In Israel, those in the know saw the situation as a real crisis, as a former high-level science adviser, Prof. Yuval Ne'eman, told one of us (Avner Cohen) 25 years ago. Ne'eman recalled that Eshkol, Ben-Gurion's successor, and his associates saw Kennedy as presenting Israel with a real ultimatum. There was even one senior Israeli official, Ne'eman told me, the former Israel Air Force commander Maj. Gen. (res.) Dan Tolkowsky who seriously entertained the fear that Kennedy might send U.S. airborne troops to Dimona, the home of Israel's nuclear complex.

What was at stake was the future of Israel's nuclear program. Kennedy, with an exceptionally strong commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, was determined to do all he could to prevent Israel from producing nuclear weapons. Ben-Gurion (and later Eshkol) were equally determined to complete the Dimona project. For them, nuclear capability was an indispensable insurance policy against existential threats to Israel. The exchange between the American president and the two prime ministers illustrates both Kennedy's tenacity and the Israeli leaders' recalcitrance.

[...]

Weeks later, in early March (1963), Kent Sherman, director of the Office of National Estimates, which prepared the NIEs, signed an intelligence estimate detailing the grave consequences of Israeli nuclearization. "Israel's policy toward its neighbors would become more rather than less tough ... it would ... seek to exploit the psychological advantages of its nuclear capability to intimidate the Arabs and to prevent them from making trouble on the frontiers." Furthermore, in dealing with the United States, Israel "would use all means in its command to persuade [it] to acquiesce in and even to support, its possession of nuclear capability."

On March 25, 1963, President Kennedy and CIA Director John A. McCone discussed the Israeli nuclear program. According to McCone, Kennedy raised the "question of Israel acquiring nuclear capability," and McCone provided Kennedy with Kent's estimate of the anticipated negative consequences of Israeli nuclearization.

Kennedy Warned Israeli Leaders in 1963 That U.S. "Commitment and Support" Could be "Seriously Jeopardized" Absent Inspection of Dimona Reactor

U.S. Intelligence Estimated That by Mid-1960s Dimona Could Produce Enough Plutonium For "One or Two Weapons A Year"

During 1963, President John F. Kennedy was preoccupied with issues such as Vietnam, the nuclear test ban negotiations, civil rights protests, and Cuba. It is less well known, however, that one of his most abiding concerns was whether and how fast Israel was seeking a nuclear weapons capability and what the U.S. should do about it.

Beginning in April 1963, Kennedy insisted that the Israeli leadership accept regular bi-annual U.S. inspections, or in diplomatic language, "visits," of Israel's nuclear complex at Dimona in the Negev Desert.

Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and his successor, Levi Eshkol, tried to evade and avoid inspections, but Kennedy applied unprecedented pressure, informing them bluntly, in a near ultimatum tone, that Washington's "commitment to and support of Israel "could be "seriously jeopardized" if it was thought that the U.S. government could not obtain "reliable information" on the Dimona reactor and Israel's nuclear intentions.

President Kennedy meeting with French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville (to Kennedy's right) and Ambassador Hervé Alphand (on the sofa), 25 May 1963.  Their discussion covered the Israeli nuclear program, with Kennedy remarking, according to a translation of the French record of the meeting, that "if Israel had atomic weapons, we would be blamed equally, you for furnishing uranium, and we for the financial aid given to Israel." (photo from John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, KN-C8712)

Ben-Gurion's focus on a threat posed by the Arab Federation Proclamation vis-a-vis Kennedy's focus on the danger of the Israeli nuclear project generated a remarkably discordant exchange of letters and personal oral messages between the two leaders throughout the spring of 1963. Ben-Gurion invoked the specter of "another Holocaust," and insisted on Israel's need to receive external security guarantees. But such an arrangement was not in the cards because Kennedy believed that so clear a sign of favoritism toward Israel would undermine U.S. relations with the Arab states.

Kennedy did not budge on Dimona and he was determined not to let Ben-Gurion change the conversation. He dismissed the prime minister's alarm over the Arab Federation Proclamation as both nothing new and practically meaningless, and insisted that the real danger to the region was the introduction of advanced offensive systems, especially nuclear weapons. To address this concern Kennedy was willing to explore an arms control scheme that would cover both Israel and Egypt. It was evident, however, that his prime focus was halting the Israeli nuclear program.

The Kennedy assassination in Dallas Tx.

The Arab-Israeli Problem 1960-1963

The Arab-Israeli Problem | NIE - 23 Jan 1963 | [declassified 2019]

DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

In the Middle East

The Arab-Israeli problem has plagued the Middle East, and the great powers for fifteen years now. The fundamental attitudes of both Arabs and Israelis are still bitterly antagonistic and mutually incompatible. The Israelis believe they have a moral and historic right to the land from which the Jews were dispersed some eighteen hundred years ago and that Israel has enforced this claim by arms and by building up a modern state in what was an impoverished land. They insist that the Arabs must recognize its right to an independent existence and feel that the return of any large number of refugees would jeopardize it.

[...]

The World Stage

The role of the great powers is an important aspect of the Arab-Israel quarrel. Britain and the US have been sources of political and economic aid for Israel, and the Arabs, particularly Nasser, believe that the US would step in the save Israel if it were invaded. France has been Israel's closest collaborator among Western governments since 1954, aiding Israel with modern arms and nuclear technology and giving it close support in the attack on Egypt in 1956. West Germany has been a major source of financial aid to Israel through its restitution and reparation payments although it also has extensive commercial relations with the Arab states.

[...]

Necessary components for the atom bomb were seized through espionage by Israeli Mossad and via traitors to America.

Krytrons are sophisticated triggers for the detonation of nuclear bombs. According to Smyth, Milchan's company had pushed him hard for the krytrons and knew perfectly what they were for-even though it was illegal to export them from the U.S. without a U.S. State Department munitions license.

Opinion | Israeli Nuclear Whistleblower Vanunu, Eternal Prisoner of Zion | Haaretz - 27 Apr 2022 | (Yossi Melman)

Why did Lyndon Johnson stay silent on the Israeli murderous attack on the USS Liberty …

Staying the course of a pariah terror state with no vision for peace, just destruction of anyone or group who dared oppose the Zionist goal of Eretz Yisrael … From the River to the Sea.

A USS Liberty’s Hero’s Passing | Op-Ed by Ray McGovern - 2014 |

On June 8, 1967, the Israeli government learned that it could get away with murder, literally, and the crime would be covered up.

USS Liberty (AGTR-5) receives assistance from units of the Sixth Fleet, after she was attacked and seriously damaged by Israeli forces off the Sinai Peninsula on June 8, 1967. (Photo: Official US Navy Photograph)

Terry Halbardier, who – as a 23-year old seaman in 1967 – thwarted Israeli attempts to sink the USS Liberty, died on Aug. 11 in Visalia, California. It took the US government 42 years after the attack to recognize Halbardier’s heroism by awarding him the Silver Star, a delay explained by Washington’s determination to downplay Israeli responsibility for the 34 Americans killed and the 174 wounded.

On June 8, 1967, during the Six-Day War, the Israeli military attacked the USS Liberty, an American spy ship which had been monitoring Israeli transmissions about the conflict. Intercepted Israeli communications indicated that the goal was to sink the Liberty and leave no survivors.

Warplanes and torpedo boats had already killed 34 and wounded 174, when Halbardier slid over the Liberty’s napalm-glazed deck to jury-rig an antenna and get an SOS off to the Sixth Fleet. The Israelis intercepted the SOS and broke off the attack immediately. In effect, Halbardier prevented the massacre of all 294 onboard. Still, the infamy of the attack on the Liberty was two-fold.

[…]

Treatment Accorded the Skipper

I was present that day and I could not get out of my head the contrast between this simple, uncomplicated event and the earlier rigmarole that senior Navy officers went through to pin a richly deserved Medal of Honor on another hero of that day, the Liberty’s skipper, Captain William McGonagle.

Although badly wounded by Israeli fire on June 8, 1967, McGonagle was able to keep the bombed, torpedoed, napalmed Liberty afloat and limping toward Malta, where what was left of the bodies of the 34 crewmen killed and the 174 wounded could be attended to. Do the math: yes, killed and wounded amounted to more than two-thirds of the Liberty crew of 294.

I remembered what a naval officer involved in McGonagle’s award ceremony told one of the Liberty crew: “The government is pretty jumpy about Israel…the State Department even asked the Israeli ambassador if his government had any objections to McGonagle getting the medal.”

When McGonagle received his award, the White House (the normal venue for a Medal of Honor award) was all booked up, it seems, and President Lyndon Johnson (who would have been the usual presenter) was unavailable.

The USS Liberty picked up signals of summary executions of Egyptian POWs near El Arish in the Sinai desert by Israel’s most ethical army under leadership of Moshe Dayan and chief of staff Yitzhak Rabin.