in 1940, and, had we had to go to war in 1938 over Czechoslovakia, we would have been ill-prepared. I think that nowadays there are fewer historians who are prepared to take that line.

"I have taken a line in my book that Chamberlain was at fault, but I have based that not so much on his political decisions. What I found very difficult to sympathise with, reading his letters and in particular his own contemporary narrative of the period, was that he did believe really much too firmly in his own ability and in his own political credibility. He used to use this expression called "the Chamberlain effect". He really believed that he had some kind of momentous effect on everyone he met, including Hitler, and he was badly mistaken in that. He ran an extraordinarily undemocratic government, and indeed the decisions at the time of the Munich crisis were taken by a very small group of people, all of whom had signed up to and were utterly committed to his own political line."

The Rise and Fall of the Nazi War Machine | Warographics |

War Machines: The Failure of German Mechanization in WWII

"Hitler's generals, raised on the dogma of Clausewitz and Moltke, could not understand that war is won in the factory." -- Joseph Stalin, 1949.

The development of mechanized fighting forces as a key element of modern warfare underwent a major transition during World War 2, as determined by the numbers of motor vehicles and armored fighting vehicles (AFV) built and engaged. Mechanized capabilities were determined based on industry, leadership, and the quality and types of vehicles and AFVs, along with the capabilities of a nation's people.

While the German army was well organized and efficient, it was not the war machine it could have been. While an innovative and outstanding force early in the war her enemies made improvements, using hard won time to make changes and apply what they had learned, while flaws in the German war machine became more apparent.

 A basic weakness of the German war machine could be found in the German population. Although they could produce excellent machines and products, Germany lacked a large populous that was sufficiently technically advanced.

There were also problems in manufacturing. The German automobile industry found itself unable to produce the wheeled vehicles needed to support mechanized forces.

The outbreak of fighting quickly magnified deficiencies. Shortages of trucks were experienced as early as the Polish campaign. After the defeat of France a number of French army vehicles were pressed into service in order to provide for the expansion in the number of panzer and motorized divisions. Despite this, as the German army entered Russia it continued to be dependent on horse-drawn wagons and carts. Only eighteen percent of German divisions were fully mechanized in 1940-41.

Appeasement’s Taint Is All in Hindsight | NY Times – 25 May 2008 |

In an era when much of the 20th century’s lexicon of geopolitical stock phrases — Iron Curtain, “collaborator,” “enemy within” — has lost the power to stir passions, the last 10 days have proven once again that cries of “appeasement” still resonate.

“Some seem to believe we should negotiate with terrorists and radicals,” President Bush said before the Israeli Parliament. “We have an obligation to call this what it is — the false comfort of appeasement.”

The White House claimed publicly that the reference was to those — including Jimmy Carter — who had met with Hamas, but an administration official acknowledged to reporters that the remarks were meant as a swipe at the probable Democratic presidential nominee, Barack Obama, who has proposed meeting autocratic world leaders “without preconditions.”

John McCain seconded both the president’s use of the word appeasement and Mr. Bush’s warning about displaying weakness to enemies. “Yes, there have been appeasers in the past, and the president is exactly right, and one of them is Neville Chamberlain,” Mr. McCain said, referring to the British prime minister who met with Hitler in Munich and ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to the Nazis. Mr. Obama responded in short order, arguing that it was in fact Mr. Bush’s policies, supported by Mr. McCain, that had made the United States weaker and its adversaries (in particular Iran) stronger.

Lost in what was widely seen as the opening salvo of the fall campaign was an understanding of what appeasement actually meant 70 years ago.

To appease, according to one concise dictionary definition, is “to yield or concede to belligerent demands, sometimes at the expense of justice or other principles.” Recent debates on the subject generally consist of one side claiming that an appeased enemy is an empowered enemy, as proved to be the case with Hitler. Winston Churchill’s famous remark that England had been “offered a choice between war and shame” and by choosing shame would get war, too, is only the most eloquent expression of what has become a maxim of international diplomacy.

In 2003, for instance, publications like The Weekly Standard editorialized that those opposed to military action in Iraq represented an “axis of appeasement.” Indeed, the only current arguments over the “lessons of Munich” concern whether those lessons have been misapplied to conflicts like those in Vietnam and Iraq, where the enemy was arguably not as dangerous as policymakers believed. Practical considerations aside, no one disputes the idea that accommodating the world’s worst dictators or terrorist groups is bad policy.

This might have come as a surprise to Chamberlain and much of his Conservative Party, who proudly referred to themselves as appeasers throughout the 1930s. “The path which leads to appeasement is long and bristles with obstacles,” Chamberlain said before Parliament after returning from Munich. “Now that we have got past” the question of Czechoslovakia, he said, “I feel that it may be possible to make further progress along the road to sanity.” Chamberlain was using the word “sanity” in the same way foreign policy hands today use the word “realism.” In other words, appeasement was not about weakness or pacifism or an unwillingness to confront danger; rather, it was a cold-hearted, realist strategy that saw negotiation with Hitler as the best way to ensure the survival of the British Empire.

Appeasing Hitler: Chamberlain, Churchill and the Road to War

War propaganda was the most effective tool during World War II ...

As it is today: NATO Stoltenberg/Rutte Gun-ho to Fight Russia

Many predicted Nato expansion would lead to war. Those warnings were ignored | The Guardian - 28 Feb 2022 |

In his memoir, Duty, Robert M Gates, who served as secretary of defense in the administrations of both George W Bush and Barack Obama, stated his belief that “the relationship with Russia had been badly mismanaged after [George HW] Bush left office in 1993”. Among other missteps, “US agreements with the Romanian and Bulgarian governments to rotate troops through bases in those countries was a needless provocation.” In an implicit rebuke to the younger Bush, Gates asserted that “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into Nato was truly overreaching”. That move, he contended, was a case of “recklessly ignoring what the Russians considered their own vital national interests”.

The following year, the Kremlin demonstrated that its discontent with Nato’s continuing incursions into Russia’s security zone had moved beyond verbal objections. Moscow exploited a foolish provocation by Georgia’s pro‐ western government to launch a military offensive that brought Russian troops to the outskirts of the capital. Thereafter, Russia permanently detached two secessionist‐ minded Georgian regions and put them under effective Russian control.

Western (especially US) leaders continued to blow through red warning light after a red warning light, however. The Obama administration’s shockingly arrogant meddling in Ukraine’s internal political affairs in 2013 and 2014 to help demonstrators overthrow Ukraine’s elected, pro‐ Russia president was the single most brazen provocation, and it caused tensions to spike. Moscow immediately responded by seizing and annexing Crimea, and a new cold war was underway with a vengeance.

Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War | Townhall Meeting National Constitution Center |

Additional reading ...

West and Dutch Cheating On the Holocaust

Nonsense to compare Chamberlain of 1939 and so-called appeasement failed to stop the advance of Nazi Germany and Hitler's strategy of Lebensraum - Arian people - Mein Kampf

In the West fascism is on the rise as it was in the interbellum years of the 20th century.

The Big Problem of ChatGPT: creating and believing in your own Echo Chamber

The World Wide Web connects people in ways previously impossible. But it also is an echo chamber to your thoughts; you will find what you are already looking for. You see content that appeals to you; you encounter people who think like you. All the recommendation systems try to attract you to more items or content similar to what you've already seen.

And now, we have ChatGPT and other AI tools that are tailor-made to answer your specific questions. And boy, do they answer. Anything. According to the prompt (your question), an answer will be written and tailor-made for you. It will sound wise and even add social proof validations (like links) to imaginary places. It will use the best cognitive tricks to sound just right.

But it won't go in-depth into the topic. It will not tell you that you are asking the wrong question -- no critical thinking here, just an answer that will be tailor-made for you and sound-wise. ChatGPT knows how to do it as it was trained on the World Wide Web and knows what works on the human intellect.

There is a great danger in adopting these tools and falling into a tunnel vision of your own thoughts.

What should you do? Start by reading these points:

  • Reinforcement of Beliefs: understand that recommendation systems, including social media platforms, often show you content similar to what you have already engaged with. This can lead to a feedback loop, where you are only exposed to information that aligns with your existing beliefs, further entrenching those beliefs and potentially leading to polarization.
  • Lack of Critical Thinking: When you are provided with information that consistently aligns with your beliefs or preferences, it can discourage critical thinking. You might not be prompted to question or challenge the information you receive, but you must do so.
  • [...]

#WeAreUnited  #WeAreNATO

I hate the guy ... but one can't get around this statement because it is very much the truth.

Farage defends Ukraine war remarks after backlash | BBC News |

Sunak and Starmer condemn Farage's 'disgraceful' comments on Ukraine war

Even former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer didn't pretend in a published op-ed in Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant in December 2017 ...

'NATO should not have committed to membership of Ukraine and Georgia'

And of course under George Bush - Dick Cheney war was declared on Russia at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008. The Georgia provocation and attack on South Ossetia in August 2008 was a first sign NATO was willing to risk war with Russia.

After the coup d'état of February 2014 with the Maidan Massacre and a few months later the Odessa massacre the neo-Nazi right-wing groups started hostilities against the Russian speaking population of the Donbass. A proxy for American intervention with goal to place a NATO naval base on Crimea and control the Black Sea to Georgia and Azerbaijan. Fossil fuel, oil and gas of the Caspian basin as Jerome a Paris so eloquently covered in the past.

Sabotage of Minsk Agreements and failure to settle disagreements 2014-2022


'Sapere aude'
by Oui (Oui) on Sun Jun 23rd, 2024 at 07:02:22 AM EST

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